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ABSTRACT
Essays on Supply Chain Contracting and Retail Pricing
by
Thunyarat (Bam) Amornpetchkul
An important operational decision that a seller has to make is how to price his
product under different situations. This dissertation addresses three unique pricing
problems, commonly faced by a seller in a supply chain, in a series of three essays.
The first essay considers a supplier’s problem of choosing which type of contracts to
offer to a retailer whose demand forecasts can be improved over time. It is shown that
there exist mechanisms which enable the supplier to always benefit from the retailer’s
improved demand forecasts. Such a mechanism consists of an initial contract, offered
to the retailer before she obtains improved forecasts, and a later contract (contingent
on the initial contract), offered to the retailer after she obtains improved forecasts.
The second essay investigates a retailer’s problem of choosing which form of price
promotions to offer to consumers, some of which are more inclined to increase spend-
ing when satisfied with the value of the deals. Two types of promotions are consid-
ered: i) all-unit discount, where a price reduction applies to every unit of a purchase
that meets the minimum requirement, and ii) fixed-amount discount, where the final
amount that a consumer has to pay is reduced by a predetermined discount amount if
the purchase meets the minimum requirement. It is shown that both discount schemes
x
can induce consumers to overspend. However, depending on consumer valuation of
the product, one scheme can be more profitable to the retailer than the other.
The third essay discusses a dual-channel retailer’s problem of choosing a price
differentiating policy (charging different prices for the same product sold at different
channels) and/or inventory transshipping policy (transferring inventory between the
channels) to balance available inventory and demand arriving at each channel. It is
shown that the two mechanisms have different implications on sales volume. Which
mechanism is more effective depends on the retailer’s initial inventory position. Fur-
thermore, when implemented concurrently, the benefit from price differentiation and




A fundamental question for any sellers in a supply chain is what pricing mecha-
nism to use to generate most profits from selling their products. The answer to this
question heavily depends on the nature of the businesses as well as the characteristics
of the buyers. For example, a supplier selling to a retailer who has superior informa-
tion about the end demand would benefit from a mechanism that promotes demand
information sharing. A retailer selling to customers who enjoy receiving discounts
would find it profitable to offer a price promotion that induces larger purchases. For
a retailer who operates in more than one channel, it is important to use a pricing
mechanism that helps balance available inventory and demand at each channel in
order to maximize the overall profit.
This dissertation explores seller’s problems across two different areas of a supply
chain: upstream (a supplier selling to a retailer) and downstream (a retailer selling to
customers). More precisely, the dissertation consists of three essays; one on Supply
Chain Contracting, and the other two on Retail Pricing. Each essay investigates
operational problems arising from interactions between the respective supply chain
parties as a seller or a buyer. Despite different focuses, all essays consider realistic
business situations where the seller and the buyer make decisions based on their own
benefits, and the buyer’s behavior may be influenced by her perspectives towards the
1
pricing mechanism offered by the seller.
The first essay titled “Mechanisms to Induce Buyer Forecasting: Do Suppliers
Always Benefit from Better Forecasting?” explores the effects of improved demand
information on the supplier’s and the retailer’s profitability under different types of
supply chain contracts. More specifically, three types of contracts that a supplier
(seller) can offer to a retailer (buyer) are considered: 1) a contract that is offered
before the buyer can obtain improved forecasts, 2) a contract that is offered after
the buyer has obtained improved forecasts, and 3) a contingent (dynamic) contract
where an initial contract is offered to the buyer before she obtains improved forecasts,
followed by a later contract (contingent on the initial contract) offered after improved
forecasts have been obtained. In a scenario where the supplier is certain that the
buyer can obtain more accurate forecasts over time, the contingent contract is shown
to be the most profitable mechanism for the supplier. The contingent contract also
guarantees the supplier an increasingly larger profit as the buyer’s forecast accuracy
increases. In a different scenario where the supplier is uncertain whether the buyer
can improve forecasts over time, the essay discusses how the supplier can modify
the contingent contract to screen the buyer on both her demand and forecasting
capability information. Under such a contract, the supplier’s profit increases with
the probability that the buyer is capable of improving forecast accuracy. In contrast
to the existing literature, the results from this essay show that there exist mechanisms
which enable the supplier to always benefit from better demand information.
The second essay, “Conditional Promotions and Consumer Overspending,” dis-
cusses the implications of sales promotions on consumer spending. In particular,
when a deal comes with an eligibility requirement in the form of a minimum purchase
quantity or a minimum spending, it may lead some consumers to end up buying more
than what they need just to qualify for the discount offer. This essay investigates
the effects of conditional promotions (e.g., buy 2 or more get 30% off, spend $50 or
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more get $15 off) on consumer purchase decisions and the retailer’s profitability. Two
popular types of conditional promotions are considered: i) all-unit discount, where
a price reduction applies to every unit of a purchase that meets the minimum re-
quirement, and ii) fixed-amount discount, where the final amount that a consumer
has to pay is reduced by a predetermined discount amount if the consumer’s purchase
meets the minimum requirement. The results from this essay show that both discount
schemes can induce consumers to overspend. However, consumer overspending bene-
fits the retailer only when there is a sufficiently large proportion of highly deal-prone
or high-valuation consumers in the market. Additionally, depending on the nature
of products, one discount scheme can be more profitable to the retailer than the
other. The all-unit discount outperforms the fixed-amount discount when consumers
are not willing to pay the regular price for the product; while, the fixed-amount dis-
count is more profitable than the all-unit discount when there exist consumers who
would make a purchase even without a discount. These findings suggest that adopt-
ing an appropriate type of conditional discounts can effectively improve the retailer’s
profit over what obtained through selling at the regular price or a conventional price
markdown.
The third essay, “Dynamic Pricing or Dynamic Logistics?” aims to understand
how the pricing mechanism and inventory transshipping mechanism can help improve
the retailer’s profit in a dual-channel environment. This study considers a dynamic
pricing problem of a retailer who sells a product through two channels (e.g., online and
physical store), where inventory is kept at two separate locations, dedicated for de-
mand arriving at each channel. To balance inventory and demand at each channel, the
retailer may employ a price differentiation policy and/or an inventory transshipment
policy. A price differentiation policy helps manage demand by allowing the retailer to
charge different prices for the same product sold at different channels in each period.
On the other hand, an inventory transshipment policy acts on the inventory side by
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allowing the retailer to transfer inventory between the channels when needed. This es-
say characterizes the retailer’s optimal pricing and transshipping policy, and compares
the effectiveness of the two mechanisms in improving profits. The findings show that
the optimal price differentiation policy in the current period always results in a larger
expected sales volume, compared to the optimal uniform pricing policy. On the other
hand, the optimal transshipment decision may result in a larger or smaller expected
sales. While price differentiation provides a larger profit improvement than trans-
shipment does in many situations, transshipment is shown more effective when the
retailer holds significantly less inventory at the high-margin channel. Furthermore,
when implemented concurrently, the benefit from price differentiation and inventory
transshipment mechanisms may either substitute or complement each other. The two
mechanisms can substitute each other when the retailer’s objective is to correct his
inventory position. However, when the retailer prefers to maintain the same balance
of inventory at the channels, the two mechanisms work together, complementarily.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2, 3, and 4 discuss the
first, second, and third essay, respectively. An overall conclusion of the dissertation
is provided in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 2
Mechanisms to Induce Buyer Forecasting: Do
Suppliers Always Benefit from Better Forecasting?
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we consider a supplier selling goods to a buyer under information
asymmetry and multiple forecast updates before the selling season. We assume that
the buyer, due to her proximity to the markets in which she is selling, may have more
information about demand than the supplier. Furthermore, as the selling period
approaches, the buyer may have the capability to obtain even better (more accurate)
forecasts. We focus on investigating when the buyer would have the incentive to
obtain better forecasts, and what kinds of contract offerings would allow the supplier
to benefit from the better information obtained by the buyer over the procurement
season. We are interested in how temporal changes in forecast accuracy affect whether
the supplier benefits from the buyer obtaining improved forecasts. Previous literature
has obtained contradictory results, showing that it is possible for the supplier’s profits
to decrease when buyers obtain improved demand forecasts. We note however that
these results were obtained under the assumption that the supplier and the buyer
utilize static contracts, where contract ordering takes place only once. In this essay,
we consider another type of contract which allows multiple ordering opportunities,
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and show that such mechanism can guarantee the supplier’s benefit from the buyer’s
improved demand information. More specifically, three unique contributions of this
essay are: 1) we consider dynamic (contingent) contracts and show how they can
be utilized in conjunction with forecast updates in favor of the supplier. We show
that if dynamic contracts are used effectively, then the supplier can in fact always
benefit from temporal improvements in the buyer’s forecast accuracy (in contrast to
the static case) so long as the buyer is capable of obtaining forecast updates. We
also show how dynamic contracts can be easily adapted to benefit the supplier even
when the buyer may refuse to obtain forecast updates. 2) We derive results that are
robust under many possible business situations (e.g., endogenous/exogenous retail
price with/without salvage values). And, 3) we provide analytical results regarding
the effects of the supplier’s uncertainty about the buyer’s forecasting capability on
the supplier’s and the buyer’s profit. In particular, we show that even in presence
of such uncertainty, the supplier can design a sophisticated screening contract which
allows him to benefit from more accurate demand information.
The value of a buyer’s demand forecast on supply chain profits has drawn a lot of
attention recently. It is intuitive to expect that both supplier and buyer benefit from
better demand information. However, under information asymmetry, and certain type
of contract structures, it may not be true that both parties benefit from improved
demand information. For example, Taylor (2006) showed that the supplier may prefer
to contract with the buyer before more accurate demand information is received. Most
of the other OM papers on this topic to date have focused on static contracts and single
forecast update scenarios. However, in this essay, we model an evolving information
asymmetry between a buyer and a supplier due to a second forecast update by the
buyer and introduce dynamic or contingent contracts. We show that if the supplier
has enough power to offer take-it-or-leave-it contingent contracts, and if the buyer has
capability to obtain better forecasts, then contingent contracts would always result in
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higher profits for the supplier than static contracts. Furthermore, utilizing dynamic
contracts, the supplier can always take advantage of the buyer’s improved demand
forecasting to increase his profits. We consider a simple two-period model similar
to those considered in other papers (e.g. Taylor 2006). We assume that in period
1, the buyer and the supplier have some priors on demand. We capture the initial
information asymmetry between the two parties by assuming that the buyer may have
more detailed prior information due to her proximity to the market, previous selling
experience, etc. Furthermore, the buyer may or may not have the capability to obtain
a better second forecast of demand in period 2. The supplier can produce in both
periods, but faces a higher production cost if producing in period 2 (This reflects the
higher capacity cost due to expedited production or transportation costs.). In such
situations, most of the contracts that have been considered in the literature are either
“early contracting,” where the buyer and supplier sign a contract in period 1, or “late
contracting,” where the contract takes place only after the buyer has obtained the
more refined forecast. If we limit ourselves to only these kinds of contracts, then
consistent with previous literature, there exist situations where both parties prefer to
contract with less accurate demand information. However, we show that the supplier
can offer a contingent contract, where he offers the buyer a menu of choices in period
1, and also a menu of choices in period 2 (which is a function of what was chosen
in period 1). In this case, we show that this contract always provides the supplier
with higher profits than either type of static contracts; hence, the supplier always
benefits from the forecast refinement. Although the contingent contract is not always
the most profitable for the buyer, there exist situations where the buyer also prefers
it and the contingent contract is a win-win solution for the supply chain.
As a simple example that describes the setting of this chapter, consider the fa-
mous Sport Obermeyer Ltd case (Hammond and Raman, 1994) taught in most MBA
programs. In the case, Sport Obermeyer first has an initial forecast, then has most
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of its demand uncertainty resolved at the Las Vegas trade show where it displays its
ski jackets for the new season and receives orders. However, to obtain better fore-
casts, Sport Obermeyer institutes an early-write program where it invites some of its
largest and most representative buyers to an all-expenses paid ski vacation in Aspen
a few months before the Las Vegas trade show and gauges the buyer’s reaction to
the products, receives some early orders, and uses the reactions and the early orders
to update its forecasts for the different ski jacket models. A key take-away of this
case study, as it is taught in many business schools, is to show the importance of
obtaining better demand forecasts before the final demand is revealed. Realizing the
importance of more accurate demand information, many manufacturers and retailers
update their demand forecasts multiple times in a procurement season as in the Sport
Obermeyer case. However, today many companies selling goods in the U.S. use fairly
large contract manufacturers or supply chain integrators in Asia to get their prod-
ucts manufactured. Increasingly, these suppliers have become much larger and more
powerful in their respective supply chains. Therefore, in certain product categories,
especially if the product requires advanced know-how, it is very difficult for a small
manufacturer to produce its products without using one of these large contract man-
ufacturers. As these contract manufacturers become larger and more powerful, they
are able to offer take-it-or-leave-it contracts to relatively smaller buyers. In an article
on aligning incentives in supply chains, Narayanan and Raman (2004) write “Com-
panies should explore contract-based solutions before they turn to other approaches,
because contracts are quick and easy to implement.” As the contract manufacturer
increasingly gets more power to set contractual terms, a reasonable question to ask
is whether a buyer would be willing to obtain better forecasts and share these with
the contract manufacturer. Consider a small start-up high tech company who would
probably have to contract with much more powerful contract manufacturers or supply
chain integrators or a small start-up apparel manufacturer who would have to con-
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tract with Li&Fung to get its products manufactured. Is it still true that obtaining
more detailed forecasts will benefit such a manufacturer facing a much more powerful
supplier as was the case 20 years ago?
A novel aspect of our research is that we also consider the situation where the
buyer’s capability to obtain more detailed forecasts may be unknown to the supplier.
Thus, our analysis is divided into two cases: 1) where all parties know that the buyer
is capable of obtaining more accurate forecasts, and 2) where the supplier is uncertain
of the buyer’s capability. Even a very powerful supplier that can offer take-it-or-leave-
it contracts may not be able to force all buyers to obtain more accurate forecasts. For
example, a buyer may claim that her staff does not have the technical sophistication,
the resources, or the market leads necessary to obtain more accurate forecasts than
what is available in period 1. If the supplier knows that the buyer in fact does have
such capabilities, then any refusal to obtain more accurate forecasts will lead the
supplier to update his beliefs about the demand that the buyer is facing. However,
the supplier may be truly uncertain about the buyer’s forecasting capabilities. For
example, even though Wal-Mart is very well regarded for its precision in matching
supply to demand, it struggled in estimating demand when entering the markets
in China, Brazil, and Indonesia. When even Wal-Mart struggles in forecasting in
these countries, a supplier facing a buyer that claims obtaining better forecasts is
not possible may have some uncertainty about the buyer’s forecasting capability.
Therefore, it is interesting to explore how such a supplier can offer contracts to a
buyer by screening them both for forecasting capability as well as demand type.
Our study aims to answer the following research questions:
1. Which type of contracts is most profitable for the buyer and supplier?
2. How does the buyer decide (if she is capable) whether or not to obtain more
accurate forecasts? How do the types of contracts offered by the supplier affect
this decision?
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3. How does the supplier’s knowledge of whether the buyer is capable of obtaining
better forecasts affect the kind of contracts he offers to the buyer?
These questions differentiate our work from most of the supply chain coordination
literature in that our emphasis is not on coordinating contracts, but rather, which
contract is most profitable to which party, and whether (and when) multiple forecasts
benefit the buyer or supplier. We note that the answer to question 2, which asks if
a buyer would ever suffer (or benefit) from a more accurate forecast, also depends
greatly on the supplier’s knowledge of the buyer’s capability. If the supplier knows
that the buyer is capable of obtaining more accurate forecasts, an announcement that
the buyer chooses not to obtain forecasts can lead the supplier to update his beliefs
about the buyer’s demand expectation. We take this into account and address whether
a buyer can ever decide not to obtain forecasts (because obtaining forecasts can result
in profit reduction) so long as the supplier knows the buyer has the capability to
obtain forecasts. Additionally, since the supplier may not be certain whether the
buyer indeed has the capability to obtain more detailed forecasts, we also address
how the supplier should revise his contract offerings taking into account his priors
on the buyer’s forecast capability. Thus, our main research focus is not only to see
whether the supplier and the buyer can benefit from contracting dynamically, but
also (and more importantly) to determine “when” or under “which circumstances”
the dynamic contract is implementable (both parties agree to contract), and when it
is not. This is why we analyze the buyer’s preferences for contracts which leads to
the question of whether the buyer can refuse to obtain more accurate forecasts. This
in turn leads us to analyze how the supplier would interpret this refusal when he is
sure the supplier is capable of obtaining forecast updates and when he is not.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the lit-
erature on contracting with information asymmetry and forecast updating. Section
3 introduces the model framework, and discusses the three contract choices we an-
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alyze. In Section 4, we study which of the three contract types (early static, late
static, or dynamic) the buyer and supplier prefer. We also address the question of
whether a buyer can refuse to obtain better forecasts if this refusal has signal value
to the supplier in Section 5. In Section 6, we address the case where the supplier is
uncertain about the buyer’s accurate forecast capability (or cost) and show how the
supplier can write a two-dimensional screening contract (on buyer’s second forecast
capability and demand type) to screen the buyer. We conclude with discussion and
future research directions.
2.2 Literature Review
In this essay, we study the nonlinear optimal static and contingent contracts that
can be signed before or after the buyer obtains more accurate demand forecast when
the information is asymmetric in the supply chain. We review three areas of research
that are related to the present work. Methodologically, this essay draws results from
Incentive Theory, a branch of Economics studying strategic interaction between two
parties under asymmetric information. Incentive Theory deals with both static and
dynamic screening problems. Its focus has mainly been on deriving the optimal static
screening contract for a principal who wants to optimally elicit information from a
privately informed agent, also known as an adverse selection problem. For more in-
formation on static adverse selection problems see Laffont and Martimort (2002).
Multi-period models with dynamic information structures are less understood. Fu-
denberg et al. (1990) is one of the first papers to study a dynamic principal-agent
model with an underlying stochastic process. Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) pro-
vides a good summary of the literature on dynamic principal agent models. In this
essay, we consider both static and dynamic (contingent) contracts in a single procure-
ment season. There are a number of papers in the operations management literature
that study the dynamic procurement contracts in a principal agent framework. Plam-
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beck and Zenios (2000) and Zhang and Zenios (2008) study dynamic principal agent
models and show that the models can be solved using dynamic programming. Lobel
and Xiao (2013) study the manufacturer’s problem of designing a long-term dynamic
supply contract, and show that the optimal contract takes a simple form: a menu of
wholesale prices and associated upfront payments. While these papers assume that
the principal and the agent contract repeatedly over multiple procurement seasons,
we assume that they contract only once but the contract terms may require repeated
(dynamic) interaction in a single procurement season. We are interested in modeling
the multiple forecast updates in a procurement season and identify situations where
the dynamic contracts are implementable.
The second related area is on the effect of the accuracy of the demand forecasts
on supply chain, supplier, and buyer profits. The issue of buyer’s demand forecast
accuracy on supply chain profits has drawn increasing attention. It is natural to
think that both supplier and buyer benefit from better forecasts. However, recently,
Taylor (2006), Taylor and Xiao (2010), and Miyaoka and Hausman (2008) show
that more accurate or precise forecasts are not always profitable to the supplier and
the retailer. Taylor (2006) examines the impact of information asymmetry, forecast
accuracy, and retailer sales effort on the manufacturer’s sale timing decision. He
characterizes the sales timing preference as a function of the production cost. Miyaoka
and Hausman (2008) consider the effects of having the wholesale price determined
by different parties and at different times. They present scenarios where the supplier
and the retailer are hurt or rewarded by the improved forecasts. One fundamental
difference between the present work and the earlier literature is that we investigate
when it benefits the supplier for the buyer to obtain multiple forecast updates in a
procurement season; while, the existing literature mostly focuses on the refinement of
a single demand forecast, and whether increased accuracy of this one demand forecast
benefits the supplier or the supply chain under almost exclusively static contracts.
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Additionally, we investigate the contract structures that promote or inhibit such
forecast updates such as dynamic (contingent) contracts that allows the supplier to
screen the buyer multiple times as she updates her forecast. This allows us to provide
managerial insights, which are different from what have been shown in the literature,
that temporal increases in forecast accuracy in fact can always benefit the supplier if
an appropriate mechanism is utilized.
Others who examine different aspects of information asymmetry and forecast shar-
ing in supply chains are Cachon and Lariviere (2001), Özer and Wei (2006), and
Taylor and Xiao (2009). Cachon and Lariviere (2001) focus on information asym-
metry and study forecast sharing between a manufacturer and a supplier. In their
model, the retailer offers the contract and channel coordination is achievable only
if she dictates the capacity decision. Similarly, Özer and Wei (2006) study forecast
sharing but assume that the supplier offers the contract. They consider capacity
reservation and advance purchase contracts to assure credible forecast sharing. Tay-
lor and Xiao (2009) study incentives to induce buyer forecasting with rebates and
returns contracts if the forecast update is costly. They design contracts that induce
the buyer to forecast and compare these with the contracts that do not induce fore-
casting. These papers assume a single forecast update and no uncertainty on the
buyer’s forecasting capability. Another relevant work to ours is Lariviere (2002). He
considers a supplier selling to a retailer who may be capable (incur a cheap forecast-
ing cost) or incapable (incur an expensive forecasting cost) of forecasting demand,
similar to our model in Section 6. To induce the capable retailer to forecast and
share improved demand information, the supplier employs either price-based returns
mechanisms (buy backs) or quantity-based returns mechanisms (quantity flexibility
contracts). His paper considers a single-period and single-forecast model, and focuses
on comparing the performance of the two restricted return mechanisms mostly rely-
ing on a numerical study. On the other hand, we focus on investigating the effects
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of uncertainty in the buyer’s forecasting capability and the buyer’s forecast accuracy
on the supplier’s and the buyer’s profit using a general non-linear contract. Solving
a two-dimensional screening problem, we analytically show that the supplier benefits
from the increased forecast accuracy and increased probability of facing a capable
buyer while the buyer’s profit decreases as the supplier’s prior about the capability
probability increases. Interestingly, when the capability of the buyer is uncertain and
the supplier screens both dimensions, as the forecast accuracy in period 2 improves,
buyer’s profit stays constant. For a general multidimensional screening problem, see
Rochet and Choné (1998). While the contract constraints in their multidimensional
screening problem are similar to what we consider in Section 6, they only consider a
single-period problem and their model does not involve demand forecasts.
The third related area is the optimal contract structure and timing of orders
when the demand information evolves over time. Ferguson (2003), and Ferguson
et al. (2005), study a buyer that produces and assembles components using parts
procured from the supplier. Similar to our model Ferguson et al. (2005) assumes that
the demand uncertainty is partially resolved before the buyer makes its production
decision. The buyer can commit early (before the forecast update) or later (after
the forecast update). They consider a wholesale price contract with a single type
of buyer and single production opportunity. Iyer and Bergen (1997) study how the
retailer’s and the manufacturer’s profits change when the retailer orders before or
after a demand forecast update. Gurnani and Tang (1999) study a two-period model
where the buyer updates his demand forecast in period 2 and can place orders in both
periods. Assuming the unit cost in the second period is uncertain and could be higher
or lower than the unit cost in the first period, they provide conditions under which
the buyer may prefer to delay her order. Similar to these papers, Brown and Lee
(1997), Donohue (2000), Huang et al. (2005), Barnes-Schuster et al. (2002), Seifert
et al. (2004), and Erhun et al. (2008) study multiple ordering opportunities where a
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delayed commitment can be either purchased upfront as an option or purchased later
at a higher per-unit cost for symmetric information scenarios. A common modeling
assumption of all of these papers is that the supplier fully knows the buyer’s demand
information and therefore he does not act strategically. Courty and Hao (2000) study
a screening contract where consumers know at the time of contracting only the distri-
bution of their valuations, but subsequently learn their actual valuations. The seller
offers a menu of refund contracts, specifying an advanced payment and a refund that
can be claimed after the consumer’s valuation is realized. Under such a contract, the
consumer is sequentially screened, as in our contingent contract. However, the con-
text and the model of their paper are significantly different as they focus on valuation
uncertainty with a single update while we consider demand forecast accuracy in a
supply chain management problem. Finally Oh and Özer (2012) consider a problem
of a supplier selling to a manufacturer when both parties can obtain asymmetric de-
mand forecast for the same product. The supplier decides when to build capacity,
how much capacity to build, whether to offer a menu of contracts to elicit private
forecast information from the manufacturer, and if so, what contract to offer. They
provide a capacity reservation contract which can be close to optimal. While they
study how the contract terms are affected by demand forecast and costs, while we
focus on comparing the performance of different types of contracts, mechanisms to
induce retailer to obtain higher forecasts accuracy and investigating the effects of
increased forecast accuracy on the supplier’s and the buyer’s profit.
2.3 Model and Preliminary Results
2.3.1 Model
We consider a supply chain composed of a single supplier (he) and a single buyer
(she). At the beginning of the season, both the supplier and the buyer have priors
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on the buyer’s demand distribution but do not know the realization. For simplicity,
we will restrict our analysis to the case where the buyer is expected to have either
high (H) or low (L) demand, with priors pH and pL respectively. We model the
information asymmetry by assuming that based on experience with the market, past
sales, etc., the buyer can privately observe information about her demand type (high
or low) in period 1. The buyer who receives a high (low) demand signal is called high
(low) type buyer. In period 2, the buyer can update her demand forecast to be more
accurate. The supplier, on the other hand, only has priors on the buyer’s demand
type at all times.
Below, we provide further details of the buyer’s demand forecast evolution, the
buyer’s revenue, and the supplier’s choices of contract types to offer to the buyer.
Demand Forecast Evolution
In period 1, the buyer observes a demand signal S1, which is type i ∈ {L,H} with
probability p1i . The accuracy of the period 1 signal is denoted by θ1, such that the
buyer’s actual demand type coincides with the signal of S1 with probability θ1. We
assume θ1 ∈ [max(pL, pH), 1) so that the observed signals provide additional infor-
mation regarding the buyer’s demand type. In period 2, the buyer observes another
demand signal S2, which is of type j ∈ {L,H} with probability pij. The period 2
signal is accurate with probability θ2, where θ2 ≥ θ1 to reflect the improvement of
demand forecast accuracy over time. We assume that the more accurate informa-
tion overwrites the less accurate one. That is, after the buyer observes the period
2 signal, her actual demand type will match the period 2 signal with probability θ2,
and the period 1 signal becomes irrelevant.1 Finally, at the end of the second period,
the buyer will observe her actual demand type ξ ∈ {L,H}, and realize the actual
demand. If ξ = k, then her demand realization will be Dk = µk + ε, k ∈ {L,H},
1 We note that our model is similar to that adopted by Taylor (2006) except for the fact that in
the current model, the buyer can obtain a second signal which is more accurate, whereas in Taylor’s
model, there is only one signal before demand is realized.
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where µk is the mean of actual demand type k, and ε is a zero-mean random variable,
whose cumulative distribution function (cdf) F is continuous and differentiable over
[−δ, δ]. This variable ε represents the idiosyncratic risk that affects both demand
types, referred to as “market uncertainty.”
Table 1 summarizes the notation used in this chapter.
Table 2.1: Notation used in Chapter 2
Notation Math. Definition Value when i = L Description
S1 S1 L if S1 = i Period 1 signal of demand type
S2 S2 L if S2 = i Period 2 signal of demand type
ξ ξ L if ξ = i Actual demand type
Di Di DL Demand of type i
µi µi µL Mean of demand type i
θ1 P (ξ = i|S1 = i) θ1 Accuracy of period 1 forecast
θ2 P (ξ = i|S2 = i) θ2 Accuracy of period 2 forecast
ε ε ε Market uncertainty
δ δ δ Parameter controlling the support
of the market uncertainty
pi P (ξ = i) pL Unconditional probability of
having demand type i
p1i P (S1 = i)
θ1+pL−1
2θ1−1 Probability of observing signal of
demand type i in period 1
p2i P (S2 = i)
θ2+pL−1
2θ2−1 Probability of observing signal of
demand type i in period 2
pij P (S2 = j|S1 = i) pLL = pHH = θ1+θ2−12θ2−1 , Probability of observing signal
pLH = pHL = 1− pLL type j in period 2, given that
the signal observed in period 1 is type i
p1ij P (ξ = j|S1 = i) p1LL = p1HH = θ1, Probability of having demand
p1LH = p
1
HL = 1− θ1 type j, given that the signal observed
in period 1 is type i
p2ij P (ξ = j|S2 = i) p2LL = p2HH = θ2, Probability of having demand
p2LH = p
2
HL = 1− θ2 type j, given that the signal observed
in period 2 is type i
Buyer’s Revenue
We define Γ(D, q) as the buyer’s revenue from selling q units in a market with
demand D ∈ {DL, DH}. Let Γ′(D, q) := dΓ(D,q)dq and Γ




Assumption 2.1. : Γ(D, q) satisfies the following properties.
1. Γ(Di, q) ≥ Γ(Dj, q) if Di < Dj (where < indicates stochastic ordering).
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2. Γ(D, q1) ≥ Γ(D, q2) if q1 ≥ q2.
3. Γ(Di, q1)− Γ(Di, q2) ≥ Γ(Dj, q1)− Γ(Dj, q2) if Di < Dj and q1 ≥ q2.
4. Γ′′(Di, q) ≤ 0 and −Γ
′′
(Di, q) is unimodal in q for all i.
These four properties are satisfied by many revenue functions commonly used in
the contracting literature. Property 1 to 3 characterize natural behavior that the
revenue should increase in demand and the quantity that the buyer has available for
sales. Property 4 helps guarantee the unimodality of the supplier’s profit in contract
quantities. We will discuss two of the most standard revenue models that satisfy
these properties.
Exogenous price with salvage value: If the market is highly competitive and
the buyer has limited pricing power, the retail price r is exogenous to the system.
Let s, 0 ≤ s < r, be the salvage value that the buyer can obtain for each unsold
unit. Then, the buyer’s revenue Γ(D, q) is given by rEmin(D, q) + sE(q−D)+. This
revenue satisfies Properties 1-3. As long as the density of the market uncertainty
ε is unimodal (e.g., Normal, Uniform, Exponential), Property 4 is satisfied as well.
In this model, the retail price and salvage value are public information, known to
both the supplier and the buyer prior to their contracting. The buyer observes her
demand signals, then chooses a contract providing a quantity q and charging a transfer
payment t, which maximizes her expected profit of rEmin(D, q) + sE(q −D)+ − t.
Endogenous price: If the buyer has pricing power, then we need to define a
demand response function. Suppose the demand curve of type ξ ∈ {L,H} is linear in
retail price r, and is given by D(r, ξ) = a+ µξ + ε− br, similar to Taylor (2006). We
assume µL < µH , and hence, D(r, L) 4 D(r,H). The buyer sets the optimal retail
price. Without loss of generality, we assume a = 0, and normalize b to 1. Then, for




resulting revenue is given by Γ(Dξ, q) := (µξ +ε−min(q, µξ+ε2 )) min(q,
µξ+ε
2
). It is easy
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to check that Γ(Dξ, q) satisfies all four properties. In this model, prior to contracting,
the buyer’s demand curve as a function of demand type is known to both the supplier
and the buyer, and the supplier knows that the buyer will set the retail price that
maximizes her revenue. The buyer chooses a contract from the menu based on her
observed demand signals. After the total order quantity q is delivered and the actual
demand type ξ and market uncertainty ε are realized at the end of period 2, the buyer





We assume that the supplier is powerful enough to offer the buyer a menu of
take-it-or-leave-it contracts. If a traditional one-time contract is to be offered, the
supplier has options to offer the contract in period 1, before the buyer obtains a more
accurate demand forecast (early static contract), or in period 2, after an improved
demand forecast has been received (late static contract). In this essay, we also consider
another possibility where the supplier can offer a menu of contracts that span both
periods. The first menu is offered in period 1, and the second menu contingent on
the first contract is offered in period 2 (dynamic contract).
The supplier has to produce at least the quantity contracted with the buyer. He
can produce in period 1 and/or period 2 but the deliveries occur at the end of period
2. The production cost in period t ∈ {1, 2} is ct, where 0 < c1 ≤ c2. Notice that while
producing in period 1 is less expensive, it exposes the supplier to overproduction or
underproduction risks if the buyer has the option to order in the second period 2.








(qLH , tLH), (qLL, tLL)
}
If the buyer chooses (qi, ti) in period 1, she pays ti for the initial order quantity
qi. After choosing (qi, ti), she can re-order from the menu {(qiH , tiH), (qiL, tiL)} in
2We assume that the inventory holding cost is negligible without loss of generality.
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forecast, obtains first 
signal type i  {L, H} 
Supplier announces  
dynamic contract menu 
Buyer selects contract 
type i 
Supplier produces 𝜌𝑖 at 
cost 𝑐1 
Period 1 
Buyer updates her 
forecast, obtains 
second signal type  
j  {L, H} 
 
Buyer selects contract ij 
contingent on period 1 
contract choice i 
 
Supplier produces  
(𝑞𝑖  +  𝑞𝑖𝑗  − 𝜌𝑖)
+ at cost 𝑐2  
and delivers 𝑞𝑖  + 𝑞𝑖𝑗 
 
Buyer realizes and 
satisfies her actual 
demand 
Period 2 
Figure 2.1: Sequence of events: Dynamic Contract
period 2. She pays tij for the additional order quantity qij. The total order qi + qij
is delivered at the end of period 2. Notice that the contract (qi, ti) is meant for the
buyer who observes a signal i in period 1, and the contingent contract (qij, tij) is
meant for the buyer who subsequently observes a signal j in period 2.
The supplier decides how much to produce upfront in period 1 after the buyer
makes the initial selection from the period 1 menu of contracts. We define ρi as the
supplier’s decision variable of the production quantity in period 1, given that the
buyer chooses the type i contract from the period 1 menu. The benefit of producing
in period 1 is the cheaper unit production cost. However, delaying part of production
to period 2 allows the supplier to produce after learning exactly how much the buyer
will order in total, and hence, reduces the risk of over- or underproduction. The
sequence of events with dynamic contract is displayed in Figure 1.
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pij[tij − c2(qi + qij − ρi)+]
(2.1)





p2jk[Γ(Dk, qi + qij)− tij] ≥ ti, i ∈ {L,H}










p2jk[Γ(Dk, q−i + q(−i)l)− t(−i)l]− t−i, i ∈ {L,H}, l ∈ {L,H}
Period 2 Participation Constraints∑
k∈{L,H}
p2jk[Γ(Dk, qi + qij)− tij] ≥
∑
k∈{L,H}
p2jkΓ(Dk, qi), i ∈ {L,H}, j ∈ {L,H}
Period 2 Incentive Constraints∑
k∈{L,H}
p2jk[Γ(Dk, qi + qij)− tij] ≥
∑
k∈{L,H}
p2jk[Γ(Dk, qi + qi(−j))− ti(−j)],
i ∈ {L,H}, j ∈ {L,H}
Nonnegativity Constraints
ρi, qi, qij, ti, tij ≥ 0 i ∈ {L,H}, j ∈ {L,H}
The first term in the objective function includes the initial payment and period
1 production cost c1ρi. The second term accounts for the period 2 payment and the
remaining production cost c2(qi + qij − ρi)+ for the total quantity ordered by the
buyer. The first constraint is the participation constraint that guarantees the type-
i buyer’s expected profit from the whole horizon is non-negative in period 1. The
second constraint is the incentive compatibility constraint, which ensures that the
type-i buyer selects the contract designed for her type in period 1. Similarly, the third
and fourth constraints are the participation and incentive compatibility constraints
in period 2. They guarantee non-negative expected profits from participating in the
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Figure 2.2: Sequence of events: Early Static Contract
Buyer conducts initial 
forecast, obtains first 
signal type i  {L, H} 
Supplier produces  
𝜌 at cost 𝑐1 
Period 1 
Buyer updates her 
forecast, obtains 
second signal type  
j  {L, H} 
 
Buyer selects  
contract j 
Supplier produces  
(𝑞𝑖  −𝜌)
+ at cost 𝑐2  
and delivers 𝑞𝑖  
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satisfies her actual 
demand 
Period 2 
Supplier announces  
late static contract menu 
(𝑞𝑖 , 𝑡𝑖), i  {L, H} 
Figure 2.3: Sequence of events: Late Static Contract
period 2 contracts, and maximum expected profits from committing to the contract
corresponding to the buyer’s second demand signal type.
Static Contracts: The early static and late static contracts are special cases
of dynamic contract. More precisely, under an early static contract, the supplier
announces a menu of contracts {(qH , tH), (qL, tL)} in period 1 to screen the buyer’s
period 1 signal type. Hence, it can be viewed as a dynamic contract with constraints
qij = 0 and tij = 0, i, j ∈ {L,H} in period 2. Under a late static contract, the supplier
offers a menu of contracts {(qH , tH), (qL, tL)} in period 2 to screen the buyer’s period
2 signal type. Hence, it is equivalent to a dynamic contract with constraints qi = 0
and ti = 0, i ∈ {L,H} in period 1. The sequence of events with early and late
static contract are given in Figure 2 and 3, respectively. In Appendix A, we provide




Propositions 2.1 through 2.3 characterize the structure of an optimal dynamic
contract (The proofs are provided in Appendix A). We will use these properties in
the next section when we discuss which contract structure (dynamic, early static or
late static) is most beneficial for the buyer or seller under different conditions.
There are multiple contracts that result in the same expected profit for the buyer
and the supplier. Proposition 2.1 shows that in one form of the optimal dynamic
contracts, all contract quantities are deferred to the second period contracts (qi =
0, i ∈ {L,H} in period 1). In this contract, the supplier charges ti in period 1 as an
option price, which gives the buyer the right to order qi + qiH or qi + qiL in period
2, and pay the additional fee tij if necessary. The buyer will have the total order,
qi + qij, delivered by the end of period 2. This contract structure is similar to that of
a capacity reservation contract commonly used in practice.
Proposition 2.1. For an optimal dynamic contract with contract quantities {qi, qij},
i, j ∈ {L,H}, there exists an equivalent dynamic contract with q′i = 0 and q′ij =
qi + qij, i, j ∈ {L,H}.
Similarly, we can show that the supplier can transfer the payments of the period
2 low-type contracts to period 1 (tiL = 0, i ∈ {L,H} in period 2) without losing
optimality. Proposition 2.2 states that there exists an optimal dynamic contract such
that if the second forecast indicates the demand is low (i.e. the buyer observes HL
or LL), then the buyer is not charged another fee in the second period. Only when
the buyer needs additional units to meet expected high demand, she has to pay an
extra fee in the second period.
Proposition 2.2. For an optimal dynamic contract with transfer payments {ti, tij},
i, j ∈ {L,H}, there exists an equivalent dynamic contract with t′i = ti + tiL, t′iH =
tiH − tiL, and t′iL = 0, i ∈ {L,H}.
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By Proposition 2.1 and 2.2, we can construct an equivalent dynamic contract
starting from any other optimal dynamic contract in the following form:
(0, tH){(qHH , tHH), (qHL, 0)}, (0, tL){(qLH , tLH), (qLL, 0)}. Proposition 2.3 character-
izes the supplier’s optimal production policy and the structure of an optimal dynamic
contract in this simplified form. The structure of the optimal early static and late
static contract are characterized in Appendix A.
Proposition 2.3. If the buyer selects type i contract in period 1, then the supplier’s










The optimal contract is not unique. Under one optimal contract, the payments to
the supplier by the buyer are given by
tL = (1− θ1)Γ(DH , qLL) + θ1Γ(DL, qLL)
tLH = θ2[Γ(DH , qLH)− Γ(DH , qLL)] + (1− θ2)[Γ(DL, qLH)− Γ(DL, qLL)]
tH = θ1Γ(DH , qHL) + (1− θ1)Γ(DL, qHL)− (2θ1 − 1)[Γ(DH , qLL)− Γ(DL, qLL)]
tHH = θ2[Γ(DH , qHH)− Γ(DH , qHL)] + (1− θ2)[Γ(DL, qHH)− Γ(DL, qHL)]
tLL = tHL = 0.
The optimal dynamic contract quantities can be obtained by solving the following
24
equations:
−[ (2θ1 − 1)
p1L
+ pLHθ2 − θ1][Γ′(DH , qLL)− Γ′(DL, qLL)] + pLLΓ′(DL, qLL)
= (c1 − pLHc2)+
θ2Γ







(1− θ2)(θ2 − θ1)
(2θ2 − 1)
]Γ′(DH , qHL) + [
θ2(θ2 − θ1)
(2θ2 − 1)
]Γ′(DL, qHL) = (c1 − pHHc2)+
θ2Γ







If qLL > qLH , it is optimal to bunch the quantity for the low-type’s period 2 contracts
and offer qLL = qLH = q̄L which satisfies (1− (1 + p1H)θ1)Γ′(DH , q̄L) + ((1 + p1H)θ1 −
p1H)Γ
′(DL, q̄L) = c1p
1
L.
If qHL > qHH , it is optimal to bunch the quantity for the high-type’s period 2 contracts
and offer qHL = qHH = q̄H which satisfies p
1
Hθ1Γ
′(DH , q̄H) + p
1




An optimal dynamic contract can always be fully characterized as long as the
buyer’s revenue function Γ(D, q) is known and satisfies the properties in Assumption
1. We also note that the task of solving for the optimal transfer payments and contract
quantities for a dynamic contract has essentially the same difficulty level as designing
a conventional static contract. The major difference between offering a static and a
dynamic contract is that a static contract distinguishes only between the two types
of the buyer (H and L in period 1 or period 2); while, a dynamic contract screens
for four different types of the buyer (HH,HL,LH,LL), based on all the possible
combinations of period 1 and period 2 signals observed by the buyer.
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2.4 Contract Preferences and Effects of Forecast Accuracy
We now address the question of which contracts are most profitable for the sup-
plier or the buyer under which conditions. First, we assume that the buyer will always
obtain a more accurate forecast in period 2. As noted earlier, early static and late
static contract are special cases of dynamic contract. Hence, it is straightforward to
see that from the supplier’s point of view, dynamic contract weakly dominates early
static and late static contracts. The advantage of dynamic contract over early static
contract comes from the supplier’s ability to screen not only the initial demand esti-
mate, but also the improved demand information, under the dynamic contract. This
allows the supplier to potentially sell more to the buyer who observes the high-type
signal in the second period. In comparison with late static contract, the superiority
of dynamic contract comes from its structure that enables the supplier to screen the
initial demand forecast. By learning about the buyer’s type upfront in period 1, the
supplier can make a better production decision, resulting in cheaper production costs
under a dynamic contract.
Given that the supplier would always prefer to use the dynamic contract (com-
pared to early static or late static contracts), an interesting question is whether the
buyer’s receiving better forecasts over time is beneficial to the supplier. There are two
ways to address this question. First, we note that the buyer receives a second signal
with accuracy θ2 > θ1 in period 2. It is straightforward to see that the supplier would
always prefer that the buyer receive this second signal. That is, if the buyer did not
receive this second (more accurate signal) or if the buyer received a second signal but
the accuracy of this second signal was identical to the first period, the supplier would
definitely be worse off. Indeed, the better the accuracy of the signal that the buyer
receives in period 2, the higher profits the supplier can receive so long as he uses the
dynamic contract.
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Theorem 2.1. The supplier’s profit under an optimal dynamic contract monotoni-
cally increases with the buyer’s second-period forecast accuracy, θ2.
We would like to point out how Theorem 2.1 complements the analysis of Taylor
(2006). In that paper, Taylor (using a model similar to ours but with a single period
analysis) analyzed a situation where the buyer received only one signal and showed
that increasing the accuracy of that signal does not necessarily increase the profits
of the supplier. In our setting, if the supplier used a late static contract, increasing
the accuracy of θ2 would not always increase the profits of the supplier, similar to
Taylor’s result. Likewise, if the buyer uses an early static contract, the only relevant
forecast signal is the first one and an increase in the accuracy of this signal does
not always increase the profits of the supplier either. However, a contrasting and
interesting result we show here is that as long as the supplier uses the dynamic
contract we specify above, a second (improved) forecast always benefits the supplier,
and the more improved the forecast is, the greater the benefit to the supplier. This
is because with a dynamic contract, the supplier screens both the initial and more
accurate demand signals, allowing him to effectively extract most of the potential
gain from the reduction in the mismatch between the buyer’s ordered quantity and
actual demand without having to pay high rents to the buyer. An example of the
supplier’s profit under the three contract types as the forecast accuracy improves is
shown in Figure 4.
It is also worth pointing out that the dynamic contract can be more profitable to
the supplier than the early static contract even when the buyer contracting under the
early static contract has an initial forecast that is more accurate than the improved
forecast of the buyer contracting under the dynamic contract. That is, even when the
demand information the supplier obtains from a dynamic contract is inferior to that
obtained from an early static contract, the supplier’s profit can still be higher under
the dynamic contract. Proposition 2.4 provides sufficient conditions for this scenario.
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When the demand is more likely to be low (pL ≥ 0.5), if the buyer does not learn
additional information from a demand forecast (θ1 = max{pL, pH} = pL), then the
buyer will always buy the low-type contract under the early static contract (p1L = 1).
If the buyer obtains a more informative demand forecast (θ1 > pL), then with a
positive probability, the buyer will observe a high signal and select the high-type
contract. However, when the additional cost to sell to the high-type buyer (production
cost c1(qH − qL) and high-type rent (2pL − 1)[Γ(DH , qL) − Γ(DL, qL)]) is greater
than the expected gain from having a high demand (pL[Γ(DH , qH) − Γ(DH , qL)] +
pH [Γ(DL, qH) − Γ(DL, qL)]), the supplier finds it less profitable to sell to the high-
type. In this case, the supplier’s profit under an early static contract is decreasing in
the forecast accuracy θ1 when the accuracy is small.
3 Hence, the supplier can earn
larger profits from a dynamic contract even when the buyer’s accuracy is lower.
Proposition 2.4. If demand is more likely to be low (pL ≥ 0.5) and if the optimal
early static contract when θ1 = pL is such that c1(qH − qL) + (2pL − 1)[Γ(DH , qL) −
Γ(DL, qL)] > pL[Γ(DH , qH)−Γ(DH , qL)]+pH [Γ(DL, qH)−Γ(DL, qL)], then there exists
θ̄ ∈ (0, 1] such that the supplier’s profit under the optimal early static contract with
a buyer whose period 1 accuracy is θ < θ̄ is less than the supplier’s profit under an
optimal dynamic contract with a buyer whose period 2 accuracy is θ2 < θ.
While the supplier can always benefit from more accurate forecasts with a dynamic
contract, it is required that the buyer obtains a more accurate forecast in the second
period for a dynamic contract to be viable. This actually raises two interesting
questions: 1) Is the buyer willing to obtain better forecasts?; i.e., do better forecasts
also always benefit the buyer assuming the buyer has the capability to obtain them?,
and 2) What if the supplier is uncertain about the buyer’s capability to obtain more
accurate forecasts in the first place? To address these two questions, we first develop
an understanding of which contracts are most profitable for each type of the buyer.
3Notice that this result is analogous to Taylor and Xiao (2010).
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Figure 2.4: Preferences of the high-type buyer, supplier, and supply chain: r =
1, c1/c2 = 0.67, c1 = 0.1, pL = 0.46, µH = 900, µL = 400, δ = 50, θ1 = 0.6)
Proposition 2.5 presents the contract preferences of the low-type buyer (who ob-
serves a low demand signal in period 1).
Proposition 2.5. The low-type buyer always prefers late static contract to early
static and dynamic contract. She is indifferent between early static and dynamic
contracts.
Under early static and dynamic contract, the low-type buyer commits to the
low-type contract in period 1, before she obtains a more accurate demand forecast.
Hence, she is screened as the lowest type, and is awarded zero expected profits since
the low-type participation constraints in period 1 under both early static and dynamic
contract are binding at optimality. The supplier sets the quantity and transfer pay-
ment such that the low-type buyer makes a positive profit only if her actual demand
turns out to be high-type; she loses money ex-post otherwise. If a late static contract
is offered, however, the low-type buyer has a chance to observe an improved demand
signal in period 2, before she commits to a contract. With a positive probability, her
second signal can be high-type and she can receive a positive expected profit from
the high-type contract. Otherwise, if her second signal is low-type, she receives a
zero expected profit. Thus, her ex-ante expected profit is positive under a late static
contract. Since the low-type buyer prefers to contract late and is indifferent between
early static and dynamic contract, she would always agree to update her forecasts
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even when the supplier offers her a dynamic contract.
The situation for the high-type buyer is different. In a screening contract, the
profit to the high-type buyer comes from the information rent that the supplier has
to offer in order to prevent the high-type from deviating to lower type contracts.
Hence, the high-type buyer always makes positive profits under all three types of
contracts. However, it is not immediate under which situations, the high-type buyer
will prefer which contract type to the others. Proposition 2.6 shows that the high-
type buyer always prefers to contract early rather than dynamically. Furthermore,
under the dynamic contract, the high-type buyer’s expected profit is hurt even more
as her second period information accuracy improves. This is because under early
static contract, the buyer only reveals her less accurate demand information, leaving
sufficient amount of uncertainty which results in higher rents. On the other hand,
the buyer reveals both her initial and improved demand information under dynamic
contract, leaving little rents to her. The additional demand information revealed
in the second period always benefits the supplier rather than the buyer because it
decreases the uncertainty about the buyer’s type.
Proposition 2.6.
1. The high-type buyer’s profit under the early static contract is at least as high as
her profit under the dynamic contract.
2. The high-type buyer’s profit under the dynamic contract monotonically decreases
with the second-period forecast accuracy.
Since the early static contract is more profitable to the high-type buyer than the
dynamic contract, if the buyer expects the supplier to offer her a dynamic contract,
she would opt out from conducting a more accurate forecast in order to be offered
an early static contract instead. However, if both the supplier’s and the buyer’s
profit are higher with the late static than with the early static contract, then the
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supplier can benefit from offering the late static contract upfront (in a sense, take
the dynamic contract off the table), so that the buyer would agree to obtain a more
accurate forecast. In this case, both parties can still benefit from more accurate
demand information. An example of such situation where the late static contract is
more preferable to both parties than the early static contract is shown in Figure 4,
when the period 2 accuracy, θ2, is between 0.78 and 0.83. Notice that the supplier
prefers the late static contract only when the forecast accuracy is sufficiently increased
in period 2 (θ2 > 0.78). This is because the significant improvement in the accuracy
of demand forecasts makes it worth waiting to contract late even though the supplier
has to incur higher production costs. For the high-type buyer, she prefers late static
to early static contract when the period 2 accuracy is sufficiently low (θ2 < 0.83).
This is because a moderate accuracy of her signal leaves enough uncertainty about
her demand type, and the supplier, after waiting to contract in period 2, would be
willing to offer her a higher rent in exchange for the more accurate and only demand
information. This situation is particularly prevalent when the period 2 production
cost is not much more expensive than the period 1 production cost (signified by
a large c1
c2
). It is worth noting that the supply chain can also benefit from more
accurate demand forecast through dynamic and late static contract, especially when
the increase in accuracy is substantial. This is because when the period 2 accuracy
is high, the value of more accurate demand information outweighs the increase in
production costs in the later period.
This section has shown that while the supplier always benefits most from, and
therefore, favors the dynamic contracts, the buyer may actually prefer the early static
contract and may claim that she will not obtain a more accurate forecast as the high
type buyer’s profit is monotonically decreasing in period 2 accuracy. But if the
supplier knows that the buyer is capable of obtaining a more accurate forecast, how
does the supplier interpret this refusal to obtain a better forecast? We answer this
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question in the next section.
2.5 Capable Buyer and Bayesian Updating Supplier
In the previous section, we showed that although there are some situations where
both parties benefit from more accurate forecasts, there are others where the buyer
does not. Since the buyer is the one obtaining the better forecast, the question is
whether the buyer can simply announce that she is not obtaining a second forecast,
when she knows that having the better forecast will put her under a less profitable
contract type. The problem is that if the supplier knows that the buyer is capable
of obtaining improved forecasts, then a decision by the buyer not to obtain them can
lead the supplier to update his beliefs about the buyer’s demand type, which will
affect the type of contracts he will offer to the buyer.
We study the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of the two-stage game played by
the supplier and the buyer. In period 1, the buyer observes her own period 1 demand
signal, and then announces whether she intends to obtain the second demand signal
or not. If she does, the supplier offers a dynamic contract menu (since it is always
most profitable for him). If the buyer does not update, the supplier offers an early
static contract menu. Note that if the Bayesian updating leads the supplier to be
certain about the buyer’s type, then the supplier can offer a first-best contract for
the buyer’s type.
In this Bayesian game, the supplier has an initial belief about the buyer’s period 1
signal type described by the probabilities p1i , i ∈ {L,H}. Let {U,N} be the set of the
buyer’s possible strategies where U is to update, and N is to not update. The buyer
with signal type i chooses U with probability σUi , and N with probability σ
N
i = 1−σUi .
After the buyer announces her strategy S ∈ {U,N}, the supplier updates his belief











The standard result for this Bayesian game is that there is no separating PBE.
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There are two pure strategy pooling PBE: one where both types of buyers announce
they will obtain better demand forecasts, and the other where both types of buyers
announce they will not obtain better demand forecasts 4. This result is driven by the
fact that the lowest type buyer is indifferent between obtaining and not obtaining a
more accurate forecast. If one assumes that the lowest type buyer will obtain a better
forecast when she is indifferent, then the equilibrium is the one where all types of the
buyer obtain more accurate forecasts. However, if one assumes that when indifferent,
the lowest type buyer will actually not obtain better forecasts, then the equilibrium
is the one where all types of the buyer choose not to obtain better forecasts, which
makes the supplier unable to benefit from more accurate demand information.
To rule out the no-updating PBE, the supplier can in fact utilize a side payment to
induce the lowest type buyer to update demand forecasts. More precisely, the supplier
can announce upfront that all buyers who obtain a better forecast will be given a small
side payment. In this case, the lowest type buyer will have an incentive to obtain a
more accurate forecast, leading to a unique all-update equilibrium. This shows that
even when the buyer has a bargaining power to refuse updating her demand forecasts,
the supplier can offer a dynamic contract with a side payment to guarantee the buyer’s
willingness to obtain improved forecasts. The only exception where such a dynamic
contract may not be preferable to the supplier is when there is a cost involved with
updating the forecasts. In this case, the supplier’s optimal strategy depends on the
update cost, as discussed in Theorem 2.2.
Theorem 2.2. There exists a threshold K̃ such that if the forecast update costs K ≤
K̃, the unique PBE with a side payment is where both types of the buyer obtain more
accurate demand forecasts. If K > K̃, the supplier offers an early static contract.
The cost of obtaining better demand forecast has essentially no impact on the
4This result extends naturally to the case where there are n > 2 types of buyers, where the types
are ordered according to the period 1 demand signal.
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buyer’s behavior since the cost is transferred to the supplier through the optimal
contract design. It is profitable for the supplier to offer a side payment to incentivize
both types of the buyer to obtain more accurate demand information at the equilib-
rium as long as the update cost is reasonable. If the forecast update is so costly that
the benefit to the supplier is less than the cost of obtaining better forecasts, then
the supplier chooses to offer an early static contract that does not require a second
forecast.
An important managerial implication here is that while the buyer may not always
benefit from more accurate forecasts, so long as the supplier offers even a small side
payment for obtaining better forecasts, he can induce the Bayesian equilibrium where
all types of the buyer agree to obtain more accurate forecasts. This is, of course, only
possible when the supplier is certain about the buyer’s capability of conducting more
accurate forecasts in the second period, which may not always be the case in practice.
Hence, we discuss the supplier’s best contract options in presence of an uncertainty
about the buyer’s forecasting capability in the next section.
2.6 Screening the Forecasting Capability
When the supplier is truly uncertain as to how accurate of a demand forecast the
buyer can obtain, we propose that the supplier can improve the screening nature of
his contracts by screening the buyer not only on demand level, but also on forecasting
capability. Suppose that the supplier has a prior on the capability of the buyer to
obtain improved forecasts. The supplier can design a capability and type screening
menu of contracts such that the capable (high accuracy θ2) buyer prefers dynamic
contract, and the incapable (low accuracy θ1) buyer prefers early static contract.
The model in this section also applies to a situation where the forecast updates are
costly, but the supplier is uncertain about the buyer’s forecasting costs, as modeled
by Lariviere (2002). That is, the buyer may incur a small update cost KL or a large
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update cost KH . If the buyer’s update cost is small (KL ≤ K̃), then it is worthwhile
for the supplier to induce the buyer to obtain improved forecasts using a dynamic
contract. On the other hand, if the buyer’s update cost is large (KH > K̃), then
the supplier prefers to contract with the buyer under an early static contract. In
this case, the large update cost will never be incurred (since the buyer is offered an
early static contract). Then, the buyer with a small update cost is equivalent to the
capable buyer, and the buyer with a large update cost is equivalent to the incapable
buyer in this model.
The capability to obtain a better demand forecast is private information to the
buyer. However, we assume the supplier estimates that with probability φ, the buyer
is capable of obtaining a more accurate demand forecast, and with probability 1− φ,
she is not capable. The capable buyer is simply the buyer described in previous
sections, who receives a better forecast in period 2. On the other hand, the incapable
buyer observes a signal whether she is low-type or high-type in period 1, but is
incapable of making that forecast more accurate in period 2. Since the incapable
buyer does not receive a second signal, if she purchases a dynamic contract, she uses
a strategy such that with probability υiH , she chooses the iH contract in period 2,
and with probability υiL = 1− υiH , she chooses the iL contract, where i ∈ {L,H} is
her signal type in period 1. Notice that if a buyer chooses the early static contract,
then she will always receive the same expected profit, whether she is capable or not,
since the contract decision is only made in period 1 and the more accurate forecasting
is irrelevant.
The supplier offers a menu of contracts that screens both the type and forecasting
capability of the buyer. He offers a menu of the early static contract, (qi, ti), i ∈
{L,H}, and the dynamic contract, (qDi , tDi ),
(
(qiH , tiH), (qiL, tiL)
)
, i ∈ {L,H}. The
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The optimization problem includes the participation and incentive compatibility
constraints for both the early static and dynamic contract. The participation and
incentive compatibility constraints of the early static contract ensures that the type
i ∈ {L,H} buyer who does not have the forecasting capability picks the early static
contract meant for her type. Similarly, dynamic contract constraints ensures that type
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i ∈ {L,H} buyer who has the forecasting capability picks the dynamic contract meant
for her type. The forecasting capability incentive constraints prevent the incapable
buyer from deviating to the dynamic contract by ensuring that, regardless of the
mixed strategy chosen by the buyer (any value of vik), the incapable buyer will do
worse by choosing a dynamic contract. Similarly, the second forecasting capability
incentive constraint ensures that the capable buyer will prefer to obtain a revised
forecast and will not deviate to the early static contract.
In this setting, we have the following results regarding the supplier’s and the
buyer’s optimal strategies and profit.
Theorem 2.3. Under an optimal two-dimensional screening contract:
1. The optimal strategy for the incapable type i buyer if she were to contract
dynamically is to choose the iL contract in period 2 with probability 1, i.e.
υiL = 1, i ∈ {L,H}.
2. Both capable and incapable buyer of the same type receive the same expected
profit, where the profit is zero for the low-type buyer and is positive for the
high-type buyer.
3. The supplier’s profit monotonically increases with the capability probability φ
and the period 2 forecast accuracy θ2.
4. The high-type buyer’s profit is monotonically decreasing in the capability proba-
bility φ and is independent of period 2 forecast accuracy θ2.
Part 1 and 2 of the theorem are driven by the binding constraints in an optimal
two-dimensional screening contract. More precisely, when the buyer is incapable
of obtaining a more accurate demand signal to help her make decision on which
contract to choose in the second period, she minimizes her risk of losing money
from ordering too much by always relying on the low-type contract. This is because
37
an optimal screening contract is designed such that the high-type buyer’s expected
profit from deviating to the low-type contract is the same as the expected profit from
choosing the high-type contract; however, the low-type buyer could lose money from
deviating to the high-type contract. The forecasting capability incentive constraints
are also binding at optimality, resulting in the same expected profit to the capable
and incapable buyer of the same type. Like under other screening contracts, the low-
type expected profit is zero while the high-type expected profit is positive due to the
information rents.
Part 3 and 4 of the theorem describe the effects of the capability probability
as well as the second forecast accuracy on the supplier’s and the high-type buyer’s
expected profit. In Section 4, it has been shown that the supplier always prefers
dynamic contract; while, the high-type buyer always prefers early static contract
to dynamic contract. Hence, as the capability probability increases, implying it is
more likely that dynamic contract will take place, the high-type buyer’s expected
profit is reduced but the supplier’s profit is increased. Figure 5a and b display the
expected profits of the high-type buyer and supplier for different values of capability
probability. (Note also that an increase in the market uncertainty δ benefits the buyer
and hurts the supplier as expected.) If instead the capability probability is fixed, but
the capable buyer’s second forecast accuracy is improved, we show that the supplier
can continue to take advantage of the buyer’s better demand information. This result
is consistent with Theorem 2.1, where we show the supplier is better off contracting
with a more accurate buyer using a dynamic contract. What is less expected here is
that a change in the capable buyer’s improved forecast accuracy has no effect on the
buyer’s expected profit. This is because the second forecast accuracy only influences
the performance of the capable buyer, but not the incapable buyer. Since the supplier
holds the same belief about the buyer’s forecasting capability and since it is optimal
to offer both capable and incapable buyer the same profit, the supplier gives the same
38
optimal level of rent to the buyer, and keeps the remaining increase in supply chain
profit due to better forecast accuracy to himself.
The results in this section show that even in the presence of the uncertainty about
the buyer’s forecast capability, there still exist a mechanism which allows the supplier
to always benefit from more accurate demand information. An implication here is
that more accurate information is always potentially beneficial to the supplier as long
as he designs a contract wisely.
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Figure 2.5: High-type buyer’s and supplier’s profits: r = 1, c1
c2
= 0.4, c1 = 0.2, pL =
0.5, µH = 1000, µL = 600, θ1 = 0.6, θ2 = 0.8
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we consider a stylized model of a multi-period procurement game
between a powerful supplier and a buyer under demand information asymmetry. We
investigate whether and when the parties benefit from more accurate demand forecasts
obtained by the buyer under different contract structures. A key finding of our study
is that a supplier who knows that a buyer is capable and is going to obtain more
accurate forecasts will always benefit from offering a dynamic contract, which screens
both the buyer’s initial and improved forecasts. We show however that there are
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cases where the buyer prefers the early static contract the most, and therefore, is
disincentivized to obtain more accurate forecasts in the second period. But if the
supplier knows the buyer is capable of obtaining a forecast update, we argue that
the buyer can not simply refuse to obtain better forecasts as this would lead the
supplier to update his beliefs about the buyer’s demand type and end up offering a
first-best contract to extract even more profit from the buyer. In fact, we show that
as long as the supplier is certain that the buyer is capable of obtaining more accurate
demand forecasts, he can always induce the buyer to update her demand forecasts
by offering a small side payment. An interesting situation is when the supplier may
be uncertain about the buyer’s capability to obtain more accurate forecasts. In this
case, the buyer may claim an inability to obtain more accurate forecasts especially
when better forecasts are likely to hurt her profits. But in response, we show that
the supplier can offer a more sophisticated contract to screen the buyer both on her
forecast updating capability and demand type.
An important conclusion of this chapter is that suppliers can always benefit from
demand forecasts obtained by buyers that become more accurate over time. How-
ever, to achieve this benefit, the supplier may sometimes be required to design more
sophisticated contracts than what are common in practice. Our findings complement
what has been found in the existing contract literature which considers mostly sim-
ple static contracts and reports that the supplier’s profit can be hurt by improved
demand forecasts from the buyer. This essay indicates a need for more sophisticated
dynamic contracts. We note that similar contracts with contingent clauses have re-
cently been observed in practice. However, the standard dynamic contracts may not
be enough when the supplier is facing a buyer who can claim an inability to obtain
more accurate forecasts. In this case, the supplier may have to develop dual-screening
contracts, which have been much less common in practice. Our finding may indicate
that there is a certain point in the supply chain contract’s complexity level where the
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benefit obtained by the contract is outweighed by its complexity. Further research is




Conditional Promotions and Consumer
Overspending
3.1 Introduction
Price promotion is a key component in today’s retailing. In 2010, the total promo-
tion spending in the United States reached $337 billions, out of which 85% was spent
on price discounts (Borrell Associates , 2010). Retailers employ price promotions to
stimulate sales in their stores, which not only generate larger revenues, but also re-
duce costs by accelerating the disposal of excess inventory (Blattberg et al., 1981).
The most common forms of price promotions include price markdowns (e.g., 20% off
from regular price), bundling (e.g., buy shirt and pants together and save $20), and
conditional discounts (e.g., buy 2 or more and get 20% off).
Among these, conditional discounts are increasingly more popular in practice.
Their use in consumer packaged goods increased by 10.3% in 2010 from 2009. They
accounted for 26% of total coupon distribution, and was as high as 33% among gro-
cery products (NCH Marketing Services , 2011). Retailers typically offer conditional
discounts in the form of either percent-off or dollars-off. For example, Travelodge
offered 15% off its regular room rate if customers stayed 2 nights or longer. Bath
& Body Works offered $10 off a purchase of $30 or more as a Mother’s Day sale.
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A distinct feature of conditional discounts is that the deal is always coupled with
an eligibility requirement, mostly in the form of a minimum purchase quantity or a
minimum spending, that customers need to fulfill in order to receive the discount.
This strategy can benefit retailers in several ways: it allows finer price discrimination
contingent on purchase quantity or spending, and potentially induces buyers with
higher consumption level or reservation price to consume more than what they would
without a discount offer.
Most existing literature on price promotions identifies price elasticity as the main
reason driving buyers to increase purchase quantity in response to a price reduction
(Jeuland and Narasimhan, 1985; Bell et al., 1999). However, this argument falls short
of explaining why some consumers go the extra mile and buy a significantly larger
quantity than what they actually need just to qualify for the deals. In fact, stories
about impulsive, deal-driven shopping behavior regularly appear in news articles,
popular press magazines, and personal blogs (Klaft , Sep. 3, 2011; Tuttle, Jul. 23,
2010; Sherman, Feb. 5, 2009; Fontinelle, Aug. 17, 2011; Tsai , 2007).
Such shopping behavior is referred to in the literature as “deal-proneness,” which
is the propensity to purchase products when they are offered on a “deal” basis (Hack-
leman and Duker , 1980). Existing studies on this subject explain that deal-proneness
arises as consumers gain psychological benefits from paying a lower-than-expected
price for a product (Schindler , 1989, 1998; Laroche et al., 2001; DelVecchio, 2005).
This enhanced positive feeling associated with the transaction is referred to as “trans-
action utility” (Thaler , 1985). Consumers who receive transaction utility when com-
pleting a deal are labeled “deal-prone.” Consumers who are not sensitive to such
cognitive benefits, and value a discount offer based solely on its monetary value, are
called “value-conscious.” (Lichtenstein et al., 1990) In order to investigate how deal-
proneness influences purchase decisions, we define overspending as a situation where
a deal-prone consumer increases her purchase quantity purely due to the transaction
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utility received from completing a deal.
The heterogeneity in consumer deal-proneness together with the heterogeneity in
consumer willingness to pay result in multiple consumer segments who make differ-
ent purchase decisions when facing a discount offer. Thus, when designing a price
promotion, retailers must account for the impact of the deal on different groups of
consumers. This is a challenging problem as it is not clear how terms of promotional
offers influence purchase decisions of heterogeneous consumers, and which discount
policy should be adopted for a given set of market parameters. This chapter aims to
study the effects of conditional discounts on consumer behavior and seller’s profitabil-
ity, focusing on two most common forms of conditional discounts: i) all-unit discount,
where the price reduction (in percentage or dollars off) applies to every unit if the
eligibility condition is met, and ii) fixed-amount discount, in which a fixed discount
(e.g., $10 off) is applied to the total expense that satisfies the condition. Note that
price markdown is a special case of the all-unit discount with no minimum purchase
requirement, and mixed bundling with a limit of one deal per transaction is a special
case of the fixed-amount discount.
Our main research questions are: 1) How do different types of consumers respond
to conditional discounts? Do conditional discounts induce consumers to overspend?
2) When should a retailer offer conditional discounts?, and 3) What are the market
conditions that favor a fixed-amount discount to an all-unit discount or vice versa?
To answer these questions, we consider a model of a single seller facing heteroge-
neous consumers whose marginal consumption surplus decreases in the quantity they
consume. Consumers are heterogeneous in two dimensions: their cognitive attitude
towards a deal (deal-prone or value-conscious) and valuation (how much they value
consumption of the product). Facing these consumers, the seller’s problem is to decide
whether to offer a discount, and if so, which discount type (all-unit or fixed-amount)
and what specific terms of discount to offer in order to maximize his expected profit.
44
To our knowledge, this essay is the first to analytically investigate consumers’
heterogeneity in deal-proneness and their response towards conditional discounts.
We show that a conditional discount can induce deal-prone consumers to overspend.
Furthermore, we derive the seller’s optimal discount strategies and show that a condi-
tional discount is strictly more profitable than selling at the regular price when either
consumer willingness to pay for the product is low, or there exist deal-prone con-
sumers in the market. If a sufficiently large proportion of consumers are deal-prone,
we show that a conditional discount also dominates a conventional price markdown.
Hence, conditional discount is an effective tool to increase the seller’s profitability. In-
terestingly, we find that the optimal terms of discounts (discount depth and minimum
purchase requirement) and consumer purchase quantities induced by the optimal dis-
counts are not always monotone in the magnitude of transaction utility. Finally, we
identify market conditions under which the all-unit or the fixed-amount discount is
more profitable than the other. We show however that regardless of the type of dis-
counts used, it is not always optimal to induce consumers to overspend. Consumer
overspending benefits the seller only when there is a sufficient proportion of highly
deal-prone consumers in the market.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we review relevant
literature on sales promotion and consumer deal-proneness. In Section 3.3, we de-
scribe the framework, introduce the model, and define the two types of conditional
discounts considered in this chapter. Section 3.4 provides analyses of the consumer’s
problem and discusses consumer purchase behavior under different types of discounts.
Section 3.5 addresses the seller’s problem and discusses optimal discount policies that
maximize the seller’s profits. To gain more insights about the effects of each dimen-
sion of consumer heterogeneity, we also derive the structure of the optimal discount
policies and the induced outcomes under two special cases. Section 3.6 presents nu-
merical study showing that the profit improvement the seller can achieve with the use
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of conditional discounts is significant. Finally, we discuss extensions of the original
model in Section 3.7 and conclude the chapter with discussion of the main results and
future research directions in Section 3.8.
3.2 Literature Review
We will review three major streams of literature on sales promotion and consumer
deal-proneness. The first stream of work relevant to ours is on price promotions. One
of the most common forms of price promotion is a simple price markdown. Early
studies on this subject explained sales as a mechanism that increases seller’s profit
from certain groups of buyers (e.g., informed buyers in Varian 1980; low-demand and
low-holding cost buyers in Jeuland and Narasimhan 1985; brand switchers in Bell
et al. 1999). Other works analyzed the profitability of periodic price reduction poli-
cies and proposed optimization models, taking into account consumer’s promotion
response and retailer’s inventory level (Lazear , 1986; Achabal et al., 1990; Smith and
Achabal , 1998). Under these price markdown mechanisms, the deal is not contingent
on the purchase quantity. On the other hand, the current essay considers condi-
tional discounts, where the deal is realized only when buyers purchase at least the
minimum required quantity. This fundamental difference in pricing schemes allows
us to investigate another potential benefit of promotions in enticing consumers to
increase their purchase quantity to complete the deal, which is not observable under
price markdowns. A more characteristically similar price promotion mechanism to
conditional discount is quantity discount. A number of papers on quantity discount
analyzed a cost-minimizing or profit-maximizing problem of a supplier selling to a
buyer, where price discounts are given on large order sizes (Monahan, 1984; Lee and
Rosenblatt , 1986; Dada and Srikanth, 1987; Corbett and de Groote, 2000). Another
group of quantity discount literature compared different types of quantity discounts
(e.g., all-unit vs. package pricing in Wilcox et al. 1987; all-unit vs. incremental dis-
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count in Weng 1995, and Munson and Rosenblatt 1998). However, the comparison
between all-unit and fixed-amount discount has not been addressed. Furthermore,
the quantity discount literature has been largely focusing on the upstream supply
chain parties, rather than a retailer selling to end consumers like in the current essay.
The closest price promotion mechanisms to the conditional discounts, both in
terms of structure and usage, are certain forms of bundling. The bundling literature
traditionally considered only pure bundling, pure unbundling, and mixed bundling
(Schmalensee, 1984; Chuang and Sirbu, 1999; Herrmann et al., 1997). Other papers
broadened their scope to consider bundling schemes where many more combinations
of products are offered to consumers (Hanson and Martin, 1990; Venkatesh and Maha-
jan, 1993; Armstrong , 1996). However, the challenges in pricing all different bundles
reduce the attractiveness of bundling when selling a large number of products. This
gave rise to the study of customized bundling, where bundles are priced based on
quantity rather than specific components, the closest mechanism to conditional dis-
counts. Hitt and Chen (2005) and Wu et al. (2008) analyzed customized bundling
problems and compared the profitability of customized bundling, pure bundling, and
individual selling. Hui et al. (2008) studied the problem of choosing the optimal
number of sizes of bundles to offer under a customized bundling scheme. They con-
cluded that, due to the cognitive cost consumers experience when evaluating many
bundle options, a small number of versions are sufficient to capture the majority of
the potential profit from versioning. An important difference between customized
bundling and conditional discount is that under customized bundling, there are often
more than one price breakpoints and discount rates. That is, consumers may receive
a deeper discount if they purchase an even larger quantity. On the other hand, under
a conditional discount, the discount rate or the discount amount is unified as long
as the purchase quantity meets the single minimum requirement. This makes con-
ditional discount simpler to implement and more straightforward to communicate to
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consumers, which explains why conditional discounts are widely used in retailing.
The second stream of literature is on consumer response to price promotions. A
handful of papers in the framing literature compared consumer response to price
promotions framed in percentage terms and in dollar terms. For example, Bitta
et al. (1981), Chen et al. (1998), Hardesty and Bearden (2003), and Gendall et al.
(2006) compared the consumer perception of the value of price discounts presented in
percentages and dollars. Their experimental results showed that discounts on high-
priced items framed in dollars were perceived more significant than the same discounts
framed in percentage. These papers have different focus and methodology from ours.
They experimentally studied consumer response to different presentations of the exact
same price promotion; while, in the current essay, we analytically compare between
structurally different price discount policies. Other papers in this stream studied the
effects of promotions which require a minimum spending or multiple-unit purchases
on consumer purchase behavior (Wansink et al., 1998; Lee and Ariely , 2006; Kivetz
et al., 2006; Foubert and Gijsbrechts , 2007). However, they did not compare the two
types of conditional discounts considered in the current essay, and did not study the
seller’s profit-maximizing promotional strategies.
Finally, the third stream of relevant literature is on consumer deal-proneness. The
existence and characteristics of deal-prone consumers have been extensively stud-
ied over the past few decades (Hackleman and Duker , 1980; Schindler , 1989, 1998;
DelVecchio, 2005; Kukar-Kinney et al., 2012). On a related subject, Thaler (1985,
1999), and Lichtenstein et al. (1990) employed the theory of mental accounting and
reference price to explain the consumer propensity to purchase products when they
are offered on a “deal” basis as driven by transaction utility, which depends on the
perceived value of the deals. Schindler (1992) and Heath et al. (1995) provided ex-
perimental results supporting that consumers are more likely to purchase at a deal
when they are informed that the price reduction is significantly lower than the regular
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price. These studies, however, did not analytically model consumer deal-proneness
when multiple units are purchased, and did not investigate how deal-prone consumers
respond to different types of deals. There are a limited number of papers which stud-
ied the purchase behavior of deal-prone consumers under different promotion types.
Lichtenstein et al. (1997) identified a consumer segment that is deal-prone across
various types of promotions. Laroche et al. (2003) studied deal-prone consumer per-
ception and purchase intention when offered coupons and two-for-one promotions.
However, similar to the second stream of literature, the papers in this area are mostly
empirical and experimental, aiming to understand consumer behavior rather than the
seller’s profitability. which is contrastingly different from our analytical approach.
Overall, the main difference that distinguishes our work from the existing litera-
ture is that we are the first to compare the profitability and the impact on consumer
purchase behavior of all-unit and fixed-amount discount, two of the most commonly
used price promotions in retailing. Furthermore, we analytically model consumer
deal-proneness and investigate its implications on consumer spending under condi-
tional discounts.
3.3 Model
We consider a seller of one product facing heterogeneous consumers. If the seller
does not offer a discount, the product is sold at a retail price of p per unit. To reflect
a retail price regulation commonly imposed by a manufacturer, we assume that the
retail price p is exogenous to the seller, as is the case for a manufacturer’s suggested
retail price (MSRP) in practice. However, the seller can adjust the price at which the
product is sold using a price promotion (discount).
While there are many different forms of discounts used in retailing, this essay
focuses on conditional discount, which refers to a discount that is applied only when a
consumer satisfies the purchase condition (e.g. minimum purchase quantity, minimum
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spending). In particular, we examine two widely used forms of conditional discounts:
all-unit discount (A) and fixed-amount discount (F). These two forms of discounts
capture all types of the price promotions identified as most commonly employed
according to Lichtenstein et al. (1997) (e.g. buy-one-get-one-free, sales, coupons,
cents-off).1
3.3.1 Types of Conditional Promotions
All-Unit Discount (A)
In an all-unit discount, a discount is applied to all purchased units if a customer’s
purchase meets a minimum eligibility requirement (e.g. buy 2 or more and get 25%
off). To represent the terms of an all-unit discount, let r ∈ [0, 1) denote the promotion
depth, or the “percent-off,” and let K denote the minimum purchase quantity required
to obtain the discount.2 For tractability purpose, we assume that K is a continuous
parameter. We acknowledge that in practice, all-unit discounts are generally offered
for products sold in discrete quantities. However, our use of continuous quantity
provides a good approximation of the discrete quantity model without sacrificing the
insights.
Let DA = (r,K) represent an all-unit discount. Then, the purchase price for q
units of product under an all-unit discount DA is given by
P (q,DA) =
 pq if 0 ≤ q < Kp(1− r)q if q ≥ K
Notice that a standard price markdown is a special case of all-unit discounts with
K equals to the smallest sellable unit of the product (e.g. 1 shirt, half-order, 1 oz.),
1Incremental discount is another well-known form of conditional discounts, primarily used by
suppliers or manufacturers. However, given its small presence in retailing, it is not considered in
Lichtenstein et al. (1997). Hence, we do not consider incremental discount in this chapter.
2Notice that an all-unit discount with an eligibility requirement in a form of a minimum spending
can be represented in the same way since the retail price is fixed. For example, a promotion “spend
$50 or more and get 25% off” for a product priced at $25 each has K = 2.
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so that any purchase is qualified for the discount.
Fixed-Amount Discount (F)
In a fixed-amount discount, the final amount that a consumer has to pay is reduced
by a predetermined discount amount if the consumer’s purchase meets a minimum
eligibility requirement (e.g. buy 2 or more get $25 off). To represent the terms of a
fixed-amount discount, let m ≥ 0 be the “dollars-off,” which is the dollar discount
amount to be subtracted from the total price of an eligible purchase; let K be the
minimum purchase quantity to qualify for the discount.
Let DF = (m,K) denote a fixed-amount discount. Then, the purchase price for q
units of product under a fixed-amount discount DF is given by
P (q,DF ) =
 pq if 0 ≤ q < Kpq −m if q ≥ K
Notice that under a fixed-amount discount, the discount amount that a customer
receives for an eligible purchase does not go up with the total purchase quantity. On
the other hand, under an all-unit discount, the dollar discount amount is larger for
an eligible purchase of a larger quantity since the discount is applied to all purchased
units. Note also that no discount is a special case of conditional discounts when the
discount is zero (r = 0 for an all-unit discount, or m = 0 for a fixed-amount discount).
Next, we discuss different types of consumers and their corresponding utility when
purchasing the product under a conditional discount.
3.3.2 Consumer’s Types and Utility
We assume that consumers are heterogenous in two dimensions: valuation of the
product, and deal-proneness. A consumer may have a high (“high-type” h) or low
valuation (“low-type” l). A high-type consumer is willing to pay a higher price and
consume a larger quantity of the product, compared to a low-type consumer. We
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denote the proportion of high-type consumers in the market by γ. Consumers may
also differ in their responses to deals. That is, some consumers are more inclined to
purchase when a deal is present. To reflect this, we assume that there are two types
of consumers based on their cognitive behavior towards deals: value-conscious (v)
and deal-prone (d). A value-conscious consumer only draws utility from purchasing
and consuming the product (acquisition utility). On the other hand, a deal-prone
consumer draws additional utility when purchasing the product at a sufficiently large
discount (transaction utility). The proportion of deal-prone consumers in the market
is denoted by β.
Notice that the two attributes of consumers: valuation and deal-proneness, are
assessed based on different aspects of consumer purchase behavior. That is, a con-
sumer’s valuation is based solely on her liking of the product; whereas, the consumer’s
deal-proneness is based on her cognitive response towards a pricing scheme. Hence,
we assume that the two attributes are independent. This gives rise to four differ-
ent consumer segments: high-type deal-prone (hd), high-type value-conscious (hv),
low-type deal-prone (ld), and low-type value-conscious (lv), with a proportion of γβ,
γ(1− β), (1− γ)β, and (1− γ)(1− β), respectively.
A consumer’s net utility from making a purchase under a conditional discount
is a sum of the acquisition utility and transaction utility, based on the acquisition-
transaction utility theory proposed by Thaler (1985). We define acquisition and
transaction utility below.
Acquisition Utility
Following the standard practice, we define acquisition utility as a consumer’s val-
uation less the purchase price. Let Vi(q), i ∈ {h, l} denotes a type-i consumer’s
valuation (willingness to pay) for q units of the product. We assume that a type-i
consumer receives a utility of si from consuming each additional unit of the product.
However, there is a limit, θi, above which consuming additional units will not increase
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the consumer’s utility. This reflects the fact that after a certain quantity, the con-
sumer gains no additional surplus from consuming more. That is, a type-i consumer
accrues utility from the first θi units at the rate of si per unit. Beyond this limit, the
marginal utility gained from consuming an additional unit becomes zero. We assume
sl < sh and θl ≤ θh to represent that a high-type consumer has a higher willingness to
pay and a larger demand for the product, compared to a low-type consumer. Thus,
Vi(q) is given by the following equation and illustrated in Figure 3.1.
3
Vi(q) =
 siq if 0 ≤ q ≤ θisiθi if q > θi







Figure 3.1: Consumer’s valuation function
Let P (q,Dk) denotes the purchase price of q units of the product under a con-
ditional discount Dk, k ∈ {A,F}, as defined previously. Then, a type-i consumer’s
acquisition utility from purchasing q units under a conditional discount Dk is given
by
Ai(q,D
k) := Vi(q)− P (q,Dk).
Transaction Utility
In addition to acquisition utility, deal-prone consumers may draw transaction
utility from buying the product at a discount. Following empirical evidence that
consumers judge the merits of a deal by its promotion depth and dollar savings
(DelVecchio, 2005; DelVecchio et al., 2007), we assume that deal-prone consumers
3We also consider a model with linearly decreasing marginal valuation, which results in a concave
utility function, in Section 3.7.2.
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draw transaction utility whenever they make a purchase at what they perceive as a
“good deal” (measured by a promotion depth or dollar savings). More specifically,
for a deal-prone consumer to receive transaction utility, the value of the savings must
be greater than a threshold. In an all-unit discount, we assume that a deal-prone
consumer receives transaction utility of t if the promotion depth (r) is greater than or
equal to a threshold R. If she does not buy enough to qualify for the discount or if the
discount does not meet the threshold, she receives zero transaction utility. Likewise,
in a fixed-amount discount, a deal-prone consumer receives transaction utility of t if
and only if the dollars-off (m) is at least as large as a threshold M . Note however
that if a consumer is value-conscious, she does not draw transaction utility from any
discount.
Let Tj(q,D
k), j ∈ {v, d}, k ∈ {A,F} denote the transaction utility of a type-j
consumer (d for deal-prone and v for value-conscious) when she purchases q units of
the product at a conditional discount Dk. Then, the transaction utility Tj(q,D
A) for
an all-unit discount DA = (r,K) is given by:
Td(q,D
A) =
 0 if q < K or r < Rt if q ≥ K and r ≥ R Tv(q,D
A) = 0 (3.1)
Similarly, the transaction utility Tj(q,D
F ) for a fixed-amount discount DF =
(m,K) is given by equation (3.1) with r and R replaced by m and M , respectively.
We will sometimes refer to t as “cognitive surplus,” and R and M as “deal-prone
threshold.” A large value of t reflects that the deal-prone consumer receives a large
additional cognitive gain when completing a good deal. A small value of R and M
represents when the deal-prone consumer perceives almost every deal as worthy, and
is therefore easily induced to commit to a deal. The value of t, R, and M are product-
specific, and may depend on several factors. For example, a deal-prone consumer may
have a small t, R, and M for a low price tag product (e.g., bags of chips, yogurt cups)
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but a larger t, R, and M for a high price tag product (e.g., shoes, shirts, hotel rooms).
Based on the definition of acquisition utility and transaction utility given above,
the net utility of a type-ij consumer, i ∈ {l, h}, j ∈ {v, d}, who purchases q units of








In the next section, we will analyze how different types of consumers respond
to deals in the form of all-unit and fixed-amount discounts. In particular, we are
interested in comparing the effectiveness of these two types of discounts in boosting
the consumer’s purchase quantity.
3.4 Consumer’s Problem
We first examine how each type of consumers behaves when a conditional discount
is offered. More specifically, we are interested in characterizing how the valuation and
deal-proneness of a given consumer (defined by type ij) influence her purchase decision
whether to buy the product, and if so, how much.
We consider a type-ij consumer’s problem of choosing the purchase quantity (q ≥
0) that maximizes her utility.4 When facing a conditional discount Dk, k ∈ {A,F},
the consumer’s utility from purchasing a quantity q is given by Uij(q,D
k), as in
equation (3.2). Notice that acquisition utility Ai(q,D
k) depends on the consumer’s
valuation type i ∈ {l, h}; transaction utility Tj(q,Dk) depends on the consumer’s deal-
prone type j ∈ {v, d}. Both acquisition utility and transaction utility also depend on
the discount type k ∈ {A,F}. Below, we discuss the consumer’s problem of choosing
an optimal purchase quantity under an all-unit discount and a fixed-amount discount.
4We assume that if the utility from purchasing two different quantities are the same, the consumer
always chooses to purchase the larger quantity due to the lower perceived per-unit price.
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3.4.1 All-Unit Discount
In an all-unit discount DA = (r,K), the utility that a type-ij consumer draws




siq − pq if 0 ≤ q < min{θi, K}
siθi − pq if θi ≤ q < K
siq − p(1− r)q + Tj(q,DA) if K ≤ q < θi
siθi − p(1− r)q + Tj(q,DA) if q ≥ max{θi, K}
The first two expressions correspond to the consumer’s utility when she buys fewer
than the minimum requirement of K units and receives no discount. Notice that
when q ≥ θi, the consumer obtains the maximum valuation of siθi. Analogously, the
third and the fourth expressions correspond to the consumer’s utility when she buys
at least the minimum required quantity and receives the discount. Note also that,
depending on the relative size of K to θi, the second or the third interval of q may
be empty.
3.4.2 Fixed-Amount Discount
In a fixed-amount discount DF = (m,K), the utility that a type-ij consumer




siq − pq if 0 ≤ q < min{θi, K}
siθi − pq if θi ≤ q < K
siq − pq +m+ Tj(q,DF ) if K ≤ q < θi
siθi − pq +m+ Tj(q,DF ) if q ≥ max{θi, K}
Notice that the only difference between the utility under a fixed-amount discount
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and that under an all-unit discount is the discount amount. That is, the fixed-amount
discount m is independent of q as long as q ≥ K, but the discount amount received
under the all-unit scheme, prq, increases with q.
The optimal purchase decision of a consumer is characterized in Proposition 3.1.
Proposition 3.1. For a given conditional discount Dk, k ∈ {A,F}, with a minimum
purchase requirement of K, the optimal purchase decision of a type-ij consumer,
i ∈ {l, h}, j ∈ {v, d}, is characterized by two switching curves: σj(θi, Dk) and θ̄j(Dk),
as follows:
i) If si < σj(θi, D
k), no purchase is optimal.
ii) If si ≥ σj(θi, Dk) and θi < θ̄j(Dk), it is optimal to buy quantity θi < K at the
full price.
iii) If si ≥ σj(θi, Dk) and θi ≥ θ̄j(Dk), it is optimal to buy either K or θi at the
discount.
The switching curves σj(θi, D
k) and θ̄j(D
k) are increasing in p and K, and de-
creasing in the depth of the discount. Furthermore, θ̄d(D
k) ≤ θ̄v(Dk) ≤ K and
σd(θi, D
k) ≤ σv(θi, Dk) ≤ p.
Proposition 3.1 states that a type-ij consumer’s optimal purchase quantity under
a conditional discount depends on her marginal valuation of the product (si) and her
maximum consumption (θi). If the consumer has low marginal valuation compared
to the price, then she will not buy the product (part i) of the proposition). If her
marginal valuation is sufficiently high, even when her consumption level is low, she
will still buy the product at the full price (part ii) of the proposition). When both
her valuation and maximum consumption level are high, she will buy at least the
required quantity K and receive the discount. If the terms of a discount become more
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attractive (smaller K or larger r or m), the consumer’s purchase quantity increases
as the switching curves decrease.
Figure 3.2 and 3.3 together show how deal-prone consumers behave differently
from value-conscious consumers for a given conditional discount Dk.5 Since deal-
prone consumers draw additional utility when they buy at a discount, they are more
likely than value-conscious consumers to increase their purchase quantity to meet the
requirement for the discount. Consequently, the deal-prone switching curves lie below
the value-conscious switching curves, as stated in Proposition 3.1 and illustrated in
Figure 3.3. This implies that deal-prone consumers always buy no less than value-
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Figure 3.2: Value-conscious purchase
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Figure 3.3: Cognitive overspending under
a conditional discount
Figure 3.3 highlights the regions (A and B, shaded) where a deal-prone consumer
purchases a strictly greater quantity than a value-conscious consumer does. Notice
that these regions are bounded by the value-conscious and the deal-prone switching
curves. If the consumer valuation falls in Region A (high marginal valuation, low
consumption), the value-conscious consumer buys θ at no discount since her maximum
consumption level is too far from the minimum requirement K (θ is below the value-
5For notational simplicity, we drop the valuation type i and discount Dk from the expressions
displayed in the figures.
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conscious switching curve). On the other hand, the deal-prone consumer is willing to
increase her purchase quantity to K in order to qualify for the discount (θ is above the
deal-prone switching curve). In this case, the deal-prone consumer ends up buying
much more than what she could consume just to receive the satisfaction (transaction
utility) from completing the deal. If the consumer valuation falls in Region B (low
marginal valuation, high consumption), the value-conscious consumer does not buy
the product since her valuation is too low (s is below the value-conscious switching
curve). However, the deal-prone consumer still buys K units to receive the discount
(s is above the deal-prone switching curve). In this case, although the deal-prone
consumer does not highly value the consumption of the product, she ends up making
a purchase anyway due to the transaction utility she receives from the discount.
We can see that when the consumer valuation is confined by the value-conscious
and deal-prone switching curves, only deal-prone consumers, not value-conscious con-
sumers, are enticed to purchase more in order to qualify for the conditional discount.
This is because in that situation, the acquisition utility from buying at discount is
marginally lower than that from buying at no discount (or not buying). Deal-prone
consumers are actually better off purchasing a larger quantity to receive the discount
since the transaction utility they obtain with the discount is sufficient to increase their
overall utility. We define such a situation where the purchase quantity of a deal-prone
consumer is strictly greater than the purchase quantity of a value-conscious consumer
with the same valuation as “cognitive overspending.”
Note that in the other regions outside of Region A and B, both value-conscious
and deal-prone consumer behave the same. In the region above the value-conscious
switching curves (to the right of Region A and B), both value-conscious and deal-
prone consumers purchase at the discount because their valuation falls above their
respective switching curves. Likewise, in the region below the deal-prone switching
curves (to the left of Region A and B), both value-conscious and deal-prone consumers
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do not buy at the discount because their valuation falls below their switching curves.
These comparisons between the purchase behavior of value-conscious and deal-
prone consumers are summarized in Proposition 3.2.
Proposition 3.2. For a consumer valuation (θ, s) and a conditional discount Dk, k ∈
{A,F}, with a minimum purchase requirement K:
i) If (θ, s) falls between the value-conscious and deal-prone switching curves (Region
A and B in Figure 3.3), a deal-prone consumer buys K units, which is strictly
more than what a value-conscious consumer buys (i.e., cognitive overspending).
ii) In all other cases, both deal-prone and value-conscious consumer behave identi-
cally.
Next, we investigate differences between consumer behavior under the all-unit and
fixed-amount discount. To rule out the framing effects (e.g. percent-off vs. dollars-off)
and make the comparison fair, we compare the all-unit and fixed-amount discount that
require the same minimum purchase quantity and offer the same amount of savings
when a consumer buys exactly K units, i.e., DA = (r,K) and DF = (m = prK,K).
When facing these discounts, a consumer who buys K units pays the same amount
of p(1 − r)K after receiving the same discount of prK, which triggers the same
transaction utility.6
Proposition 3.3 discusses the conditions under which the consumer’s optimal pur-
chase quantity is the same or different under the all-unit and fixed-amount discount.
Proposition 3.3. For any consumer’s valuation (θ, s), an all-unit discount DA =
(r,K), and a fixed-amount discount DF = (m = prK,K):
i) The all-unit and fixed-amount switching curves are identical. That is, σj(θ,D
A) =
σj(θ,D
F ) and θ̄j(D
A) = θ̄j(D
F ), for j ∈ {v, d}.
6For this, we establish the relationship between the all-unit and fixed-amount deal-prone thresh-
olds, R and M , that M = pKR. Hence, m ≥M is equivalent to r ≥ R.
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ii) If θ > K and p(1 − r) ≤ s < p, then the consumer purchases θ units under
the all-unit discount, but K units under the fixed-amount discount. In all other
cases, the consumer purchases the same quantity under both discount schemes.
Part i) of the proposition shows that the forms of discounts do not change the
region in which a consumer buys at the discount or not. This is because the two
discounts set the same condition for the minimum purchase quantity, and the offered
discounts trigger the same transaction utility. However, part ii) of the proposition
points out that a consumer may in fact purchase different quantities under the two
types of discounts in certain situations. More precisely, when a consumer has a high
consumption level (θ > K) but moderate willingness to pay (p(1 − r) ≤ s < p), she
will buy θ under the all-unit discount, but will buy a smaller quantity of K under the
fixed-amount discount. This is because the consumer is willing to pay for the product
only at the discounted price, but not the regular price. Under the all-unit discount,
she pays the discounted price for every unit. Hence, she is willing to buy as much
as her maximum consumption level. On the other hand, under the fixed-amount
discount, the consumer essentially has to pay the full price for any units beyond K.
Since the full price is too high, the consumer has no incentive to purchase more than
what she needs to qualify for the discount.
Proposition 3.1, Proposition 3.2, and Proposition 3.3 altogether fully characterize
and compare the consumer purchase behavior under all-unit and fixed-amount dis-
counts. It is worth noting that the effects of deal-proneness on consumer purchase
behavior may be either stronger or weaker than the effects of valuation. That is, a
deal-prone consumer with a lower valuation may buy a larger or a smaller quantity,
compared to what a value-conscious consumer with a higher valuation buys.
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3.5 Seller’s Problem
We now examine the seller’s expected profit when offering a conditional discount
Dk, denoted by Π(Dk), k ∈ {A,F}. Let Πij(Dk) be the seller’s expected profit from
selling to a type-ij consumer. For instance, Πhd(D
k) represents the seller’s profit from
a high-type deal-prone consumer; likewise, Πlv(D
k) represents the seller’s profit from







k) + β(1− γ)Πld(Dk) + (1− β)γΠhv(Dk) + (1− β)(1− γ)Πlv(Dk).
To simplify our analysis, we assume in the base model that the seller’s unit cost
is normalized to 0 (e.g., the procurement/production cost is sunk, and the seller’s
objective is to maximize revenues from sales.). But later in Section 3.7.1, we will
discuss how to modify our model to reflect when the unit cost is c > 0, and show
that the presence of a positive unit cost does not change the main insights obtained
in this chapter.
For each type of conditional discounts, the seller’s problem is to choose the terms
of a discount – minimum purchase quantity K, and the discount rate r (all-unit) or
m (fixed-amount) – that maximize his expected profit. The seller may also choose to
offer no discount by setting r = 0 or m = 0. While offering a discount can boost the
sales volume, the benefit does not come for free. The seller needs to forgo the margin
in exchange for the increased sales. This intuition suggests that a conditional discount
may not provide additional profits to the seller under all circumstances. Proposition
3.4 identifies exactly when the seller should employ conditional discounts.
Proposition 3.4. [When is it optimal to offer a discount or not?] 7
i) If there exist deal-prone consumers (β > 0), no discount is never optimal.
7The results in part i) and iia) continue to hold when there are N > 2 types of consumer valuation.
62
ii) If all consumers are value-conscious (β = 0), then no discount is optimal if and
only if a) all consumers are willing to buy the product at the regular price (i.e.
sl ≥ p) or b) only high-type consumers are willing to buy the product at the
regular price and γ ≥ sl
p
.
Part i) of the proposition states that no discount can never be optimal as long as
there exist deal-prone consumers in the market. This is because the seller can always
set the terms of a discount to offer just enough discount to trigger transaction utility
of deal-prone consumers while requiring them to purchase a sufficiently large quan-
tity for the discount to be profitable. Even when all consumers are value-conscious,
conditional discounts increase the seller’s profit in all cases except when there exist
enough consumers in the market who are willing to buy the product at the regular
price (part ii)). This is because in that situation, the demand for the product is
already high without a discount offer. Hence, it is not worth increasing sales volume
by discounting the price.
Proposition 3.4 implies that there are many circumstances where the seller can
utilize a conditional discount to extract more profits. The next result discusses which
type of discounts the seller should use.
Proposition 3.5. [All-unit discount, fixed-amount discount, and price mark-
down] 8
i) When no consumers are willing to buy at the regular price (i.e., sh < p), all-unit
discount weakly dominates fixed-amount discount. Furthermore, price markdown
is an optimal all-unit discount when β ≤ β̄, for some β̄ ∈ [0, 1].
ii) In all other cases, fixed-amount discount weakly dominates all-unit discount.
8When there are N > 2 types of consumer valuation, it continues to hold that all-unit discount
weakly dominates fixed-amount discount when no consumers are willing to buy at the regular price,
and fixed-amount discount weakly dominates all-unit discount when all consumers are willing to buy
at the regular price.
63
All-unit discount outperforms fixed-amount discount when consumer willingness
to pay for the product is sufficiently low that no consumers are willing to buy at
the regular price. In this case, only the all-unit discount can induce consumers to
buy a quantity strictly greater than the minimum requirement because the price
reduction applies to all units purchased. The fixed-amount discount can at most
attract consumers to buy exactly the minimum quantity required for the discount
because consumers are not willing to pay the full price for any units beyond that.
On the other hand, if there exist some consumers in the market who are already
willing to pay for the product at the regular price, then fixed-amount discount is
more profitable than all-unit discount. If only the high-type consumers are willing to
pay the regular price, the seller’s main objective of offering a discount is to attract
low-valuation consumers, who originally are not willing to pay the regular price, to
buy the product. However, since a discount is offered to all consumers, the high-
valuation consumers, who otherwise would buy up to their maximum consumption
level at the full price, can also take advantage of the lowered price. Under the all-unit
discount, the high-valuation consumers can “free ride” on the discount for every unit
they purchase. But under the fixed-amount discount, the maximum discount amount
the high-valuation consumers can be awarded is capped. Thus, the seller’s margin and
total profit are greater with a fixed-amount discount. If all consumers are willing to
pay the regular price, notice from Proposition 3.3 part ii) that each type of consumers
always purchase the same quantity, either K or θ, under all-unit and fixed-amount
discount. If all consumers buy K, then they all receive the same discount of m = prK
under both all-unit and fixed-amount discount, and the two discounts result in the
same profit to the seller. However, if some consumers buy θ, which is strictly greater
than K (This happens when the seller intends to offer the discount to increase the
purchase quantity of the low-type only, so θl < K < θh.), then the seller has to award
them a larger amount of discount under the all-unit scheme. Hence, the fixed-amount
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scheme is more profitable.
Proposition 3.5 also shows that price markdown is optimal when most consumers
in the market are value-conscious. This is because the benefit from inducing deal-
prone consumers to overspend is not significant enough to boost the seller’s profit
when there are not enough deal-prone consumers in the market. In this case, it suffices
to use a stand price markdown to increase profits from both value-conscious and deal-
prone consumers. The seller’s optimal discount schemes discussed in Proposition 3.4
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Figure 3.4: Seller’s optimal discount schemes
In addition to identifying the seller’s optimal discount scheme, we discuss when
a conditional discount is increasingly more profitable than no discount and price
markdown in Proposition 3.6.
Proposition 3.6. An optimal conditional discount is increasingly more profitable
than no discount and price markdown when either more consumers are deal-prone (β
increases), or deal-prone consumers have a larger cognitive surplus (t increases).
A conditional discount is especially beneficial when the market is more deal-prone,
signified by either a larger proportion of deal-prone consumers, or a larger degree of
responsiveness to deals of deal-prone consumers. This is because conditional discounts
can effectively induce deal-prone consumers to overspend.
So far, we have characterized the seller’s optimal discount policies when selling to
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consumers who are heterogenous in both valuation and deal-proneness. To understand
how each dimension of consumer heterogeneity affects the seller’s discount policies, we
analyze two special cases where consumer valuation and deal-proneness are considered
in isolation.
3.5.1 Deal-Prone Market with Heterogeneous Valuation
In order to isolate the effects of the heterogeneity in consumer valuation, we
consider a special case where all consumers are deal-prone (β = 1) but they are
heterogeneous in valuation. That is, the market consists of two types of consumers:
high-valuation deal-prone, and low-valuation deal-prone.9 Hence, the seller’s profit
in (3.3) reduces to
Π(Dk) = γΠhd(D
k) + (1− γ)Πld(Dk).
When choosing the optimal discount terms, the seller needs to decide either to
offer a conservative discount, to increase purchase quantity of only the high-type
consumers, or to offer a more aggressive discount to increase purchase quantity of
the low-type consumers. Lemma 3.1 describes that it is optimal to offer a more
generous discount (larger r and/or smaller K) to generate more sales from the low-
type consumers only when there is a sufficiently large proportion of them.
Lemma 3.1. For a conditional discount of type k ∈ {A,F}, there exists a threshold
Γk ∈ [0, 1] such that offering a discount targeted to only high-type consumers is optimal
for γ > Γk. Otherwise, offering a deeper discount targeted to low-type consumers is
optimal.
We now examine how the threshold Γk changes with respect to the magnitude
of transaction utility, t. Let Γk(t) denote the switching curve that characterizes,
9The situation where all consumers are value-conscious is a special case of a deal-prone market
with t = 0.
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for a given t, at which γ the seller should target the discount at which segment of
consumers. An example of Γk(t) is shown in Figure 3.5, where the shaded region
denotes when the proportion of the high-type consumers is small (γ ≤ Γ(t)) and
hence it is optimal to target the discount at the low-type segment. Notice that since
all consumers are deal-prone, the seller should always offer some form of discounts
to increase the purchase quantity of at least one type of consumers, as previously
discussed in Proposition 3.4 part i). However, this does not mean that at least one
type of consumers should always be induced to overspend (i.e., enticed by transaction
utility to purchase more than what a value-conscious consumer would do). To induce
cognitive overspending, the seller needs to offer a deep enough discount and set a
sufficiently large minimum purchase quantity, which may or may not improve the
overall profit. Our next result identifies when cognitive overspending is indeed optimal
for the seller.
Proposition 3.7. When consumers are deal-prone but different in valuation, there
exists a continuous switching curve ΓA(t) such that for a given t:
i) If γ > ΓA(t), then r∗ ≥ R and K∗ ≥ θh (only high-type consumers overspend).
ii) If γ ≤ ΓA(t), then there exists a threshold t̂ such that r∗ ≥ R and K∗ ≥ θl (at
least low-type consumers overspend) for t > t̂.
The same results hold for the optimal fixed-amount discount DF∗ = (m∗, K∗) when
replacing ΓA(t) with ΓF (t), and r∗ ≥ R with m∗ ≥M .
Proposition 3.7 implies that it is optimal for the seller to trigger transaction utility
and induce cognitive overspending (evident by r∗ ≥ R or m∗ ≥ M) when either a)
there is a sufficiently large proportion of consumers with high valuation (large γ),
or b) the magnitude of transaction utility is sufficiently large (large t). Under these
conditions, there exist enough consumers who can be induced by transaction utility
to significantly increase their purchase quantity due to either a large consumption
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level (condition a)) or large transaction utility (condition b)). Hence, the seller can
improve profit by offering a deep discount while requiring a large minimum purchase
quantity to induce cognitive overspending.
We note, however, that when t and γ are both small, it is not always optimal to
induce cognitive overspending (i.e., it is possible to have r∗ < R or m∗ < M). Such
a situation where cognitive overspending is not optimal is illustrated by the darker
region in Figure 3.5. When the cognitive surplus is too small, the consumers are not
willing to overspend by much when they receive transaction utility. Hence, it may not
be profitable for the seller to offer a deep discount that triggers transaction utility in
exchange for a small increase in sales. In particular, when the proportion of neither
type of consumers is sufficiently large (moderate γ), it is not profitable for the seller
to induce either type of consumers to overspend since they do not have enough mass
to generate much larger sales. Notice however that as the cognitive surplus increases,
both types of consumers are willing to overspend more when their transaction utility
is triggered, making cognitive overspending more profitable for the seller. Hence, the
no-overspending region shrinks, and finally disappears.
The exact behavior of the switching curve with respect to t is rather complicated
as revealed in Figure 3.5. (The closed-form expressions of the switching curve under
each type of conditional discounts are provided in Appendix B.) As a result, for a
given γ, the terms of the optimal discount may not be monotone in t. For example,
consider γ = 0.55 in Figure 3.5. Notice that in this example, both types of consumers
do not buy at no discount since sl < sh < p. When t is small (point A), it is not
optimal to induce the consumers to overspend. Instead, it is most profitable for
the seller to offer a modest discount (r∗ = 0.4 < R) and require a small purchase
quantity (K∗ ≤ 2), just enough to get both the low-type and high-type consumers
to purchase their corresponding maximum consumption level. As t increases to a
medium value (point B), it becomes profitable to induce the high-type consumers to
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overspend since they are willing to increase their purchase quantity far beyond their
maximum consumption level (K∗ = 7, θh = 4) when receiving transaction utility
(r∗ = 0.5 = R). It is however still not profitable to induce the low-type consumers to
overspend since their consumption level is much lower (θl = 2). When t is sufficiently
large (point C), even the low-type consumers are willing to increase their purchase
quantity by a lot due to large transaction utility. Given a significant presence of the
low-type consumers in the market, it is optimal for the seller to set a smaller minimum











Figure 3.5: Switching curve ΓA(t): sl = 2.4, sh = 3, θl = 2, θh = 4, p = 4, R = 0.5
Our results for this special case show that it is not always optimal for the seller to
induce deal-prone consumers to overspend even when all consumers are deal-prone.
Next, we investigate the effects of consumer heterogeneity in deal-proneness on the
optimal discount policies.
3.5.2 Homogeneous Valuation with Heterogeneous Deal-Proneness
To isolate the effects of the heterogeneity in consumers’ attitude towards a deal,
we consider a special case where all consumers have the same valuation, characterized
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by the same s and θ, but they are either deal-prone or value-conscious. For a given
proportion of deal-prone consumers β, the seller’s profit in (3.3) can be expressed by
Π(Dk) = βΠd(D
k) + (1− β)Πv(Dk).
The seller’s optimal strategy in targeting the discount at either the deal-prone or
value-conscious segment of the market is characterized in Lemma 3.2.
Lemma 3.2. For a conditional discount of type k ∈ {A,F}:
i) There exists a threshold β̄k ∈ [0, 1) such that offering a discount to increase
the purchase quantity of only deal-prone consumers (cognitive overspending) is
optimal for β > β̄k. Otherwise, offering a discount to increase the purchase
quantity of all consumers is optimal.
ii) If consumers are willing to buy at the regular price (s ≥ p), then β̄k = 0. Other-
wise, β̄k = sθ
t+sθ
.
Lemma 3.2 part i) implies that it is optimal to induce cognitive overspending only
when there are enough deal-prone consumers in the market. Notice that in order to
induce cognitive overspending, the seller needs to offer a sufficiently deep discount
to trigger transaction utility. In exchange, the seller will set a large minimum pur-
chase quantity so that the deal-prone consumers end up purchasing a larger quantity
than the value-conscious consumers do. Such a discount does not attract the value-
conscious consumers to buy more. Hence, cognitive overspending is not profitable
when the proportion of deal-prone consumers is small.
Part ii) of the lemma reveals that if the consumers are willing to buy at the
regular price, then cognitive overspending is always optimal (evident by β̄k = 0). In
this case, since the value-conscious consumers are already willing to buy up to their
maximum consumption at the full price, it is in fact optimal to not offer them any
discount. If the consumers are not willing to pay the regular price, the threshold β̄k is
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given by a function that is decreasing in t. This implies that as deal-prone consumers
receive larger transaction utility from a deep discount, the proportion of deal-prone
consumers that is required for cognitive overspending to be profitable for the seller
gets smaller because they are willing to overspend by a larger amount.
Next, we investigate whether the all-unit discount or fixed-amount discount is
more profitable. Interestingly, as Proposition 3.8 reveals, the optimal all-unit and
fixed-amount discount always induce the same consumer purchase behavior and yield
the same profit to the seller.
Proposition 3.8. When consumers have the same valuation but are different in their
deal-proneness, the optimal all-unit discount and fixed-amount discount always result
in the same consumer purchase quantities and the same seller’s profit.10
To understand this result, consider the following two cases of a conditional dis-
count: a) cognitive overspending is optimal, and b) cognitive overspending is not
optimal. In case a), we learn from Proposition 3.2 that the deal-prone consumers buy
K while the value-conscious consumers buy less than K. Since no consumers buy
more than K, the optimal all-unit and fixed-amount discounts (DA = (r,K), DF =
(m = prK,K)) always induce the same purchase quantity, give the same discounts to
the consumers, and yield the same seller’s profit. In case b), we know from Lemma
3.2 part ii) that it is only possible when s < p. Hence, from Proposition 3.5, the
all-unit discount weakly dominates the fixed-amount discount. Notice that the only
situation where the all-unit discount DA = (r,K) can be strictly more profitable than
the fixed-amount discount is when both types of consumers buy θ > K. However, in
this case, there is always a fixed-amount discount DF = (m = prθ, θ) which induces
both types of consumers to buy the same quantity θ, and results in the same profit
of p(1− r)θ.
10This result continues to hold when t is a random variable, uniformly distributed over a finite
interval, e.g., t ∼ U [0, t̄].
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The results from the two special cases (Section 3.5.1 and 3.5.2) show that it is not
always optimal for the seller to induce deal-prone consumers to overspend. In a market
where all consumers are deal-prone, cognitive overspending can be optimal when the
magnitude of transaction utility (t) is large or the proportion of the high-type (γ)
is large. In a market where consumers have the same valuation for the product,
cognitive overspending can be optimal when the consumers have high valuation (s)
or the proportion of the deal-prone consumers (β) is large. While it is intuitive to
find that cognitive overspending is likely to be profitable when the market is highly
deal-prone (large t or large β), it is quite surprising to find that the seller is also likely
to benefit from cognitive overspending when the market has high valuation (large s
or large γ). Naturally, one would think that offering a discount to increase consumer
purchase quantities is only beneficial when the consumers have low valuation. We
show, however, that when some consumers are deal-prone, the seller can extract even
more profit when the consumers have high valuation by using a conditional discount
to induce the deal-prone consumers to overspend.
Regarding the types of discounts, we find that the all-unit and fixed-amount dis-
count may perform differently only in presence of heterogeneity in consumer valu-
ation. If consumers have the same valuation, even when they are heterogenous in
deal-proneness, both all-unit and fixed-amount discount are equally profitable. This
implies that the fundamental differences between the two mechanisms of conditional
discounts are the different effects they have on consumers with different valuations of
the product.
Our next interest is to get a sense of how much profit improvement can be gen-
erated by implementing conditional discounts under different retailing scenarios. We
employ numerical study to address this in the next section.
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3.6 Numerical Study
We conduct two sets of numerical experiments to address a few important manage-
rial questions regarding the use of conditional discounts in practice. More specifically,
we are interested in answering the following questions: 1) By how much can a seller
improve profits with a conditional discount? 2) What is the profit difference between
using all-unit and fixed-amount discounts? and 3) What factors affect the magnitude
of profit improvement from offering a conditional discount?
3.6.1 Profit Improvement
In the first numerical study, we compare the performance of different types of
discounts under a large number of different retailing scenarios. We generate 1,296
different problem instances by varying each parameter, as summarized in Table 3.1.11
θl θh sl sh p t R γ β








Table 3.1: Problem parameters for the numerical study of profit improvement
For each problem instance, we solve for the optimal price markdown, all-unit,
and fixed-amount discount, and compare the seller’s profit under different discount
schemes. Table 3.2 summarizes how much profit (in percentage) the seller can gain
by offering an optimal price markdown, all-unit, and fixed-amount discount, over no
discount. We note however that the instances where the no-discount profit is zero (p =
2.5) are excluded from the statistics presented in the table as the profit improvement
in those cases is infinite. Since only the instances where at least some consumers are
willing to pay the regular price are considered, we observe that the profit improvement
from offering the fixed-amount discount is greater than that from offering the all-unit
discount, supporting the result in Proposition 3.5. Overall, Table 3.2 provides some
11We normalize θl and sl to 1, and sh to 2 since similar effects of changing these parameters can
be observed by changing θh and p.
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evidence to support that in many cases, offering a discount can significantly increase
the seller’s profit. In particular, when using a conditional discount, the seller can
expect to see a profit improvement of as much as 20% on average, which is about
10% higher than the profit improvement obtained from a standard price markdown.
Next, we compare the performance of the all-unit and fixed-amount discount.
Out of 1,296 instances, we find that the two discounts perform equally well in 688
(53.08%) instances; all-unit discount performs better in 297 (22.92%) instances; and
fixed-amount discount performs better in 311 (24%) instances. This reveals that
about half of the time, the seller can employ either form of conditional discounts
to increase profits. However, the other half of the time, one discount scheme can
perform better than the other, calling the seller’s attention to choosing the appro-
priate type of conditional discounts for the market he is facing. In fact, the profit
differences between offering the two discount schemes can be significant, as reported
in Table 3.3. (Profit improvement of all-unit over fixed-amount discount refers to
profit from all-unit - profit from fixed-amount
profit from fixed-amount
.) In approximately 40% of the instances where the
all-unit discount performs better than the fixed-amount discount, we find that the
profit improvement is at least 10%. Likewise, an analogous analysis on the profit
improvement of the fixed-amount over all-unit discount shows a similar result that
when the fixed-amount discount performs better than the all-unit discount, the profit
improvement is at least 10% in about 40% of the instances.
Profit Improvement Statistics
when Using Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Price Markdown 10.22% 0.00% 25.45% 0.00% 98.00%
All-Unit Discount 19.37% 7.48% 27.99% 0.00% 175.76%
Fixed-Amount Discount 23.94% 10.66% 32.49% 0.00% 179.34%
Table 3.2: Statistics for the seller’s profit improvement when using conditional dis-
counts over no discount
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Profit improvement of All-unit over Fixed-amount Discounts
< −10% −10− 0% 0− 10% 10− 20% 20− 30% 30− 40% 40− 50% > 50%
106 893 177 53 49 9 7 2
Table 3.3: Profit difference between all-unit and fixed-amount discounts
3.6.2 Effects of Problem Parameters
In the second numerical study, we investigate how each parameter affects the
performance of conditional discounts, compared to other discount schemes. We sys-
tematically increase the value of each parameter at steps of 0.01, one at a time, from
the three base cases (p > sh, sl < p ≤ sh, and p ≤ sl). This results in a total of
1,400 problem instances, as summarized in Table 3.4. In each problem, we solve for
the optimal discount policies and compare the seller’s profits. Table 3.5 presents the
results.
Scenario θl θh sl sh p t R γ β
Base cases 1 2 1 2 {0.5, 1.5, 2.5} 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Increase θh 1 [2.01, 3] 1 2 {0.5, 1.5, 2.5} 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Increase t 1 2 1 2 {0.5, 1.5, 2.5} [0.21, 1] 0.2 0.2 0.2
Increase R 1 2 1 2 {0.5, 1.5, 2.5} 0.2 [0.21, 0.8] 0.2 0.2
Increase γ 1 2 1 2 {0.5, 1.5, 2.5} 0.2 0.2 [0.21, 1] 0.2
Increase β 1 2 1 2 {0.5, 1.5, 2.5} 0.2 0.2 2 [0.21, 1]
Increase p 1 2 1 2 [0.51, 2.5] 0.2 0.2 2 0.2
Table 3.4: Problem parameters for the numerical study of effects of parameters on
the profit improvement
Scenario
Optimal Policy Vs. Optimal Policy Vs. All-unit Vs.
No Discount a Price Markdown Fixed-Amount
Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Base cases 58.74% 58.74% 81.19% 3.50% 1.33% 4.95% 9.26% 7.79% 10.08%
Increase θh 47.38% 1.33% 47.14% 4.53% 1.23% 5.66% 11.43% 10.50% 10.08%
Increase t 65.96% 73.08% 50.76% 8.31% 9.17% 8.33% 9.26% 7.79% 8.25%
Increase R 58.57% 57.77% 57.48% 3.44% 1.33% 3.98% 9.27% 7.79% 7.79%
Increase γ 4.17% 3.01% 11.66% 3.52% 1.72% 4.43% 2.97% 0.07% 5.28%
Increase β 65.46% 68.45% 55.81% 8.33% 9.17% 6.57% 9.36% 7.79% 8.42%
Increase p 81.52% 91.70% 63.87% 4.74% 1.27% 5.38% 8.67% 7.85% 7.50%
Table 3.5: Statistics for profit improvement with respect to changes in problem pa-
rameters
aThe statistics for the comparisons with no discount does not include the case of p > sh since no
discount profit is zero.
As in Table 3.2, the profit improvement of the optimal policy vs. no discount
and the profit improvement of the optimal policy vs. price markdown in Table 3.5
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measure the gains in profits from using the better one of the all-unit and fixed-amount
discount. The profit improvement of the all-unit vs. fixed-amount discount measures
the profit difference between using the two types of conditional discounts. From the
table, we observe that an increase in θh, γ, and R lead to a smaller profit improvement;
while, an increase in p, t, and β lead to a larger profit improvement of the optimal
conditional discount over no discount and price markdown. This is because as θh and
γ increase, consumers have larger consumption and higher willingness to pay for the
product. These characteristics of consumers contribute to a larger sales volume in
the market, making it less necessary for the seller to employ a conditional discount to
boost sales. Analogously, when the regular price of the product increases, the sales
volume decreases. In this case, offering a discount is needed in order to generate more
sales, and requiring a minimum purchase quantity for the discount helps improve sales
even further. The profit improvement obtained from the use of conditional discounts
is also strengthened when the market is more deal-prone, caused by a decrease in
R, an increase in t, or an increase in β, following the results we have discussed in
Proposition 3.6.
The profit difference between all-unit and fixed-amount discount is shown to be
most affected by a change in θh and γ. More precisely, the profit difference increases
with θh but decreases with γ. To understand this result, recall from the discussion
of Proposition 3.5 that the all-unit discount is more profitable than the fixed-amount
discount when consumers buy strictly more under the all-unit discount (θ) than un-
der the fixed-amount discount (K, where K < θ). Hence, as θh increases, the profit
difference becomes larger. On the other hand, the fixed-amount discount is more prof-
itable than the all-unit discount when the high-type consumer buys their maximum
consumption level (θh, where θh > K) but receives a larger discount amount under
the all-unit discount (prθh under all-unit; m = prK under fixed-amount). In this
case, the profit difference becomes larger when the discount rate and θh are larger.
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Notice that the seller is likely to offer a larger discount rate when there are more
low-type consumers in the market (γ small). This explains why the profit difference
decreases with γ.
3.7 Extension
3.7.1 Positive Unit Cost
In our base model, we assume that the unit cost is normalized to 0. Here, we
modify the model to reflect when the seller incurs a unit cost of c for each unit sold,
where 0 < c < p. Notice that a positive unit cost has no effects on the consumer’s
problem since consumers do not observe the cost. Hence, all results regarding the
consumer purchase behavior (Section 3.4) continue to hold.
For the seller’s problem, the presence of a positive unit cost affects the seller’s
profit as follows. The seller’s profit from selling q units under an all-unit discount
DA = (r,K) is given by (p(1 − r) − c)q if q ≥ K, and (p − c)q if q < K. Likewise,
the seller’s profit from selling q units under a fixed-amount discount DF = (m,K) is
given by (p − c)q −m if q ≥ K, and (p − c)q if q < K. Hence, with a positive unit
cost, we find that the region where no discount is optimal becomes larger, and the
region where cognitive overspending is optimal becomes smaller. Consequently, the
following results need to be modified to reflect a positive unit cost. Proposition 3.4
part i), which states that no discount is not optimal as long as there exist deal-prone
consumers, will hold only when the unit cost is not too large. (We can prove that
there exists a threshold c̄ such that the result holds as long as c < c̄.) Condition b)
of Proposition 3.4 part ii) will be changed from sl < p ≤ sh and γ ≥ slp to sl < p ≤ sh
and γ ≥ sl−c
p−c . Notice that the threshold on γ is smaller with a positive unit cost than




), implying that the region where no discount is optimal is
larger. Likewise, the results for the two special cases (Section 3.5.1 and 3.5.2) will be
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affected in the same way that no discount is more likely to be optimal and cognitive
overspending is less likely to be optimal. Other than these, all other results continue
to hold in presence of a positive unit cost.
3.7.2 Concave Consumer Valuation
In our base model, we assume that a consumer type i ∈ {l, h} has a constant
marginal valuation of si for the first θi units of consumption. Here, we consider an
alternate form of the consumer valuation in which the marginal valuation is linearly
decreasing in the units consumed, as adopted in Chuang and Sirbu (1999). More
precisely, let v0 be the marginal valuation of the first unit of goods. Then, for a
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Solving the consumer’s problem with this acquisition utility, we obtain similar results
as in Proposition 3.1. That is, the consumer’s optimal purchase quantity under
a conditional discount DA = (r,KA) and DF = (m,KF ) is characterized by two
thresholds: θj(v0, D
k) and θ̄j(v0, D
k), k ∈ {A,F}, such that a type-ij consumer buys
a quantity smaller than Kk at no discount if θi < θj(v0, D
k), buys exactly Kk at
discount if θj(v0, D
k) ≤ θi < θ̄j(v0, Dk), and buys more than Kk at discount if
θi ≥ θ̄j(v0, Dk), i ∈ {l, h}, j ∈ {v, d}. Furthermore, if KA = KF and m = prK,
then θj(v0, D
A) = θj(v0, D
F ) and θ̄j(v0, D
A) ≤ θ̄j(v0, DF ). Figure 3.6a and 3.6b
graphically illustrate the consumer’s optimal purchase quantity, qj(θi), under the all-
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Figure 3.6: Optimal purchase quantity under a conditional discount with a concave
valuation: a. all-unit, b. fixed-amount
We also find that there exists a region where a deal-prone consumer overspends
(buys strictly more than what a value-conscious consumer does) under the all-unit
and fixed-amount discount, analogous to Proposition 3.2. Likewise, there exists a
region (θ > θ̄j(v0, D
A)) where a consumer purchases strictly more under the all-unit
discount than under the fixed-amount discount, similar to Proposition 3.3.
Given that the consumer’s problem with concave valuation shares similar charac-
teristics as that in the base model with linear valuation, we can infer similar results
for the seller’s problem. First, for DA = (r,K) and DF = (prK,K), we have that
the all-unit discount weakly dominates the fixed-amount discount when consumers
valuation (v0) is sufficiently low, and the fixed-amount discount weakly dominates
the all-unit discount otherwise. Furthermore, when all consumers have the same val-
uation but are different in their deal-proneness, we continue to have that the all-unit
and fixed-amount discount yield the same seller’s profits.
3.7.3 Endogenous Price
Previously, we have assumed that the retail price p is exogenously given. Here,
we extend our model to consider the situation where the seller can optimize the
retail price in addition to the discount term. Hence, the seller’s problem under each
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discount scheme involves three decision variables: the regular price p, the discount
rate r for all-unit or discount amount m for fixed-amount discount, and the minimum
purchase quantity K. Given large degrees of freedom in the discount terms, there
can be multiple optimal prices for a given problem. However, we can show for each
discount scheme that an optimal price is either p = sl (all consumers are willing to
pay the regular price), p = sh (only high-type consumers are willing to pay the regular
price), or p = shθh+t
θh(1−R)
(no consumers are willing to pay the regular price).12
Let pA and pF denote the optimal price under the all-unit and fixed-amount dis-
count, respectively. If pA = pF , then all results in the base model with exogenous
price follow immediately. Otherwise, Proposition 3.5 implies that the all-unit discount
can be better than the fixed-amount discount only when pA = shθh+t
θh(1−R)
. Likewise, the
fixed-amount discount can be better than the all-unit discount only when pF is sl
or sh. Furthermore, we can show that the result in Proposition 3.5 part i), which
states that price markdown is an optimal all-unit discount for β < β̄ still holds, and
we continue to have that the optimal all-unit and fixed-amount discount result in
identical outcome when consumers have homogeneous valuation but different levels
of deal-proneness, as in Proposition 3.8.
3.8 Conclusion
Motivated by consumer behavior in retailing, this chapter discusses how price
promotions influence purchase decisions of different types of consumers, and which
type of promotions is most profitable to the seller under which market situations.
We consider a market where consumers can be heterogeneous in two dimensions:
willingness to pay for the product and the deal-proneness to a discount offer, and focus
on two popular types of conditional promotions: all-unit discount and fixed-amount
discount. Our study shows that deal-prone consumers may be induced to overspend
12See Appendix B for the proof.
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when offered a conditional discount. As a result, retailers can employ conditional
discounts to effectively improve their profitability, especially when facing a market of
consumers with low willingness to pay and high deal-proneness. We find, however,
that it is not always optimal for the seller to induce consumer overspending. Only
when there is a sufficiently large proportion of highly deal-prone or high-valuation
consumers in the market that inducing overspending can be profitable.
Another key finding is that, depending on the market, one conditional discount
scheme can perform better than the other. We show that when consumers are not
willing to pay the regular price for the product, the all-unit discount outperforms
the fixed-amount discount because only the all-unit discount can induce consumers
to buy strictly more than the minimum quantity required for the discount. On the
other hand, when some consumers are already willing to pay the regular price, the
fixed-amount discount is more profitable than the all-unit discount. In this case, the
fixed-amount discount awards only a limited discount amount, less than that awarded
under the all-unit scheme, to the consumers who otherwise would voluntarily pay the
regular price. Hence, it allows the seller to maintain a greater profit margin. Based
on these findings, an important implication is that an all-unit discount should be
adopted to stimulate sales of a high price tag product or a newly-launched item;
while, a fixed-amount discount is more effective as a frequent promotion of a low
price tag or established brand-named product. Our key results are shown robust
to changes in modeling assumptions, suggesting that the insights from this chapter
apply to a broad range of realistic retailing situations.
There are a few aspects of price promotions and consumer psychology relevant to
our problem that are not included in the current study, but can serve as interesting fu-
ture research directions. We will discuss two major areas here. The first area involves
post-promotion effects. As reported in several studies, price promotions may lead
consumers to experience sticker shock due to the downward price expectation they
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develop after seeing the product sold at a cheaper price during the promotion period
(DelVecchio et al., 2007). Such effect may be more or less intense under different dis-
count schemes, and may pose a limitation on the discount rate that should be offered.
These factors could affect the profitability of conditional discounts, which may lead
to different results from this essay. The second area is framing and promotional vehi-
cles. When consumers make a purchase decision in an actual shopping scenarios, they
are sometimes influenced by how a promotion is framed (e.g., dollars-off, percent-off,
Buy-X-Get-Y-Free, Buy-X-for-Y) and how it is awarded (e.g., coupons, straight off
the shelf) in addition to the discount term. For example, Chen et al. (1998) reported
that for high-price products, a price reduction framed in dollar terms was perceived
more significant than the same price reduction framed in percentage terms. Dhar
and Hoch (1996) found that coupons lead to higher sales compared to straight-off-
the-shelf price discounts. Taking consumer psychological response to different forms
of promotions into account, the seller’s joint decision on the discount term and its
vehicle can be complicated, yet meaningful to study.
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CHAPTER 4
Dynamic Pricing or Dynamic Logistics?
4.1 Introduction
An important operational problem faced by retailers is how to most effectively
match inventory to customer demand over a selling horizon. This problem becomes
especially challenging for retailers who sell their products through multiple channels
or stores. While multi-channel retailing is found to be associated with enhanced
customer loyalty and sales growth, it requires extra efforts in coordinating channel
strategies to efficiently serve customers across channels (Neslin et al., 2006). If not
managed well, a multi-channel environment could result in a supply-demand mis-
match, and hurt the retailer. For example, Best Buy reported that 2 to 4 percent of
its online traffic did not result in a purchase because the inventory was out of stock
at distribution centers, and hence, was shown on the website as unavailable. The
company estimated, however, that in 80 percent of those cases, the products were in
fact available at one of its stores. The Best Buy CEO Hubert Joly admitted that
this lost sales due to the stockouts at their online channel represented a very large
number (Schinkel , Jun. 25, 2013; Blair , Jul. 1, 2013).
To efficiently balance inventory and demand in a multi-channel environment, re-
tailers may deploy various tools from marketing and supply chain management. The
most common marketing tools involve some form of pricing and promotions, aiming
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to shape demand to match with available inventory at each channel. These are often
implemented through channel-specific discounts or promotions such as online-only
sale events at Forever21, and in-store-only coupons at Staples. In fact, a number
of major retailers like JC Penney, Kohl’s, and Walmart, explicitly state under their
pricing policies that they do not match the prices of an item sold in-store and online
(DeNicola, May 13, 2013). JC Penney explains that it may offer a clearance discount
on an online item if it does not sell as quickly as it does it store (Brownell , May 31,
2013); whereas, Walmart attributes this pricing policy to differences in distribution,
regional competition and other factors (Walmart.com).
Alternatively, retailers can better manage and allocate their inventory across mul-
tiple channels in pace of sales. For example, retailers like Macy’s, Nordstrom, and
Toys ‘R’ Us leverage their store inventory to fulfill online orders through the practice
known as “ship-from-store distribution” (Lynch, Jul. 18, 2013). A Canadian clothing
company, Roots, utilizes inventory for online orders to fulfill an in-store purchase by
offering to ship items, which are out of stock in stores, to an in-store customer’s house
(Financial-Post , Sep. 24, 2013).
Although both pricing and inventory strategies are intended to serve the same
purpose of reducing supply-demand mismatch and increasing the firm’s profit, many
retailers choose to adopt both of these strategies, sometimes in an uncoordinated
way. This raises an important research question as to whether managing the supply-
demand balance in a multi-channel environment using a pricing tool or an inventory
tool is more effective under which situations. Furthermore, if a retailer uses both
tools, how do they interact with each other?
In this chapter, we consider a dual-channel retailer selling over a finite horizon.
The retailers in this category include many of the major department stores, electron-
ics stores, and fashion retailers, who offer short life-cycle products both online and
in physical stores (“brick-and-click” retailers). Facing uncertain and price-sensitive
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demand at each channel, the retailer may use a pricing strategy (charging different
prices at different channels), or a transshipment strategy (transferring inventory be-
tween store and distribution center) 1 to maximize total profits from sales. We are
interested in answering the following research questions:
1. What is the optimal dynamic pricing and transshipment strategy?
2. What factors affect the benefit of price differentiation and transshipment?
3. Is transshipping inventory more or less effective than differentiating prices under
which situations?
4. If the retailer adopts both price-differentiating and transshipment strategies,
how is the optimal pricing decision influenced by the transshipping decision,
and vice versa?
We model a joint dynamic pricing and transshipping problem, where the retailer
incurs a unit transaction cost when selling the product at each channel, and a unit
transshipping cost when making a transshipment of inventory between the channels.
An arriving customer decides whether to purchase the product from one of the avail-
able channels, based on her valuations and the observed prices at the channels. In
this setting, although both channels sell the same product, the customer may de-
rive different utilities when purchasing from different channels due to the nature of
transactions (e.g. ability to try on) and associated costs (e.g. shipping fee) involved.
Hence, the product sold at one channel can be perceived as a different product from
the product sold at the other channel. This justifies the assumption that the customer
choice model follows the multinomial logit (MNL) model, which is widely used in the
multi-product literature.
1This is an instance of lateral transshipments (stock movements between locations of the same
echelon (Paterson et al., 2011))
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To answer the research questions, we first consider the situation where the re-
tailer can adopt either a price differentiation policy or an inventory transshipment
policy in the current period, but not both. We characterize the retailer’s optimal
dynamic pricing and transshipping policies. Our findings show that the optimal price
differentiation policy always results in a larger probability of making a sale in the
current period, compared to what would happen under the optimal uniform pricing
policy. On the other hand, a transshipment in the current period may or may not
be profitable, and an optimal transshipment decision may result in either a larger or
a smaller probability of making a sale in the current period. We also investigate the
factors that affect the benefit from adopting a price differentiation policy or a trans-
shipment policy. Next, we consider the situation where the retailer can utilize both
price differentiation and inventory transshipment. We show that transshipment can
increase the value of the remaining inventory at the channel from which the trans-
shipment is made, allowing the retailer to charge a higher price for the product at
the channel. Transshipment can also be used to replenish stock at the channel that
stocks out. This makes it possible for the retailer to continue selling the product at
both channels and benefit from price differentiation.
To further investigate the benefit of price differentiation and transshipment, we
conduct a numerical study. Our results show that the benefit of price differentiation
is generally larger than the benefit of transshipment. However, when the retailer’s
inventory position is significantly out of balance (e.g. very low inventory at the
channel with high customer valuation), transshipment can be more effective than
price differentiation. We also find that the benefit of price differentiation and the
benefit of transshipment may either substitute or complement each other. When the
retailer’s inventory position is unfavorable (low inventory at the high-margin channel),
the two mechanisms substitute each other since the retailer can use either mechanism
to try to adjust his inventory position in the intended direction. On the other hand,
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when the retailer’s inventory position is already favorable (high inventory at the
high-margin channel), the same balance of the inventory levels at the channels should
be maintained. In this case, the two mechanisms are complementarily employed to
influence the inventory position in the opposite direction, so that the balance is kept.
4.2 Literature Review
Our research problem lies in the area of both dynamic pricing and transship-
ment decisions for multi-channel retailers. These two topics have been studied in the
Operations Management as well as the Marketing literature. We will review three
main streams of relevant work: dynamic pricing, transshipment for multi-location or
multi-channel retailers, and joint dynamic pricing and inventory policies.
Dynamic pricing problems have received much attention from the academia due to
its popularity and practicality in many industries. One of the most influential works
in this field is Gallego and van Ryzin (1994), who consider a dynamic pricing problem
of a single product over a finite horizon, and show that the optimal price is strictly
decreasing in the stock level but increasing in the length of the selling horizon. A
similar problem is considered in Bitran and Mondschein (1997), with extensions to
periodic-review pricing and pricing policies with announced discounts. Their compu-
tational experiments reveal that loss of profits when using periodic review instead of
continuous review is small. With announced discounts, the resulting optimal prices
allow the store to sell most of the merchandise during the first periods and avoid
offering large discounts toward the end of the horizon. A natural extension of these
works is to consider a dynamic pricing problem for multiple products. When a firm
sells multiple products, the demand for each product may be influenced by the avail-
ability and price of the other products that the customers consider as substitutes.
This gives rise to research problems on dynamic pricing of substitutable products.
A similarity between the setting where a retailer sells substitutable products and
87
our setting where the retailer sells an identical product through multiple channels is
that a customer’s decision on which product to buy or where to buy it from depends
on her valuations and prices of all the possible choices. Hence, we assume our cus-
tomer choice model is characterized by the MNL model, which is widely used among
the substitutable products literature. Dong et al. (2009) study a dynamic pricing
problem of multiple substitutable products, where the customer’s choice is explained
by the MNL model. They show that dynamic pricing converges to static pricing as
inventory levels of all products approach the number of remaining selling periods.
Furthermore, their numerical findings, considering only two substitutable products,
suggest that the performance of unified dynamic pricing (charging the same price for
all products) is closest to that of the full-scale dynamic pricing especially when the
quality difference among the products decreases. Suh and Aydin (2011) considers a
dynamic pricing problem of two substitutable products; they also adopts the MNL
model to describe the customer’s choice. They provide analytical results showing that
the marginal value of an item is increasing in the remaining time and decreasing in
the stock level of either product; however, the optimal prices of an item do not always
behave in the same direction as the marginal value. Another multi-product pricing
paper using logit models is Li and Huh (2011). They consider the nested logit model
and show the concavity of the seller’s profit function with respect to market shares
in a single-period setting. This result can be applied to other settings, including the
joint inventory and dynamic pricing problem, to find optimal policies. While these
papers consider similar customer choice model and seller’s dynamic pricing problem
to ours, they do not consider inventory transshipments since the substitutable prod-
ucts in their settings are not identical. Additionally, no analytical results regarding
the benefits of price differentiation are provided.
Another group of pricing papers which are relevant to our work is in the area of
multi-channel pricing. According to some earlier studies and practitioners’ beliefs,
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retailers generally keep consistent prices across distribution channels to maintain a
strong brand and to avoid customers’ irritation due to the perception of price unfair-
ness (Neslin et al., 2006; Campbell , 1999). However, other studies argue that channel-
based price differentiation could be justified by differences in channel characteristics
and the fact that consumers derive different utility from various distribution channels
(Chu et al., 2007; Kacen et al., 2003). Hence, options to differentiate price levels
among channels can in fact create opportunities for firms to improve their pricing
strategies (Sotgiu and Ancarani , 2004). Based on data collected from multi-channel
retailers, Wolk and Ebling (2010) find that many multi-channel retailers do engage in
channel-based price differentiation, with some indication that this tendency increases
over time. Analytical works on multi-channel pricing mostly consider a dual-channel
seller selling a product through a physical store and an online store. Yan (2008) as-
sumes that customers value a purchase from the physical store more than that from
the online store. It is shown that the optimal online price is higher than the physical
store price if and only if the marginal cost to sell the product online is far larger
than the marginal cost to sell through the physical channel. Shen and Zhang (2012)
consider a market with two groups of customers: fashion customers who value an
online purchase more, and traditional customers who value a physical-store purchase
more. They show that when there exist enough fashion customers and the unit cost
for the online channel is low, it is profitable for the seller to offer the product through
the online channel in addition to the traditional store, and charge a higher price.
These papers consider a pricing problem of a dual-channel retailer similar to our es-
say. However, they study a single-period problem with different customer’s choice
models from ours, and without inventory or transshipment consideration.
The second stream of relevant literature is on inventory transshipments in a multi-
location system. Rudi et al. (2001) study a problem of two retail firms at distinct
locations selling the same product; the firm who runs out of stock may receive a
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transshipment from the other firm with surplus inventory at a cost. Under central
coordination, this problem is similar to our transshipment problem in the sense that
the system’s objective is to make transshipment decisions which maximize the total
profits. However, they consider a single-period model, where demand at the two loca-
tions are independent and retail prices are exogenously given. A multi-period setting
is considered in Hu et al. (2005), where a centralized-ordering system of N stores
periodically decides on order sizes, allocation quantities, and if necessary, emergency
transshipments among the stores, in order to minimize the total expected cost until
the end of the horizon. Since they focus on inventory problems and the systems’s
objective is to minimize costs rather than maximize profits, dynamic pricing is not
addressed. For additional review of inventory transshipment literature, please see
Paterson et al. (2011).
The closest literature to the current essay is in the area of joint dynamic pricing
and inventory policies. A joint dynamic pricing and inventory problem of a distri-
bution system consisting of multiple geographically dispersed retailers is considered
in Federgruen and Heching (2002). In each period, the system decides on size of a
replenishment, the price to be charged, and the allocation of any arriving order to
the retailers. They provide an approximate model where a base-stock/list-price pol-
icy is optimal. The optimal price is shown to be nonincreasing in the system-wide
inventory position. What differentiates our work form their work is that we allow
prices at different locations to differ; whereas, in their model, the price in each period
is applied to all stores. Moon et al. (2010) study a joint dynamic pricing and inven-
tory problem in a dual-channel supply chain system. A customer chooses to buy the
product from the channel where she receives a larger surplus. Under the vertical in-
tegration setting, the manufacturer decides on the production quantity as well as the
price for each channel. Their inventory problem is rather different from ours because
they assume that production can occur at any time. Hence, there are no stockouts,
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and no need for transshipments in their model. Another relevant work in this area
is Ceryan et al. (2013), who study a joint dynamic pricing and capacity allocation
problem for two substitutable products sharing a flexible resource. Their results sug-
gest that the availability of a flexible resource helps maintain stable price differences
across products over time even though the price of each product may fluctuate. The
allocation of a flexible resource among substitutable products is similar to the option
to transship inventory among the channels in our model. However, in their setting,
the products can be replenished in each period; while, in our setting, the inventory
is not replenishable. This difference can lead to different implications of inventory
decisions on the system’s performance. The closest work to ours in terms of inventory
model is Bitran et al. (1998), considering a dynamic pricing problem of a retail chain
of multiple stores, who has an option to transfer merchandise among stores at a cost.
They propose a heuristic and numerically show that it performs better than the cur-
rent practice in a fashion retail chain in Chile. While the transshipment problem in
their paper is similar to the transshipment problem that we consider, there are some
notable differences in other dimensions. Their paper considers coordinated prices and
independent demand among stores. On the other hand, we allow different stores to
charge different prices and let a customer’s purchase decision depend on her valua-
tions and prices of all stores. Furthermore, we analytically characterize the optimal
pricing and transshipping policies, and investigate their benefits to the retailer.
To our best knowledge, we are the first to consider a joint dynamic price differ-
entiating and inventory transshipping policy for a dual-channel retailer. This model
enables us to answer important questions regarding best practices in pricing and
transshipping strategies, which have not been addressed by existing literature, for
instance: How do transshipping policies affect pricing policies, and vice versa? Is
transshipping more or less effective than pricing, under what situations? We address
these questions in subsequent sections.
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4.3 Model
We consider a retailer who sells a seasonal product through two channels (e.g.
“brick-and-click” retailer who sells products both online and at a physical store,
retailer who has two physical stores at different locations) over a finite horizon of
length T . Since the selling horizon is short, we assume no replenishment can take
place during the horizon. No salvage value is obtained for unsold units at the end
of the horizon. Stocks of the product are kept at two separate locations, dedicated
for demand arriving at each channel. At the beginning of period t = 1, ..., T , the




i ≥ 0 is the level of inventory to
satisfy demand at channel i ∈ {1, 2}. The retailer decides on i) whether to transship
any stock from one channel to the other2, and ii) how much to charge for the product
sold at each channel.





is the amount of inventory being transshipped from channel i to channel j, i 6= j.
For simplicity, any transshipment is assumed to occur instantaneously and before a
customer arrival in each period.3 Let Yt = (Y t1 , Y
t






ji − stij, i, j ∈
{1, 2} denote the inventory level at channel i after a transshipment is made in period
t. Notice that a transaction can occur at channel i only when Y ti > 0. We let
A(Yt) = {i : Y ti > 0} denote the set of channels with the product available in stock.





price of a unit of product sold at channel i in period t. In each period, a pricing
policy pt is made based on the updated inventory level Yt, and is announced before
a customer arrival.
2A transshipment in our setting refers to the practice where inventory dedicated for a channel is
used to satisfy demand at the other channel with or without the actual transfer of inventory between
two warehouses.
3Transshipment lead times can be incorporated with slight modifications.
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4.3.1 Customer Choice Model
We assume that each period is short enough that at most one customer arrives,
and each customer buys at most one unit of the product. The probability that a
customer arrives and demands the product in a single period t is λt ∈ [0, 1]. Due to
easy access to price and availability information nowadays, we assume that an arriv-
ing customer can observe the product price and availability at both channels before
making a purchase decision. Hence, pt1, p
t
2, and A(Y
t) are known to the customer.4
The customer only considers purchasing the product from one of the channels with
product availability (i ∈ A(Yt)). We adopt a multinomial logit model (MNL), which
has been extensively used in the marketing and operations management literature,
to describe the choice of an arriving customer to make a purchase from one of the
available channels, or neither. The MNL model nicely captures both the known and
random factors that influence the purchase decision of a utility-maximizing customer
in a dual-channel setting while still providing desirable properties, which make the
analyses tractable.
Let Ui = vi − pi + ζi be a customer’s net utility from purchasing a unit of the
product from channel i ∈ A(Yt) at price pi, where vi denotes the customer’s net
valuation from the purchase, and ζi is a Gumbel error term with mean 0 and shape
parameter 1. The customer’s net valuation vi represents the product valuation ad-
justed for channel-specific (dis)utilities. These include, for instance, the ability to try
on the product, traveling time, customer service, time until the product arrives, etc.
Although the customer’s valuation of the product itself should generally be the same
for both channels, the customer may have shopping preferences for a channel over
the other, resulting in different net valuation of the purchase at each channel. The
random variable ζi represents the utility influenced by unobservable characteristics.
4Customers do not need to know the exact inventory level at each channel, but they can observe
whether the product is in stock or out of stock at each channel.
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We assume that ζ1 and ζ2 are independent and identically distributed.
Let µi be the probability that an arriving customer purchases from channel i ∈
{1, 2}, and µ0 be the probability that the customer does not purchase. Then, we have
the following well-known results from the MNL model (Luce, 1959; McFadden, 1974),










if i ∈ A(Yt)







j∈A(Yt) exp(vi − pti)
For notational simplicity, we will sometimes write µi(p
t, A(Yt)) as µi when p
t
and A(Yt) are clearly stated in the context.
4.3.2 Retailer’s Problem
In a period t = 1, ..., T , the retailer’s problem is to decide whether to make a
transshipment from one channel to the other: st = (st12, s
t
21), and what price to
charge for the product sold at each channel: pt = (pt1, p
t
2). Notice that if the product
is out of stock at channel i (Y ti = 0), then p
t
i becomes irrelevant since a customer will
never consider buying the product from channel i. We let pti →∞ for i /∈ A(Yt).
The unit transshipment cost from channel i to channel j is mij ≥ 0. To avoid un-
necessary transshipments, we assume that st12 · st21 = 0. Since a transshipment occurs
instantaneously, we can innocuously restrict the retailer’s transshipment decision to
be such that a positive transshipment may be made only when the current inventory
at the destination channel is zero.5 Furthermore, since the retailer can sell at most
one unit in each period, there is no need to transship more than one unit at a time.
As a result, the transshipment decisions in our model can be simplified to stij ∈ {0, 1}
5This practice corresponds to “reactive transshipment,” as opposed to “proactive transshipment”,
in Paterson et al. (2011).
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for all t = 1, ..., T .
We assume that the production cost of the product is sunk. However, the retailer
incurs a total unit transaction cost of cti when a unit of product is sold at channel
i ∈ {1, 2}.
Let V t(It) denote the retailer’s expected discounted profit-to-go under the optimal
policy in period t with the initial inventory level It = (I t1, I
t
2), t = 1, ..., T , and a
discount rate β ∈ [0, 1]. Then, the retailer’s dynamic program when he can adopt
both price differentiating and inventory transshipping policies is given by:
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ji − stij for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, t = 1, ..., T
(inventory level after transshipment),
0 ≤ stij ≤ Iti , stij = 0 if Itj > 0 for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, t = 1, ..., T
(transshipment constraints),
pti ≥ 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}, t = 1, ..., T (nonnegative pricing),
V 0(I) = 0 for all I (end of horizon).
Notice that since the customer only considers purchasing from a channel where the
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product is available, we have µi > 0 if and only if Y
t
i ≥ 1. To simplify the expressions,
we define ∆ti(I) = V
t−1(I) − V t−1(I − ei), for i ∈ {1, 2}, where e1 = (1, 0) and
e2 = (0, 1). That is, ∆
t
i(I) is the marginal value of the product at channel i, given
the inventory level I and the remaining time t. Then, we can rewrite the retailer’s
profit-to-go as:











pt1 − ct1 − β∆t1
(






pt2 − ct2 − β∆t2
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−m12st12 −m21st21 + λtJ t(pt, st,Yt)
}
(4.2)
Here, we let J t denote the terms in the retailer’s profit-to-go which involve the re-
tailer’s pricing decisions.
Furthermore, to help explain the effects of pricing on the retailer’s profit more
intuitively, we define “sale ratio” as follows.
Definition 4.1. Sale ratio [R(pt, A(Yt))] is the probability of making a sale divided
by the probability of not making a sale in the current period, for given prices and




When the product price is set optimally, we refer to the resulting sale ratio as the
optimal sale ratio [Rt∗ = R(pt∗, A(Yt))].
In the next section, we will characterize the retailer’s optimal pricing and trans-
shipping policy.
4.4 Optimal Pricing and Transshipping Policies
To understand how the price differentiation and inventory transshipment mech-
anism work independently or concurrently to help improve the retailer’s profit in a
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dual-channel environment, we consider situations where the retailer implements each
mechanism alone, and when he can implement both mechanisms together. To rep-
resent different policy options, we will denote a joint pricing-transshipping policy
with AB, where A ∈ {u, d} denotes the pricing option (u for uniform pricing, d for
differentiated pricing), and B ∈ {n, t} denotes the transshipment option (n for no
transshipment, t for transshipment). For example, if the retailer adopts a policy of
type dt, he can set different prices at the two channels, and make an inventory trans-
shipment from the non-empty location to the empty location. On the other hand,
under a policy of type un, the retailer always sets the same price at both channels,
and cannot transfer any inventory between the channels. Table 4.1 summarizes the
four types of policies we consider in this essay.
Price Differentiation No Transshipment With Transshipment
Yes dn dt
No un ut
Table 4.1: Possible pricing and transshipping policies
As a benchmark, we first study the base model where the retailer adopts a uniform
pricing policy without transshipment.
4.4.1 Base Model: Uniform Pricing and No Transshipment
When the retailer charges the same price for the product sold at both channels
and when transshipment is not an option, the retailer’s only decision is the optimal
uniform price for each period. In this case, the retailer’s dynamic program is given
by equation (4.2), with the following constraints:
Y ti = I
t
i for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, t = 1, ..., T ,




t ≥ 0 for t = 1, ..., T (uniform pricing),
V 0(I) = 0 for all I.
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+ λtJ t(pt, It)
}
. (4.3)
We derive the retailer’s optimal uniform dynamic pricing policy under two sce-
narios: i) when inventory is in stock at both channels, and ii) when inventory runs
out at one channel. (If inventory runs out at both channels, the selling horizon ends
immediately.) In the first scenario, the retailer can expect to make a sale at each
channel with a positive probability. However, in the second scenario, the retailer can
never make a sale at the channel where the stockout occurs, regardless of the price.
Without loss of generality, when analyzing the stockout scenario, we assume that the
inventory runs out at channel 1. The results for the case when the inventory runs out
at channel 2 is analogous. Proposition 4.1 characterizes the optimal uniform dynamic
pricing and the optimal profit.
Proposition 4.1. For any remaining time t = 1, ..., T and inventory level It, the
optimal uniform pricing policy without transshipment is as follows:
1. If I t1 > 0 and I
t
2 > 0, the optimal uniform price p
t∗












. The retailer’s expected dis-
counted profit-to-go under the optimal policy is given by V tun(I
t) = [exp(v1 −
pt∗un) + exp(v2 − pt∗un)]λt + βV t−1un (It) = Rt∗unλt + βV t−1un (It).
2. If I t1 = 0 and I
t
2 > 0, the optimal uniform price p
t∗








. The retailer’s expected discounted profit-to-go
under the optimal policy is given by V tun(I
t) = exp(v2 − pt∗un)λt + βV t−1un (It) =
Rt∗unλ
t + βV t−1un (I
t).
When there is no stockout, the optimal uniform price consists of two components.
The first component is a weighted average of the sum of the marginal value and
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the unit transaction cost associated with each channel. This quantity depends on
how likely a customer will buy from each channel. Since the price is uniform, what
determines the purchase decision is simply the net valuation of the purchase, v1 and
v2. The optimal price is more influenced by the marginal value and transaction cost
of the channel from which a customer is more likely to make a purchase. The other
component of the optimal price is a base premium, 1
µ0(pt∗un)
, which goes up with the
probability that the customer makes a purchase from one of the channels.
When there is a stockout at a channel, the optimal uniform price has similar
characteristics as in the no stockout case. That is, it includes a base premium on top
of the marginal value and the unit transaction cost of the product. The only difference
is that the optimal price in the stockout case involves only the marginal value and the
unit transaction cost of the product at the channel with available inventory. This is
because the product can never be sold from the stockout channel. The base premium
remains the same as that under the no stockout case.
Next, we investigate the retailer’s optimal pricing policy when the price at the
two channels can be differentiated.
4.4.2 Price Differentiation and No Transshipment
Suppose the retailer can charge different prices for the product sold at different
channels, but cannot transfer inventory between channels. Then, the retailer’s pricing
problem becomes similar to a standard dynamic pricing problem of two substitutable
products (e.g., Suh and Aydin 2011). The retailer’s dynamic program in this case is
similar to (4.3) except that pt1 and p
t
2 in each period can be different, and hence, ∆
t
i
under this pn policy can be different from that under the un policy. Let V tdn denote













+ λtJ t(pt, It)
}
, pt = (pt1, p
t
2). (4.4)
Under this pricing policy, only the prices at the channels where the product is available
are relevant. Hence, when there is a stockout at channel 1, the retailer essentially sets
only one price at channel 2. This optimal price corresponds to the optimal uniform
price in the stockout case, as characterized by Proposition 4.1 part 2. The retailer
can take advantage of price differentiation only when the product is available at both
channels. We characterize the optimal dynamic pricing policy in Proposition 4.2.
Proposition 4.2. For any remaining time t = 1, ..., T and inventory level It, the
optimal dynamic pricing policy without transshipment is as follows:
1. If I t1 > 0 and I
t













t). The retailer’s expected discounted profit-to-go
under the optimal price differentiation policy is given by V tdn(I
t) = [exp(v1 −




2. If I t1 = 0 and I
t
2 > 0, the optimal price at channel 2, p
t∗
2 , is the same as the
optimal uniform price for the same inventory level.
Under the price differentiation policy, when there is no stockout, we see that the
optimal price for each channel has a similar structure as the optimal uniform price
discussed in Proposition 4.1 part 1. That is, the optimal channel price consists of the
marginal value and unit transaction cost, specific to the channel, as well as the base
premium, which is the same for both channel. Alternatively, we can view this result
as the optimal margin pt∗i − cti for each channel is the sum of the marginal value of
the product in the channel and a base premium, which is channel-independent.
Now that we have characterized the retailer’s optimal pricing policies, we can
compare the retailer’s profit under the price differentiation and uniform pricing policy
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to see the benefit of price differentiation for a dual-channel retailer. Since many
problem variables are time-dependent, we focus our comparisons on the retailer’s
profit under different pricing policies in a single period in order to provide clean
results that highlight the benefit of the price differentiation strategy. For this, we
consider the benefit from price differentiation as how much profit the retailer can
gain if he is allowed to price differentiate in period t only, as supposed to using a pure
uniform pricing policy.6
Corollary 4.1 shows that the optimal sale ratio under price differentiation is always
greater than or equal to the optimal sale ratio under uniform pricing. This implies
that the retailer’s ability to price discriminate between the two channels allows him
to strategically convert more of the customer traffic into sales. In fact, as shown in
Proposition 4.3, the larger the sale ratio he can induce using price differentiation, the
more profit he can generate.
Corollary 4.1. For any remaining time t = 1, ..., T and inventory level It, the optimal
sale ratio under price differentiation is greater than or equal to the optimal sale ratio
under uniform pricing: Rt∗dn ≥ Rt∗un.
Proposition 4.3. For any remaining time t = 1, ..., T and inventory level I t where
I t1 > 0 and I
t
2 > 0, the benefit from using price differentiation in the current period is
monotonically increasing with the sale ratio difference, Rt∗dn −Rt∗un.
Due to differences in customer preferences and nature of the transactions taken
place at different channels, the customer willingness to pay and the costs incurred
by the retailer when selling the product at each channel generally differ across the
channels. Price differentiation allows the retailer to reflect such differences on the
product prices. That is, the retailer can charge a high price at the channel where
the customer has high willingness to pay and/or the transaction cost is high in order
6Alternatively, we can consider how much the retailer will lose if constrained to offer a uniform
price in period t only. The same results hold.
101
to extract more surplus and protect the margin. On the other hand, for the channel
with a low customer willingness to pay and a low transaction cost, the retailer can
generate more profit by increasing the sales volume. Hence, a lower price should be
offered. By charging the prices that customers are willing to pay, the retailer can
attract more customers to purchase the product while maintaining a reasonable level
of sales margin. This cannot be done as effectively under uniform pricing since the
same price is charged for the product sold at both channels. While the price may
seem attractive for the channel with a higher customer willingness to pay, the price
will be deemed too expensive for the other channel with a lower customer willingness
to pay. To balance the sales volume and margin at both channels using a single price,
the retailer cannot attract as much customers to purchase, resulting in a smaller sale
ratio under uniform pricing than under price differentiation. Since the retailer’s profit
is directly correlated to the sale ratio, the profit difference between the two pricing
strategies is amplified as the difference in sale ratio gets larger.
Next, we investigate the optimal transshipment policy and the benefit of trans-
shipment.
4.4.3 Uniform Pricing with Transshipment
When the retailer can transfer inventory between the channels but cannot charge
different prices, his profit is as given by (4.2) except that pt1 = p
t
2 = p
t for all t. Let V tut












−m12st12 −m21st21 + λtJ t(pt, st,Yt)
}
(4.5)




ji − stij for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, t = 1, ..., T ,
stij ∈ {0, 1}, stij = 0 if I tj > 0 for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, t = 1, ..., T ,
V 0(I) = 0 for all I.
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Under the assumption that a transshipment occurs instantaneously and the trans-
shipment costs and discount rate are time-independent, it is easy to see that the
retailer’s optimal strategy in the current period is to not make any transshipment as
long as there is some inventory at both channels. Thus, st∗ij = 0, i, j ∈ {1, 2} whenever
I t1 > 0 and I
t
2 > 0. We will consider a transshipment decision only when there is a
stockout. As before, we assume that the stockout occurs at channel 1: I t1 = 0 and
I t2 > 0. When there is a stockout at channel 1, a transshipment in the current period
may or may not be profitable. Since the retailer can sell at most one unit in each
period (λt ≤ 1), he only needs to transfer at most one unit of inventory from channel
2 to channel 1. Hence, the retailer’s transshipment decision in period t is essentially
to decide whether to transfer a unit of inventory from channel 2 to channel 1 or not.
That is, the optimal transshipment decision in period t is st∗ = (st∗12 = 0, s
t∗
21 ∈ {0, 1}).
Since a transshipment results in a change in the inventory level at both channels,
there is a tradeoff between the marginal value of a unit of inventory before and after
the transshipment. We define the quantity “transshipment marginal value” to capture
this tradeoff, which plays an important role in determining optimal transshipment
strategies.
Definition 4.2. Transshipment marginal value (∆t12(I
t)) is the difference be-
tween the marginal value of the inventory at channel 1 after the transshipment is
made, and the marginal value of the inventory at channel 2 before the transshipment
is made. Mathematically, ∆t12(I
t) := ∆t1(1, I
t
2 − 1)−∆t2(0, I t2).
The retailer’s optimal transshipment strategy and the benefit of transshipment
under uniform pricing are characterized in Proposition 4.4. Again, to highlight the
effect of transshipment on the retailer’s profit, we consider the benefit from transship-
ment as the profit gain when the retailer is allowed to transship a unit of inventory
to the stockout channel in a single period. To exclude the effect from pricing policies,
we assume the retailer uses the optimal uniform pricing policy in all periods.
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Proposition 4.4. For any remaining time t = 1, ..., T and inventory level It such
that I t1 = 0 and I
t




ut) be the optimal sale ratio before (after) the
transshipment; pt∗un(p
t∗
ut) be the optimal uniform price before (after) the transshipment.
1. It is optimal for the retailer to transship a unit from channel 2 to channel 1
(st∗21 = 1) in period t if and only if m21 ≤ (Rt∗ut −Rt∗un)λt + β∆t12(It).
2. Suppose a transshipment is made from channel 2 to channel 1 in period t. Then,
pt∗ut ≥ pt∗un if β∆t12(It) ≥ ct2 − ct1 and a) I t2 > 1 and ∆t2(1, I t2 − 1) ≥ ∆t2(0, I t2), or
b) I t2 = 1 and v1 ≥ v2.
3. The benefit from making a transshipment in period t is monotonically decreasing
in m21 and c
t




When a transshipment is made, the retailer’s inventory position is changed. This
in turn influences the retailer’s pricing decisions both in the current period and the
future periods. Hence, the overall effects of a transshipment on the retailer’s profit
can be viewed as coming from two parts: the effects in the current period, and the
effects in the future periods. After a transshipment takes place in the current period,
the retailer charges an optimal price corresponding to the updated inventory position.
This price may be different from what he would have charged if the transshipment
was not made. The difference in prices leads to different customer purchase decisions,
which subsequently result in the difference in the retailer’s current period profit. This
profit difference is therefore captured by the difference in the sale ratio before and
after the transshipment, multiplied by the customer arrival rate: (Rt∗ut − Rt∗un)λt. For
future periods, the effects of transshipment essentially come from the tradeoff between
the marginal value of a unit of inventory before and after the transshipment. Hence,
the expected profit difference before and after the transshipment coming from the
future periods is given by the discounted transshipment marginal value, β∆t12(I
t). To
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decide whether a transshipment in the current period is profitable or not, the retailer
needs to compare the overall potential gain in profit with a transshipment to the
transshipment cost he has to incur. As characterized in Proposition 4.4 part 1, it is
optimal for the retailer to make a transshipment if the expected gain in profit is large
enough to cover the transshipment cost.
Part 2 of the proposition discusses an implication of the transshipment marginal
value on the optimal uniform price before and after the transshipment. Recall from
Proposition 4.1 that the optimal uniform price is larger the larger the unit transaction
cost and the marginal value of the product. Without a transshipment, the optimal
price depends on the transaction cost and the marginal value at channel 2 only since
channel 1 stocks out. If a transshipment is made, then the optimal price will also
depend on the transaction cost and the marginal value at channel 1. Hence, if the
transshipment results in a significant increase in the marginal value of inventory, or
if the transaction cost at channel 1 is large relative to the transaction cost at channel
2, then the retailer should charge a higher price after the transshipment. The same
insight holds for a special case where there is only one unit of inventory left (I t1 = 0
and I t2 = 1). However, in this case, the optimal price after the transshipment is
essentially the price at channel 1 alone since channel 2 stocks out. Hence, for the
retailer to charge a higher price after the transshipment, the customer valuation at
channel 1 should also be greater than the customer valuation at channel 2.
The benefit of transshipment depends on several factors as discussed in part 3 of
the proposition. Intuitively, we see that the transshipment cost negatively affects the
benefit because it is an additional cost that the retailer has to incur when making a
transshipment. The benefit also goes down with the transaction cost at channel 1.
This is because the main purpose of transshipping a unit of inventory from channel 2
to channel 1 is to trade the potential loss in profit from not selling the unit at channel
2 with the potential gain from selling the unit at channel 1. A higher transaction cost
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at channel 1 translates to a lower potential gain of selling a unit at channel 1, and
subsequently, a smaller benefit from making a transshipment to channel 1.
A quantity that positively affects the benefit of transshipment is the sale ratio
difference. As pointed out earlier, the sale ratio difference is directly linked to the
current period gain in profit from the transshipment. Hence, the larger sale ratio
generated by the transshipment, the larger benefit to the retailer. This result is
similar to what we have seen from Proposition 4.3 that the benefit from price differ-
entiation monotonically increases with the sale ratio difference. There is however a
notable difference between the benefit from price differentiation and the benefit from
transshipment. Recall from Corollary 4.1 that the optimal sale ratio under price dif-
ferentiation is always greater than that under uniform pricing, implying the sale ratio
difference between the two pricing policies is always positive. This is not the case
when we consider the sale ratio difference between uniform pricing with transship-
ment and uniform pricing without transshipment. When the stockout channel does
not have a significantly higher customer willingness to pay or a much lower transac-
tion cost, the optimal price after the transshipment may result in a smaller sale ratio,
signifying that the retailer does not benefit from the transshipment in the current
period. Figure 4.1 illustrates a scenario when the optimal sale ratio after a transship-
ment is smaller than the optimal sale ratio before a transshipment (Rt∗ut − Rt∗un < 0).
Since the retailer’s current period profit is smaller with the transshipment, the bene-
fit from transshipment monotonically decreases with the customer arrival rate in the
current period. Notice however that in this example, the benefit of transshipment
from future periods is still positive (∆t12(I
t) > 0). Hence, when the customer arrival
rate in the current period is sufficiently small, the overall benefit of transshipment is
still positive.
So far, we have considered the retailer’s optimal decisions and benefit from im-
plementing price differentiation and inventory transshipment policies independently.
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Benefit of Current−Period Transshipment under Uniform Pricing 
vs. Customer Arrival Rate














Figure 4.1: Benefit from transshipment in the current period vs. the customer arrival
rate: T = 5, I51 = 0, I
5
2 = 2, β = 0.95, v1 = 8.5, v2 = 10, c
t
1 = 1, c
t
2 = 2,m12 =
0.2,m21 = 0.05, λ
t = 0.3 for t = 4, 3, 2, 1
In the next section, we investigate the scenario where the retailer adopts both price
differentiating and inventory transshipping policies together, and discuss how the two
mechanisms interact with each other.
4.4.4 Price Differentiation with Transshipment
When evaluating the benefit of price differentiation and transshipment separately
in a single period, we know that price differentiation is beneficial only when both
channels hold some inventory. On the other hand, for a transshipment decision to be
relevant in the current period, there must be a stockout at a channel. These different
requirements prevent us from conducting a fair comparison of the two mechanisms
when implemented in a single period. However, we are able to provide results in
Theorem 4.1 which describe how a price differentiating decision as well as its benefit
are influenced by a transshipment decision when the retailer adopts a joint price
differentiating-inventory transshipping policy.
Theorem 4.1. For any remaining time t = 1, ..., T and inventory level I t such that




1. If the transshipment in period t increases the marginal value of the product
at channel 2, then the optimal price of the product at channel 2 after the
transshipment is higher than the optimal price without the transshipment. (If
∆t2(1, I
t
2 − 1) ≥ ∆t2(0, I t2), then pt∗2,11 ≥ pt∗2,10). 7
2. Under the optimal transshipment decision in the current period, the benefit from
price differentiation is monotonically decreasing in the transshipment cost in the
current period.
Part 1 of Theorem 4.1 discusses an interesting dynamic between the price differen-
tiation and transshipment policy. Since a transshipment allows the retailer to transfer
inventory from the channel with an abundance to the channel with a shortage, the
mechanism can result in an increased marginal value of inventory at the originating
channel. This subsequently justifies the retailer charging a higher price for the prod-
uct sold at the channel since he incurs less risk of overstocking. In a way, this result
explains how the transshipment mechanism works to help the retailer avoid marking
down prices at the channel with excessive inventory.
Transshipment also enables the retailer to leverage price differentiation to im-
prove profits when facing a stockout situation. Without transshipment, the retailer
is constrained to operate in only one channel, from which the benefit from price dif-
ferentiation cannot be realized. A transshipment makes it possible for the retailer to
replenish inventory at the stock-out channel, allowing him to continue selling at both
channels and extract more profits using channel-based price discrimination. While
transshipment can be beneficial, we learn from Proposition 4.4 part 1 that when the
transshipment cost is too high, it is not optimal for the retailer to transship. In this
case, the retailer makes more profit from selling at a single channel, without exercising
price differentiation. This explains the result in part 2 of Theorem 4.1 that the benefit
7This result is relevant only when It2 > 1. If I
t
2 = 1, then after the transshipment is made from
channel 2 to channel 1, the inventory level at channel 2 becomes zero and pt∗2,10 is irrelevant.
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of price differentiation decreases as the transshipment cost increases. Notice however
that this result applies to the situation where the retailer has only one opportunity
(in the current period) to transship and/or price differentiate the product. If the
retailer is allowed to implement both mechanisms over a longer period of time, the
result may be different, as shown in Figure 4.2. In this example, we observe that the
benefit from price differentiation (V Tdn − V Tun) increases with the transshipment cost
when the cost is not too high. This is because for this particular setting, the retailer
can employ either the price differentiation or the transshipment mechanism to balance
inventory and demand at each channel over the selling horizon. In other words, the
two mechanisms can substitute each other. (We will discuss more in the next section
when the benefit from the two mechanisms may substitute or compliment each other.)
Hence, when the transshipment cost is larger, the retailer increasingly prefers to use
price differentiation rather than transshipment, resulting in larger benefits from price
differentiation. When the transshipment cost is too large, however, the retailer finds
it not profitable to transship even in a stockout situation, which could occur in future
periods. Hence, the benefit from price differentiation is less likely to be realized in
future periods, following the same insight from Theorem 4.1 part 2.
When considering the benefit of transshipment, many retailers may only think
about the ability to use inventory at one channel to cover the possible loss in demand
arriving at the other channel. The less visible, but potentially more substantial
benefit of transshipment in enabling the retailer to realize the benefit from pricing
to a larger extent is often understated or overlooked. Hence, our results in Theorem
4.1 as well as Proposition 4.4 part 2 provide important managerial insights to help
retailers understand the transshipment and pricing mechanisms better.
Although transshipment can affect the optimal price levels, we note that the overall
behavior of optimal prices with respect to inventory level and remaining time is not
significantly changed by the transshipment option. As illustrated in Figure 4.3 a. and
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Benefit of Price Differentiation under Transshipment Option 
vs. Transshipment Cost


















Figure 4.2: Benefit from price differentiation vs. transshipment cost: T = 5, I51 =
1, I52 = 2, β = 0.95, v1 = 4, v2 = 2, c
t
1 = 2, c
t
2 = 0.5,m12 = 0.1, λ
t = 0.8 for t =
5, 4, ..., 1
b., the optimal prices with and without transshipment options share similar trends
with respect to the inventory level at channel 1. Likewise, Figure 4.3 c. and d. show
that the optimal prices with and without transshipment options behave similarly with
respect to the remaining time. Notice also that, unlike the case of a single channel
(e.g. Gallego and van Ryzin (1994)), the optimal prices in our dual-channel setting
are not necessarily monotone in either the inventory level or the remaining time. For
example, as the inventory level at channel 1 increases, the optimal price at channel
2 may either decrease or increase. This is because an increase in stock at channel
1 requires the retailer to lower the price at channel 1 to reduce the risk of having
unsold inventory at the end of the selling horizon. The lower price at channel 1
draws some customers away from channel 2. Hence, the retailer may need to lower
the price at channel 2 as well in order to avoid overstocking at channel 2 due to the
substitution effect. On the other hand, if the inventory level at channel 1 becomes
a lot higher, the potential loss from overstocking at channel 1 is significantly larger
than that from overstocking at channel 2. In this case, it may be optimal for the
retailer to increase the price at channel 2, in addition to lowering the price at channel
110
1, to send even more customers from channel 2 to buy from channel 1. We note that
similar non-monotonicity results have been observed in Suh and Aydin (2011) for the
optimal prices of two substitutable products without transshipment options, where
the customer choice also follows a MNL model.




























(a) Prices vs. inventory, with transshipment











Optimal Prices vs. Inventory Level at Channel 1 under No Transshipment

















(b) Prices vs. inventory, no transshipment























(c) Prices vs. remaining time, with transship-
ment
























(d) Prices vs. remaining time, no transshipment
Figure 4.3: Optimal prices vs. inventory level and remaining time: IT2 = 2, λ
t =
0.8, β = 0.95. In Figure a-b, T = 5, v1 = 10, v2 = 6, c
t
1 = 3, c
t
2 = 1,m12 = 0.5,m21 =
0.5. In Figure c-d, IT1 = 1, v1 = 4, v2 = 2, c
t
1 = 2, c
t
2 = 0.5,m12 = 0.1,m21 = 0.2.
We have discussed how the transshipment and pricing mechanisms work together
to most effectively balance inventory and demand in a dual-channel setting. Our next
interest is to compare the effectiveness of the transshipment and price differentiation
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policies in improving the retailer’s profit. To get a sense of how much benefit the
retailer can gain from each policy, we employ numerical study to determine the re-
tailer’s optimal profits under different scenarios. The results are presented in the next
section.
4.5 Numerical Study
We conduct three sets of numerical examples, 200 instances each. Each set is given
a different initial inventory level, but the problem parameters are either the same,
or randomly chosen based on the same distributions for all three sets. The problem
parameters are summarized below.
Set 1: IT1 = 2, I
T
2 = 3
Set 2: IT1 = 1, I
T
2 = 4
Set 3: IT1 = 4, I
T
2 = 1
For all three sets, T = 5, β = 0.95, v1 ∼ U [1, 4), v2 ∼ U [1, 2),m12 = 0.1,m21 =
0.2, ct1 ∼ U [0.5, 2.5), ct2 ∼ U [0.5, 1.5), λt ∼ U [0, 1) for t = 5, 4, ..., 1.
Notice that the problem parameters are chosen to simulate a situation where chan-
nel 1 is a premium channel (higher customer valuation and higher transaction cost,
on average). Hence, for a brick-and-click retailer, channel 1 in our model represents
the physical store whereas channel 2 represents the online store. Note also that we
keep the total initial inventory the same across the three sets of experiments, and
only vary the inventory distribution between the two channels.
Our program randomly generates 200 problem instances for each set, and solves
for optimal solutions under the four types of pricing and transshipping policies, listed
in Table 4.1. The statistics of the optimal prices in the current period and the
profit improvement from using price differentiation and/or transshipment policies are
summarized in Table 4.2 and Table 4.5, respectively.
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Table 4.2: Statistics for the optimal prices in the current period
No Transshipment With Transshipment
Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation
Price Differentiation
pT∗1 3.47 0.54 3.42 0.53
pT∗2 2.77 0.32 2.80 0.35
Uniform Pricing pT∗ 3.24 0.45 3.21 0.42
Table 4.2a: Optimal prices under Set 1
No Transshipment With Transshipment
Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation
Price Differentiation
pT∗1 3.69 0.54 3.42 0.47
pT∗2 2.69 0.30 2.80 0.39
Uniform Pricing pT∗ 3.34 0.48 3.19 0.38
Table 4.2b: Optimal prices under Set 2
No Transshipment With Transshipment
Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation
Price Differentiation
pT∗1 3.29 0.50 3.33 0.51
pT∗2 3.09 0.35 2.92 0.39
Uniform Pricing pT∗ 3.23 0.37 3.18 0.39
Table 4.2c: Optimal prices under Set 3
First, we discuss the optimal prices in Table 4.2. We observe that in Set 1 and Set
2, the average optimal price at channel 1 under transshipment options is lower than
that under no transshipment; while, the average optimal price at channel 2 under
transshipment options is higher than that under no transshipment. This is due to
the fact that the initial inventory level in Set 1 and Set 2 are such that there is less
inventory at channel 1, which is the premium channel. Hence, if the retailer has an
option to transship, it is likely that most of the transshipments will be made from
channel 2 to channel 1. In response to a higher expected stock level at channel 1
and a lower expected stock level at channel 2 as a result of future transshipments,
it is optimal for the retailer to charge a lower price at channel 1 and a higher price
at channel 2 in the current period. Furthermore, notice that the gaps between the
average optimal prices with and without transshipment options are larger in Set 2
than in Set 1. This is because the initial inventory level at channel 1 in Set 2 is less
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Table 4.3: Benefit of price differentiation and transshipment
than that in Set 1. Hence, transshipments are likely to take place more often in Set
2, resulting in larger effects of future transshipments on the current prices.
Now, consider the optimal prices in Set 3. We find that under transshipment
options, the average optimal price at channel 1 is higher while the average optimal
price at channel 2 is lower, compared to the optimal prices without transshipment.
These results are in contrast with what we observe from Set 1 and Set 2. This
is because, unlike Set 1 and Set 2, Set 3 is given an initial inventory level with
significantly more inventory at channel 1. In this case, it is much more likely that
channel 2 will stock out in the future periods. Hence, if the retailer has an option to
transship, most of the transshipments are likely to be made from channel 1 to channel
2. Since the expected stock level at channel 1 is lower whereas the expected stock
level at channel 2 is higher under transshipment options, it is optimal for the retailer
to charge a higher price at channel 1 and a lower price at channel 2 in the current
period.
It is interesting to see that in all three sets of experiments, the average optimal
uniform price in the current period is lower with transshipment options than without
transshipment. This is mainly driven by the fact that under transshipment options,
the retailer can always make a transshipment to the stockout channel when needed
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in a future period, and still be able to charge a reasonable price for the product, as
we have learned from Proposition 4.4 part 2. Since stocking out at a channel in the
future periods is not a huge concern, the opportunity cost of selling a unit in the
current period (marginal value of a unit of inventory) is lower, compared to under
no transshipment. Hence, it is optimal for the retailer to charge a lower price in
the current period, when a transshipment is not needed (since the initial inventory
level in all three sets are such that both channels carry some inventory), in order to
generate more sales earlier on and reduce the risk of overstocking at the end of the
selling horizon.
Next, we discuss the profit improvements from using price differentiation and
inventory transshipment. From Table 4.5, we see that the benefits of price differenti-
ation in Set 1 and Set 2 are higher than that in Set 3 on average. This is because the
initial inventory level in Set 3 is already quite in balance with the arriving demand.
Since the customer valuation is generally higher at channel 1, even when a uniform
price is offered, more customers are likely to buy from channel 1, where there is more
inventory to serve. Hence, there is only a small room for profit improvement using
price differentiation. On the other hand, in Set 1 and Set 2, the retailer starts with
less inventory at channel 1. If a uniform price is offered, the retailer will quickly run
out of inventory at channel 1. Therefore, charging different prices at the two channels
(specifically, higher prices at channel 1) has a high potential in helping the retailer
more efficiently balance inventory with demand.
The benefit from transshipment is also largely influenced by the initial inventory
level. Notice from Table 4.5 that transshipment improves the retailer’s profit the
most in Set 2, and the least in Set 1. This is because in Set 2, the initial inventory
level is notably out of balance as there is a lot less inventory at channel 1, which is
the premium channel. In this case, the retailer is in critical need of more inventory
at channel 1. Hence, the ability to transfer inventory between the channels greatly
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improves profits. In Set 3, the initial inventory level is preferable to the retailer as
there is a lot more inventory at channel 1. However, since channel 2 has very little
inventory, the chance of stocking out is high. Hence, transshipment is still very much
necessary in this setting. On the other hand, Set 1 is given an initial inventory level
where both channels have almost equal amount of inventory in stock. Since the chance
of stocking out is not particularly high at either channel, inventory transfers are not
required very often, resulting in small benefits of transshipment.
While both price differentiation and inventory transshipment can significantly im-
prove the retailer’s profit, the performance of the two mechanisms can vary, depending
on the problem parameters. We note that in the majority of the problem instances
(70% in Set 1, 54.5% in Set 2, and 62% in Set 3, out of 200 instances conducted in each
set), the benefit of price differentiation is larger than the benefit of transshipment.
This is likely to be due to the fact we pointed out earlier that price differentiation is
always profitable whereas transshipment may or may not be profitable. Furthermore,
we notice that transshipment is especially beneficial when the initial inventory level is
such that there is a lot more inventory at channel 2, and channel 1 has high customer
valuation but low transaction cost, relative to channel 2. When these conditions do
not hold, the benefit of transshipment is generally smaller than the benefit of price dif-
ferentiation. This is because, when the inventory level is substantially uneven (large
difference between the inventory levels at the two channels) in a way that there is
less inventory at the high-margin channel, the retailer can resolve the situation more
effectively by correcting his inventory position. If he only price differentiates between
the channels, he could prevent stocking out at the high-margin channel by charging a
high price. However, doing so results in less sales at the high-margin channel and less
profits overall. Based on this reason, it is not surprising to observe that the benefit
of transshipment is larger than the benefit of price differentiation in more problem
instances in Set 2.
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Finally, it is worth noting that the benefit from price differentiation and the benefit
from transshipment may either substitute or complement each other. To see this,
notice from Table 4.5 that in Set 1 and Set 2, the benefit of price differentiation is
larger when the retailer does not have an option to transship. Likewise, in Set 1 and
Set 2, the benefit of transshipment is larger under uniform pricing than under price
differentiation. This implies that the benefit of price differentiation and the benefit
of transshipment generally substitute each other under the settings of Set 1 and Set
2. The main driver of this result is the fact that Set 1 and Set 2 are given an initial
inventory level that is unfavorable to the retailer (less inventory at the high-margin
channel). In such a situation, the retailer would want to rebalance his inventory
position by trying to reduce the inventory at channel 2 and maintain or increase the
inventory at channel 1. Both price differentiation and transshipment mechanisms
can be employed for this same purpose. Hence, the benefit of the two mechanisms
substitute each other. However, the opposite result is observed in Set 3, where the
benefit of price differentiation is larger when the retailer can transship, and the benefit
of transshipment is larger when the retailer can price differentiate. This is because in
Set 3, the initial inventory level is favorable for the retailer as there is more inventory
at the high-margin channel. In this case, it is in the retailer’s best interest to try to
maintain the same balance in his inventory position. To most effectively achieve this,
the retailer needs to employ both price differentiation and transshipment mechanisms
to complement each other’s effect. More precisely, the retailer would maintain a high
price at channel 1 to extract most surplus. However, doing so increases the chance
of having a stock out at channel 2 and a leftover at channel 1 in the future periods.
Hence, transshipments will be needed to replenish the stock at channel 2, allowing




So far, we have assumed that if the retailer decides to make a transshipment in
the current period, the transshipment then takes place before a customer arrival,
and an arriving customer observes the actual product availability at the channels. In
practice, some retailers may have more flexibility in the timing of a transshipment, and
hence, are able to delay the transshipment until after the customer makes a decision
to purchase. In this case, even when the product is out of stock at a channel, the
retailer can announce the product availability at both channels, but only transship the
product to the stock-out channel when a customer decides to buy from that channel.
If an arriving customer does not buy or buys from the in-stock channel, then the
retailer does not need to make a transshipment in that period. For example, if the
product is out of stock at the distribution center, used to fulfill demand at the online
store, the retailer may continue to display the product as available online, and ship
the product from the physical store only after a customer places an online order. We
refer to this transshipment policy as “ex-post transshipment,” and use x to denote
the policy.
To see how the results regarding transshipment (Proposition 4.4 and Theorem
4.1) are affected by the ex-post transshipment policy, we consider an inventory level
It = (0, I t2), where I
t
2 > 0, and assume as before that the retailer may transship the
product from channel 2 to channel 1 only in the current period. Under the ex-post
transshipment policy, if the retailer decides to continue selling at both channels, he
makes a unit transshipment from channel 2 to channel 1 only when the customer
chooses to buy from channel 1. Hence, the retailer’s pricing problem under price
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(






pt2 − ct2 + βV t−1un
(












































s.t. pti ≥ 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}, t = 1, ..., T ,
V 0dx(I) = 0 for all I.




Comparing V̂ tdx to the retailer’s pricing problem with ex-ante transshipment in
period t, given by (4.2) with st21 = 1, s
t
12 = 0,Y
t = (1, I t2 − 1), and V t−1 = V t−1un , we
see that the terms that depend on prices (J t) under the ex-post transshipment are
the same as those under the ex-ante transshipment with β∆t1(1, I
t
2 − 1) replaced by
β∆t2(0, I
t




2 − 1) replaced by ∆t2(0, I t2). With these two modifi-
cations, the optimal prices under ex-post transshipment can be characterized in the





2) + m21, the transshipment marginal value ∆
t
12(I
t) is modified to m21
β
under the ex-post transshipment.
The results in Proposition 4.4 and Theorem 4.1 continue to hold under ex-post
transshipment with the two term modifications discussed above. For example, the
condition when it is optimal to make a transshipment (in this case, to offer the
product at both channels) in the current period, given in Proposition 4.4 part 1., is
119
modified from m21 ≤ (Rt∗ut − Rt∗un)λt + β∆t12(It) to (Rt∗ux − Rt∗un)λt ≥ 0, which reduces
to Rt∗ux − Rt∗un ≥ 0 since λt ≥ 0. In Theorem 4.1 part 1., the sufficient condition
for the optimal price at channel 2 after the transshipment to be higher than the
optimal price without transshipment is modified from ∆t2(1, I
t
2 − 1) ≥ ∆t2(0, I t2) to
∆t2(0, I
t
2) ≥ ∆t2(0, I t2), which is always true. Hence, with ex-post transshipment, the
optimal price at channel 2 with the transshipment is always higher than the optimal
price without the transshipment.
4.7 Conclusion
Channel-based price differentiation and inventory transshipment are two of the
most common mechanisms used by multi-channel retailers to balance inventory and
demand arriving at each channel. Price differentiation can be employed to shift the
demand from the channel with low inventory to the channel with more inventory
in order to prevent overstocking or understocking. On the other hand, inventory
transshipment does not affect the demand, but it allows the retailer to directly correct
his inventory position by transferring inventory from the channel with more inventory
to the channel with less inventory. Since both mechanisms can be implemented to
serve the same purpose of balancing the inventory and demand across the channels,
we are interested in investigating what factors affect the benefit from each mechanism,
when one mechanism is likely to be more effective than the other, and how the two
mechanisms influence each other if they are adopted concurrently.
We model a dual-channel retailer’s joint dynamic pricing and transshipping prob-
lem over a finite horizon. In each period, the retailer decides how much to charge for
the product sold at each channel, and whether to make any inventory transshipment
between the channels. An arriving customer decides whether to purchase the product
from one of the available channels, based on her valuations and the observed prices
at the channels. Her purchase decision follows the multinomial logit model.
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We characterize the retailer’s optimal dynamic pricing and transshipping policies.
We find that price differentiation and transshipment policies have different implica-
tions on the product sales. The optimal price differentiation policy always results in
a larger probability of making a sale in the current period, compared to the optimal
uniform pricing policy. On the other hand, the optimal transshipment decision may
result in a larger or smaller probability of making a sale in the current period. When
price differentiation and inventory transshipment policies are implemented together,
we show that transshipment can increase the value of the remaining inventory, and
subsequently the price, at the channel from which the transshipment is made. Ad-
ditionally, since a transshipment is required in a stock-out situation for the benefit
of price differentiation to be realized, we find that the benefit of price differentiation
may decrease in the transshipment cost when the cost is large.
Our numerical study helps compare the benefit of price differentiation and in-
ventory transshipment under various scenarios. The results show that the benefit of
price differentiation is generally larger than the benefit of transshipment. However,
transshipment can be more effective than price differentiation when the retailer holds
significantly less inventory at the high-margin channel. When adopted together, the
price differentiation and inventory transshipment mechanisms may either substitute
or complement each other. When the retailer’s inventory position requires some cor-
rection, either price differentiation or inventory transshipment can be used. Hence,
the two mechanisms substitute each other in this case. On the other hand, when the
current inventory balance at the channels should be maintained in the same propor-
tion, the two mechanisms work together complementarily to improve the retailer’s
profit.
This study considers a joint dynamic pricing and inventory problem in a setting
and context that are different from existing literature. In particular, we focus on
the price differentiation and inventory transhipment mechanisms in a dual-channel
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retailing, which are widely observed in practice, but not well studied in the literature.
Our results help explain how each mechanism works in a dual-channel environment,
how the two mechanisms are similar or different, and when one should be chosen
over the other, or both are required. Although our current model assumes a specific
customer choice model and a simple retailer’s cost structure, we believe that the
managerial insights obtained from this study can be applied to many realistic dual-
channel situations to help make appropriate pricing and inventory decisions.
There are several directions for future research on this topic that would further
provide valuable contribution to the literature. A natural extension of the current
model is to consider a multi-channel setting (more than two channels/stores). Hav-
ing multiple channels is likely to result in a significantly higher complexity level of
the problem, especially on the transshipment decisions. However, certain modeling
assumptions may help reduce the decision space and make it possible to achieve some
interesting results. One could also extend the model to consider a different customer
choice model. For example, the heterogeneity in customer valuation for the product
sold at each channel may be distributed over a general distribution; different cus-
tomers may react differently when they find that their preferred channel stocks out;
observing different prices at the channels may have certain effects on how customers
evaluate their purchases. Lastly, the model can be extended to incorporate additional
costs and operational constraints that could affect the retailer’s pricing and transship-
ping decisions. These include, for instance, costs associated with managing different
prices at the channels, fixed transshipment costs, inventory holding costs, inventory




While there are many pricing mechanisms used in practice, different mechanisms
may not deliver the same benefits to sellers under different business situations. Hence,
choosing an appropriate mechanism can be a challenging problem for a seller. This
dissertation aims to provide insights into how different pricing mechanisms affect the
buyer’s behavior and the seller’s profitability to ultimately help business managers
make effective operational decisions.
To address various types of pricing problems commonly occurring in a supply
chain, this dissertation considers three different seller’s problems in a series of three
essays.
The first essay (Chapter 2) examines whether and when the supplier benefits from
more accurate demand forecasts obtained by the buyer under different contract struc-
tures. An important finding of the essay is that there indeed exist contracts under
which the supplier can always benefit from the buyer’s more accurate demand fore-
casts. However, depending on how certain the supplier is about the buyer’s forecasting
capability, the contract structure may be more sophisticated than what is common
in practice. This finding complements the existing supply chain contract literature
which has considered simpler forms of contracts and reported that the supplier’s profit
can be hurt by the buyer’s improved demand forecasts.
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The second essay (Chapter 3) discusses how price promotions influence purchase
decisions of different types of consumers, and which type of promotions is most prof-
itable to the seller under which market situations. Two forms of conditional discounts,
all-unit and fixed-amount discount, are considered. This study shows that both all-
unit and fixed-amount discount are equally effective in inducing deal-prone consumers
to overspend. However, when consumers are heterogenous in their willingness to pay
for the product, one form of discounts may outperform the other. Hence, the seller’s
choice of discount types can significantly determine how much profit he obtains. The
findings from this essay provide guidance on when it is optimal to offer a conditional
discount, and which form of discounts to offer to maximize profits.
The third essay (Chapter 4) considers a dual-channel retailer who can employ
either price differentiation or inventory transshipment to balance inventory and de-
mand at each channel. This study investigates what factors affect the benefit from
each mechanism, when one mechanism is likely to be more effective than the other,
and how the two mechanisms influence each other if they are implemented concur-
rently. It is shown that while price differentiation always increases sales volume,
inventory transshipment may sometimes result in a smaller sales volume in the cur-
rent period. In terms of benefits to the retailer, whether the mechanism of price
differentiation or inventory transshipment results in a larger profit improvement, and
whether the benefit of the two mechanisms, when adopted together, substitute or
complement each other primarily depend on the retailer’s initial inventory position.
The results obtained from this study can help retailers make good judgement when
implementing joint pricing and inventory policies in a dual-channel environment.
On the academic side, this dissertation studies new research problems and provides
original results that contribute to the existing Operations Management literature as
well as other related fields such as Marketing and Economics. On the practical side,
the insights discussed in this work can help managers craft their strategies to achieve
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Additional Results and Proofs for Chapter 2
A.1 Characterization of Optimal Contracts
A.1.1 Early Static Contract









p1ij[Γ(Dj, qi)− ti] ≥ 0, i = {L,H}∑
j∈{L,H}
p1ij[Γ(Dj, qi)− ti] ≥
∑
j∈{L,H}
p1ij[Γ(Dj, q−i)− t−i], i = {L,H}
qi, ti ≥ 0 i = {L,H}
One can show that the supplier’s problem is equivalent to the following reduced
problem. (We provide the detailed discussion of how to obtain this reduced form
when we study the supplier’s problem with dynamic contract, the derivation for early
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p1Lj [Γ(Dj , qL)− tL] ≥ 0,∑
j∈{L,H}
p1Hj [Γ(Dj , qH)− tH ] ≥
∑
j∈{L,H}
p1Hj [Γ(Dj , qL)− tL], i = {L,H}
qH ≥ qL
From this, we can characterize the optimal early static contract, which is presented
in Proposition A.1.
Proposition A.1. The optimal early static contract quantities can be obtained by
solving the following equations.
(1− (1 + p1H)θ1)Γ′(DH , qL) + ((1 + p1H)θ1 − p1H)Γ′(DL, qL)− c1p1L = 0
θ1Γ
′(DH , qH) + (1− θ1)Γ′(DL, qH)− c1 = 0
The supplier charges the retailer tL = (1− θ1)Γ(DH , qL) + θ1Γ(DL, qL),
tH = θ1Γ(DH , qH)− (2θ1 − 1)Γ(DH , qL) + (1− θ1)Γ(DL, qH) + (2θ1 − 1)Γ(DL, qL).
The supplier always produces exactly the quantity selected by the buyer.
Proof of Proposition A.1: Consider the reduced early static optimization prob-
lem given by (A.1). The optimal contract quantities can be obtained from solving
the first-order conditions because Γ(D, q) satisfies Property 4 in Assumption 1, which
implies the unimodality of the supplier’s profit in contract quantities. If Γ(D, q) also
satisfies Γ′(Di, q) ≥ Γ′(Dj, q) for any Di < Dj, as is the case for the buyer’s revenue
in both exogenous price and endogenous price models, the solution of qL and qH that
satisfy the first-order conditions always satisfy the monotonicity constraint qL ≤ qH .
To see this, let ΠES be the objective function of this optimization problem. From the
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first-order conditions given in the proposition, we have,
∂ΠES
∂qL
|qH = (1− θ1)Γ′(DH , qH) + θ1Γ′(DL, qH)− c1
≤ θ1Γ′(DH , qH) + (1− θ1)Γ′(DL, qH)− c1 = 0
where the inequality is due to θ1 ≥ max{pL, pH} ≥ 12 and Γ
′(DH , qH) ≥ Γ′(DL, qH),
and the last equality follows from the first-order condition with respect to qH . Since
the objective function is unimodal in qL,
∂ΠES
∂qL
|qH ≤ 0 implies qH ≥ qL.
The supplier produces the exact quantity selected by the buyer in period 1 because
the production is made after the screening.
A.1.2 Late Static Contract













p2jkΓ(Dk, qj) ≥ tj∑
k∈{L,H}




ρ, qj, tj ≥ 0, j = {L,H}










p2Lj[Γ(Dj, qL)− tL] ≥ 0,∑
j∈{L,H}






The optimal late static contract is characterized in Proposition A.2.











The optimal late static contract quantities can be obtained by solving the following
equations:
(1− (1 + p2H)θ2)Γ′(DH , qL) + ((1 + p2H)θ2 − p2H)Γ′(DL, qL) = (c1 − p2Hc2)+
p2H [θ2Γ
′(DH , qH) + (1− θ2)Γ′(DL, qH)] = min{c1, p2Hc2}
If qL > qH , it is optimal to bunch the low- and high-type quantity and offer qL =
qH = q̄ which satisfies (1− θ2)Γ′(DH , q̄) + θ2Γ′(DL, q̄)− c1 = 0.
The supplier charges the buyer tL = (1− θ2)Γ(DH , qL) + θ2Γ(DL, qL),
tH = θ2Γ(DH , qH)− (2θ2 − 1)Γ(DH , qL) + (1− θ2)Γ(DL, qH) + (2θ2 − 1)Γ(DL, qL).
Proof of Proposition A.2: We know from (A.2) that qH ≥ qL holds at the
optimal solution. If the expected saving is greater than the loss, p2Hc2 ≥ c1, the
supplier improves his expected profit by producing the larger quantity of qH in period
1.
The transfer payments are derived from the binding constraints stated above. The
unimodality of −Γ′′(D, q) implies the concavity of the supplier’s profit function in the
contract quantities. Plugging in the expressions of the optimal transfer payments
into the objective function, we can use first-order conditions to derive the optimal
contract quantities. First, we solve the first-order conditions ignoring the constraints
qH ≥ qL. However, if the inequality qH ≥ qL is violated, then we know that bunching
is optimal for the two quantities. Hence, we replace qL and qH by q̄ in the supplier’s
profit, and solve the first-order condition with respect to q̄ to obtain the optimal
solution of qL = qH = q̄.
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A.1.3 Dynamic Contract
We will first show that the supplier’s optimization problem for dynamic contract




























p2Hk[Γ(Dk, qL + qLH)− tLH ] + pHL
∑
k∈{L,H}
p2Lk[Γ(Dk, qL + qLL)− tLL]− tL∑
k∈{L,H}
p2Lk[Γ(Dk, qi + qiL)− tiL] ≥
∑
k∈{L,H}
p2LkΓ(Dk, qi), i = {L,H}
(Period 2 Participation Constraints)∑
k∈{L,H}
p2Hk[Γ(Dk, qi + qiH)− tiH ] ≥
∑
k∈{L,H}
p2Hk[Γ(Dk, qi + qiL)− tiL], i = {L,H}
(Period 2 Incentive Constraints)
ρi, qi, qij , ti, tij ≥ 0 i = {L,H}, j = {L,H} (Nonnegativity Constraints)
qHH ≥ qHL, qLH ≥ qLL
Let PCi and PCij i, j ∈ {L,H} be the participation constraints of buyer type i and
type ij in period 1 and 2, respectively. Let ICij, i(−j)/(−i)k,(−i)l i, j, k, l ∈ {L,H} be
the period 1 incentive constraint of the type i buyer not to deviate to contract (−i)k
in period 2 when she observes ij, and not to deviate to (−i)l when she observes i(−j).
Let ICij be the period 2 incentive constraint for the buyer observing ij not to deviate
to i(−j).
Period 1 PCH is implied by period 1 PCL, period 1 ICHH,HL/LH,LL, and pe-
























Lk[Γ(Dk, qL + qLL)−
tLL] − tL ≥ 0. The first inequality is period 1 ICHH,HL/LH,LL. The second in-
equality follows from period 2 ICLH and the fact that pHH ≥ pLH . The third
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inequality is period 1 PCL. Next, period 1 ICHH,HL/LL,LL is implied by period 1


















Lk[Γ(Dk, qL + qLL)− tLL]− tL.
Similarly, period 1 ICHH,HL/LH,LH is implied by period 1 ICHH,HL/LH,LL and
period 2 ICLL; period 1 ICHH,HL/LL,LH is implied by period 1 ICHH,HL/LH,LL and
period 2 ICLH and ICLL.
For the low-type period 1 incentive constraints, similar to high type period 1
incentive constraints, we can show that ICLH,LL/HH,HH is implied by ICLH,LL/HH,HL
and period 2 ICHL; ICLH,LL/HL,HL is implied by ICLH,LL/HH,HL and period 2 ICHH ;
and ICLH,LL/HL,HH is implied by period 2 ICHL and ICHH .
Period 2 constraints can be reduced as follows. PCHH is implied by PCHL, ICHH ,
and p2HH ≥ p2LH . PCLH is implied by PCLL, ICLH , and p2HH ≥ p2LH . Adding ICHH
and ICHL, we see that ICHL is implied by ICHH and qHH ≥ qHL. Similarly, adding
ICLH and ICLL, we see that ICLL is implied by ICLH and qLH ≥ qLL.
Finally, note that at the optimal solution, period 1 PCL, period 1 ICHH,HL/LH,LL,
period 2 ICHH , and period 2 ICLH must be binding, or else the supplier can profitably
increase tL, tH , tHH , and tLH , correspondingly. Notice that the binding period 1 PCL
together with pLH ≤ pHH and qHH ≥ qHL implies ICLH,LL/HH,HL. Hence, all four
period 1 low-type incentive constraints can be removed.
Proof of Proposition 2.1: Suppose an optimal dynamic contract is given by
DC := (qi, ti){(qiH , tiH), (qiL, tiL)}, i = L,H. Now, consider another contract, DC ′ :=
(0, ti){(qi+qiH , tiH), (qi+qiL, tiL)}, i = L,H. Since the total quantities and payments
at both DC and DC ′ are the same for all types, the two contracts result in the same
profits to the supplier and the buyer if the buyer chooses the contract meant for
her type. We will show that DC ′ satisfies all the constraints, so that it is also
an optimal contract. To see this, observe from the supplier’s reduced optimization
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problem given by (A.3) that all constraints of DC and DC ′ are the same except
for period 2 participation constraints. Notice however that the period 2 participation













LkΓ(Dk, 0), i = {L,H} by Property
2 in Assumption 1. Hence, DC ′ satisfies all the constraints and it is equivalent to
DC.
Proof of Proposition 2.2: By Proposition 2.1, there exists an optimal dynamic
contract in the following form DC := (0, ti){(qiH , tiH), (qiL, tiL)}, i = L,H. Now, con-
sider the following dynamic contract, DC ′ := (0, ti+ tiL){(qiH , tiH− tiL), (qiL, 0)}, i =
L,H.
Since the total quantities and payments in both DC and DC ′ are the same for
all types, the two contracts result in the same profits to the supplier and the buyer if
the buyer chooses the contract meant for her type. We will show that period 1 and
period 2 constraints hold under DC ′. Period 1 participation and incentive constraints
of DC ′ are the same as those of DC because the total transfers ti+ tij from the buyer
to the supplier are the same under both contracts. Since period 2 transfer payments
of DC ′ are smaller than those of DC, period 2 participation constraints of DC ′ are
implied by period 2 participation constraints of DC. Period 2 incentive constraints
of DC ′ are equivalent to those of DC. Therefore, DC ′ is a feasible contract and it is
equivalent to the optimal dynamic contract DC.
Proof of Proposition 2.3: Suppose that in period 1 the buyer chooses type i
contract. Then, the supplier produces at least qiL units in period 1. We know that
qiH ≥ qiL, i = L,H in a dynamic contract from (A.3). Therefore, if the cost of
producing an additional unit at c1 is less than the expected saving, piHc2, then the
supplier produces exactly qiH in period 1. The optimal transfer payments are obtained
from the binding constraints. Since Γ(D, q) satisfies Property 4 in Assumption 1, the
supplier’s profit is unimodal in the contract quantities. Hence, the optimal contract
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quantities can be derived from solving the first-order conditions, provided in the
proposition. If any of the two monotonicity constraints of the contract quantities
qiH ≥ qiL is violated, we replace the two quantities with the same variable (q̄i =
qiH = qiL) and resolve the first-order condition. This case corresponds to bunching
of contract quantities.
A.2 Contract Preferences
Proof of Theorem 2.1: We consider the reduced problem for the dynamic con-
tract given in (A.3). Let S∗(θ2) := {q∗i (θ2), q∗ij(θ2), ρ∗i (θ2), t∗i (θ2), t∗ij(θ2)}, i, j ∈ {L,H}
denote an optimal solution to the supplier’s optimization problem under dynamic
contract when the buyer’s second period information accuracy is θ2, with q
∗
i = 0
and t∗iL = 0, i ∈ {L,H}. Let Π∗DC(θ2) := ΠDC(S∗(θ2), θ2) denote the corresponding
supplier’s optimal profit. We will show that there exists a solution S(θ′′2) such that
Π∗DC(θ
′′
2) ≥ ΠDC(S(θ′′2), θ′′2) ≥ Π∗DC(θ′2), for θ′′2 > θ′2.
Suppose an optimal solution at θ2 = θ
′
2 is given by S







2)}, i, j ∈ {L,H}. We construct a solution S(θ′′2) = {q∗ij(θ′2), ρ∗i (θ′2), t∗i (θ′2),
tiH(θ
′′









2))− Γ(DH , q∗LL(θ′2))]









2))− Γ(DH , q∗HL(θ′2))]
+(1− θ′′2)[Γ(DL, q∗HH(θ′2))− Γ(DL, q∗HL(θ′2))]
Notice that we adopt the same contract quantities, period 1 production, and transfer
payments from the optimal contract for θ2 = θ
′





2). We will first show that this solution is feasible for










2) are optimal for θ
′
2, by Proposition 2.3 they must satisfy
t∗L(θ
′
2) = (1− θ1)Γ(DH , q∗LL(θ′2)) + θ1Γ(DL, q∗LL(θ′2))
t∗H(θ
′




2)) + (1− θ1)Γ(DL, q∗HL(θ′2))
−(2θ1 − 1)[Γ(DH , q∗LL(θ′2))− Γ(DL, q∗LL(θ′2))]
Both the period 1 low-type participation constraint and the period 1 high-type in-
centive constraint ICHH,HL/LH,LL are reduced to 0 ≥ 0. Hence, it follows immedi-
ately that these constraints are satisfied when θ2 = θ
′′
2 . The period 2 participation
constraints are satisfied since q∗i = 0. Additionally, the period 2 ICHH and ICLH




2) as provided above.
Therefore, S(θ′′2) is a feasible solution.




2) ≥ Π∗DC(θ′2). Since the contract quantities,
period 1 production, and period 1 transfer payments in S(θ′′2) are chosen to be identical
to those in S∗(θ′2), and hence are independent of θ2, we will drop the script θ2 from
these quantities for notational simplicity. We will write only tHH and tLH , which
are given by (A.4), as functions of θ2. Then, the supplier’s profit function with
S(θ2) = {q∗ij(θ′2), ρ∗i (θ′2), t∗i (θ′2), tiH(θ2)}, i, j ∈ {L,H} with tiH given by (A.4) can be
written as Π̂DC(θ2) = p
1
H [pHH(tHH(θ2)−c2(qHH−ρH)+)+tH−c1ρH ]+p1L[pLH(tLH(θ2)−
c2(qLH − ρL)+) + tL − c1ρL]. Notice that Π̂DC(θ′′2) = ΠDC(S(θ′′2), θ′′2) and Π̂DC(θ′2) =
Π∗DC(θ
′













(2θ2−1)2 (tHH(θ2) − c2(qHH − ρH)
+) +
(θ1+θ2−1)





c2(qLH − ρL)+) + (θ2−θ1)(2θ2−1)(Γ(DH , qLH)− Γ(DH , qLL)− Γ(DL, qLH) + Γ(DL, qLL))].
Notice that by Property 3 in Assumption 1, the term (Γ(DH , qHH)−Γ(DH , qHL)−
Γ(DL, qHH) + Γ(DL, qHL)) is nonnegative because qHH ≥ qHL and DH < DL. Simi-
larly, (Γ(DH , qLH)− Γ(DH , qLL)− Γ(DL, qLH) + Γ(DL, qLL)) ≥ 0 because qLH ≥ qLL
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and DH < DL. The term tHH(θ2) − c2(qHH − ρH)+ and tLH(θ2) − c2(qLH − ρL)+





2) ≥ c2(qiH − ρL)+, i ∈ {L,H}, where the second inequality follows
from the fact that t∗iH(θ
′
2) is optimal for qiH and ρi, and hence, must be profitable for
the supplier to sell the iH contract in period 2. Given that θ2 ≥ θ1 ≥ max{pL, 1−pL},
θ2 ≥ θ1 ≥ 12 . Hence, all of the following terms 2θ1− 1, 2θ2− 1, θ1 + θ2− 1, and θ2− θ1
are nonnegative. Then, the only possibly negative term in dΠ̂DC(θ2)
dθ2
is the first term.
Observe from Proposition 2.3 that if c1
c2
≤ pHH , then ρH = qHH and the optimal
qHL is the solution of [
(1−θ2)(θ2−θ1)
(2θ2−1) ]Γ
′(DH , qHL) + [
θ2(θ2−θ1)
(2θ2−1) ]Γ
′(DL, qHL) = 0. Since
the left hand side of the equation is always nonnegative, in this case it is optimal to
offer the maximum possible quantity for qHL, which is qHL = qHH = q̄H . In other
words, whenever c1
c2
≤ pHH , bunching is optimal for the high-type contract, leading
to tHH(θ2)− c2(qHH − ρH)+ = 0. Then, it follows that dΠ̂DC(θ2)dθ2 ≥ 0.
When c1
c2
> pHH , ρH = qHL. This also implies ρL = qLL since pLH ≤ pHH < c1c2 ; the














(2θ2−1)2 [Γ(DH , qHH)−Γ(DH , qHL)−
Γ(DL, qHH) + Γ(DL, qHL) + Γ(DH , qLH) − Γ(DH , qLL) − Γ(DL, qLH) + Γ(DL, qLL)].
Suppose dΠ̂DC(θ2)
dθ2
< 0 for some θ̂2. Then, from
d2Π̂DC(θ2)
dθ22




0 at θ̂2 since the first term is positive and the second term is nonnegative. Given this,
whenever dΠ̂DC(θ2)
dθ2
< 0, we must have d
2Π̂DC(θ2)
dθ22
> 0, which implies that dΠ̂DC(θ2)
dθ2
is
minimized at the minimum θ2 ≤ θ̂2. Since we are considering the case of c1c2 > pHH =
θ1+θ2−1
2θ2−1 , and since pHH is monotonically decreasing in θ2, the minimum θ2 corresponds
to the maximum pHH , which is pHH =
c1
c2
. But we have seen earlier that at this point
it is optimal to bunch the high-type contracts, resulting in dΠ̂DC(θ2)
dθ2
≥ 0, which is a





< 0. The supplier’s
profit monotonically increases in the buyer’s second period information accuracy.
Proof of Proposition 2.4: We will first show that under the conditions stated
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in the proposition, the supplier’s profit under the optimal early static contract is
decreasing in θ1 at θ1 = pL (i.e.,
∂ΠES
∂θ1
|θ1=pL < 0). From equation (A.1) and the
results in Proposition A.1, we can derive:
∂ΠES
∂θ1


































Notice that when θ1 = pL, we have p
1












[(1− 3pL)Γ(DH , qL) + (3pL − 2)Γ(DL, qL) +
pLΓ(DH , qH) + (1− pL)Γ(DL, qH)− c1(qH − qL)]
Then, it follows immediately that whenever c1(qH − qL) + (2pL − 1)[Γ(DH , qL) −
Γ(DL, qL)] > pL[Γ(DH , qH)−Γ(DH , qL)]+pH [Γ(DL, qH)−Γ(DL, qL)], ∂ΠES∂θ1 |θ1=pL < 0.
This implies that there exists θ̄ > pL such that the supplier’s profit under the optimal
early static contract is decreasing in θ1 for θ1 ≤ θ̄. Hence, for a θ ≤ θ̄, we have that
ΠES|θ1=θ < ΠES|θ1=pL . Now, consider the supplier’s profit under an optimal dynamic
contract when the buyer’s first-period accuracy is θ1 = pL and the buyer’s second-
period accuracy is a θ2 ∈ (pL, θ). Notice that ΠDC in this case cannot be smaller than
ΠES|θ1=pL since the early static contract is a special case of the dynamic contract.
Hence, we have ΠDC |θ1=pL,θ2<θ ≥ ΠES|θ1=pL > ΠES|θ1=θ.
Proof of Proposition 2.5: The low-type buyer is the lowest type under early
static and dynamic contract, and hence, makes zero expected profit under those two
contract types in period 1. However, if offered a late static contract and if she observes
a high demand signal in period 2, the low-type buyer can make a non-zero profit
because (qH , tH) is not the lowest-type contract. More precisely, the expected profit






which is positive by the incentive compatibility constraint of the high-type. This
occurs with positive probability, pLH . Therefore, the expected profit of a low-type
buyer under late static contract may be strictly more than that from early static and
dynamic contracts.
Proof of Proposition 2.6: 1. Given the expression of optimal transfer payments
for early static contract in Proposition A.1, we can derive the high-type buyer’s
expected profit from early static contract as πES := (2θ1− 1)[Γ(DH , qL)−Γ(DL, qL)].
Likewise, from the result in Proposition 2.3, we can derive the high-type buyer’s
expected profit from dynamic contract as πDC := (2θ1− 1)[Γ(DH , qLL)−Γ(DL, qLL)].
Hence, the profit difference is
πES − πDC = (2θ1 − 1)[Γ(DH , qL)− Γ(DH , qLL) + Γ(DL, qL)− Γ(DL, qLL)].
Notice that to show πES − πDC ≥ 0, it suffices to show that qL ≥ qLL. Under
an optimal dynamic contract characterized in Proposition 2.3, q̄L is the solution to
the sum of the equations for qLL and qLH . Note however that the equation that
characterizes q̄L is identical to the equation that characterizes the optimal qL in early
static contract. Hence, qL = q̄. Let qLj be the solution to the first-order condition of
the dynamic contract: yLj(q) = 0, j ∈ {L,H} (i.e., yLL(q) = 0 is equal to the equation
for qLL in Proposition 2.3). Then, q̄L and qL is the solution to yLL(q) + yLH(q) = 0.
Notice that yLH(qLL) ≥ 0 by the unimodality of the supplier’s profit in the contract
quantity, and the fact that qLL ≤ qLH . This implies yLL(qLL)+yLH(qLL) = yLH(qLL) ≥
0. Hence, it follows that qLL ≤ q̄L = qL, which in turn implies that πES − πDC ≥ 0.
2. From part 1., we have πDC := (2θ1−1)[Γ(DH , qLL)−Γ(DL, qLL)]. By Property
3 in Assumption 1, πDC increases with qLL since DH < DL. We will show the
result by showing ∂qLL
∂θ2





where yLL(θ2, qLL) = 0 denotes the first-order condition with respect to qLL given in
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Proposition 2.3. We will show the result for the two cases of i) c1
c2






≤ pLH : In this case, we have ∂yLL∂θ2 =
(2θ2(1−θ2)−θ1)
(2θ2−1)2 [Γ
′(DH , qLL)−Γ′(DL, qLL)]−
(2θ1−1)
(2θ2−1)2 Γ
′(DL, qLL). First, we will show that A := (2θ2(1− θ2)− θ1) ≤ 0. To see
this, notice that dA
dθ2
= −2(2θ2−1) ≤ 0 since θ2 ≥ θ1 ≥ max{pL, pH} ≥ 12 . Hence,
A is maximized at θ2 = θ1. Note that A|θ2=θ1 = −θ1(2θ1−1) ≤ 0, implying A ≤
0 for any θ1 and θ2. Next, notice from
∂yLL
∂θ2
that Γ′(DH , qLL)−Γ′(DL, qLL) ≥ 0 by
Property 3 in Assumption 1, and Γ′(DL, qLL) ≥ 0 by Property 2 in Assumption
1. Thus, we can conclude that ∂yLL
∂θ2
≤ 0. Now, consider ∂yLL
∂qLL
. Let ΠDC









. Since the supplier’s profit is unimodal in qLL
by Property 4 in Assumption 1, it follows that ∂
2ΠDC
q2LL
≤ 0 at an optimal qLL.
Hence, ∂yLL
∂qLL
≤ 0. Together with ∂yLL
∂θ2











′(DH , qLL)−Γ′(DL, qLL)]−
(2θ1−1)
(2θ2−1)2 [Γ
′(DL, qLL) − c2]. Since c1c2 > pLH , ρ
∗
L = qLL by Proposition 2.3.
Hence, if the buyer orders the LH contract in the second period, the sup-
plier needs to produce qLH − qLL at the cost of c2, and will receive a trans-
fer payment of tLH . For the LH contract to be profitable to the supplier,
the production cost must be no greater than the transfer payment. That
is, c2(qLH − qLL) ≤ tLH . From the expression of tLH in Proposition 2.3, it





′(DH , qLL) + (1 − θ2)Γ′(DL, qLL), where the second inequality follows from
Property 4 in Assumption 1. Applying this to the expression of ∂yLL
∂θ2
derived




′(DH , qLL) − Γ′(DL, qLL)]. Let
B := (2θ2(1− θ2)− θ1 + θ2(2θ1 − 1)). Notice that dBdθ1 = 2θ2 − 1 ≥ 0. Hence, B
is maximized at θ1 = θ2, where B|θ1=θ2 = 0. This implies B ≤ 0 for any θ1 and
139
θ2. Note also that Γ
′(DH , qLL)− Γ′(DL, qLL) ≥ 0 by Property 3 in Assumption
1. Hence, ∂yLL
∂θ2
≤ 0. Next, consider ∂yLL
∂qLL
, which is identical to that in i) since




Proof of Theorem 2.2: We will first show that the supplier’s optimal strategy
when K ≤ K̃ is to announce upfront that a side payment will be given to any
buyer who updates forecast, and the optimal strategy when K > K̃ is to offer an
early static contract. Let ΠES and ΠDC be the supplier’s expected profits from an
optimal early static and dynamic contract, respectively. We denote the supplier’s
profit when the update is free by Πfx, x ∈ {ES,DC}, and when the update is costly
by Πcx, x ∈ {ES,DC}. Since an early static contract is a special case of dynamic
contract, we have ΠfDC ≥ Π
f




ES ≥ 0. If the update cost is K,
and the supplier pays the update cost, it is easy to see that the supplier’s profit from
dynamic contract is reduced by K. If the buyer pays the update cost, the supplier’s
profit from dynamic contract is reduced by K since the supplier has to reduce the
transfers to tij − K, to ensure the buyer’s participation. The supplier’s profit from
early static contract remains the same because there is no update cost involved. Thus,
ΠcDC = Π
f




DC − ΠcES = K̃ −K. If K ≥ K̃,
early static contract is more profitable to the supplier than dynamic contract. Hence,
the supplier always offers an early static contract without a side payment. If K < K̃,
then the supplier offers a dynamic contract with a side payment of S < K̃−K to any
buyer who is willing to obtain a forecast update. Notice that under such contract,
the low-type buyer strictly prefers to obtain a forecast update. The high-type buyer
does not have an incentive to deviate from updating, which can be supported by an
off-the-path equilibrium belief such that if the supplier observes no-update, then he
believes the buyer is high-type with probability one, and will offer the first-best high-
type early static contract, resulting in zero profit to the deviating high-type. Hence,
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the pooling equilibrium where both types update is a PBE.
Next, we will show that if K ≤ K̃, separating equilibrium does not exist when the
supplier announces upfront that a side payment will be given if the buyer updates
forecast. Suppose there exists a separating equilibrium where the low-type announces
an update while the high-type announces no update. Then, the supplier’s optimal
contract for the high-type is the first-best early static contract. For the low-type, the
optimal contract is the first-best dynamic contract with a side payment. In this case,
the high-type has an incentive to mimic the low-type since the low-type’s contract
gives the high-type positive profits. Therefore, such an equilibrium does not exist.
Now consider the opposite separating equilibrium where the low-type buyer announces
to not update; the high-type announces to update. In this equilibrium, the low-type
buyer is offered the first-best early static contract; the high-type buyer is offered the
first-best dynamic contract with a side payment. Let the high-type profit from taking
the low-type’s first-best early static contract be M . Notice that it is optimal for the
supplier to offer a side payment smaller than M to maximize his expected profit. In
this case, it is profitable for the high-type buyer to deviate to the no-update strategy.
Hence, this separating equilibrium does not exist.
We can show there is no separating equilibrium for the case of K > K̃ in the same
way.
Proof of Theorem 2.3: 1. Observe that the constraints for the two-dimensional
screening contract in the supplier’s problem include all the constraints of both early
static and dynamic contract. Hence, the set of constraints that are implied and re-
moved from the problem is the same as what we have shown in Appendix A.1. Based
on the resulting reduced problem, we can show that the period 2 incentive compati-
bility constraints ICHH and ICLH are binding at optimality. Otherwise, the supplier
can increase tHH and tLH , respectively, without violating any other constraints. The
binding ICiH implies that the type iH buyer’s expected profit from choosing the
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contract type iH and iL in period 2 are the same, i ∈ {L,H}.






















i + qiL)− tiL
− tDi .
We can see that the difference in the expected profit to the capable buyer and the inca-
pable buyer essentially comes from the mismatch of the chosen contract quantity and













i + qiL). That is, with probability υiHpiL, the
incapable buyer chooses the iH contract but would have observed signal L in period
2 if she were capable. With probability υiLpiH , the buyer chooses the iL contract but
would have observed signal H in period 2 if she were capable. Given what we showed
earlier that the period 2 constraint ICiL can be removed and ICiH is binding, we
know that the low-subtype (iL) deviation to the high-subtype (iH) contract is not
profitable; while, the high-subtype deviation to the low-subtype contract yields the
same expected profit as that from the high-subtype contract. This implies with prob-
ability υiHpiL, the incapable buyer may end up losing money. The optimal strategy
for the incapable buyer is to always choose the low-subtype contract, iL, in period 2;
υiL = 1.



















i +qiL)− tiL]− tDi . Since
















tij] − tDi . That is, the RHS of the first forecasting capability incentive constraint is
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equal to the LHS of the second forecasting capability constraint, i ∈ {L,H}. This
shows that both forecasting capability incentive constraints are binding at optimality
since the LHS of the first constraint is the same as the RHS of the second constraint.
Therefore, the equality of the capable and incapable expected profit for each buyer
type i is shown.
Now, consider the low-type buyer. Given the remaining constraints in the reduced
problem, we can check that the period 1 participation constraints for both incapable
and capable low-type buyer must be binding at optimality. Otherwise, the supplier
can profitably and feasibly increase tL and t
D
L accordingly. This implies that the low-
type expected profit is zero for both capable and incapable buyer. For the high-type
buyer, the period 1 participation constraints are not binding, implying the high-type
expected profit is positive for both capable and incapable buyer.
3. We will first show that the supplier’s profit monotonically increases with the
capability probability φ. The supplier’s profit for a given capability probability φ ∈
[0, 1] is Π(φ) = φΠC(φ) + (1 − φ)ΠI(φ) where ΠC(φ) is the expected profit from
contracting with a capable buyer and ΠI(φ) is the expected profit from contracting
with an incapable buyer. Notice that ΠC(φ) ≥ ΠI(φ) for any φ ∈ [0, 1]. Otherwise, the
supplier can increase his profit by offering the same early static contract to the capable
buyer while satisfying all constraints because the early static contract is a special case
of the dynamic contract. Next, we show that Π(φ′) ≥ Π(φ) for any φ′ > φ. Notice
that if φ′ > φ, then we have φ′ΠC(φ)+(1−φ′)ΠI(φ) ≥ φΠC(φ)+(1−φ)ΠI(φ) = Π(φ)
because ΠC(φ) ≥ ΠI(φ). This implies that at probability φ′, the supplier can at least
offer the same optimal contract for φ to receive at least as much profit as Π(φ). Note
that all constraints will be satisfied since the forecasting capability probability does
not affect the buyer’s profit as long as the same contract is offered. Hence, it follows
that Π(φ′) ≥ Π(φ).
Next, we will show that the supplier’s profit monotonically increases with the
143
buyer’s period 2 forecast accuracy θ2. It is easy to see that the results in Proposition
2.1 and Proposition 2.2 for the dynamic contract continue to hold in this model.
Hence, we will consider the two-dimensional screening contract where the dynamic
contract is in this simplified form with qDi , tiL = 0.
Let S∗(θ2) denote an optimal contract when the buyer’s second-period informa-
tion accuracy is θ2. Let Π
∗(θ2) := Π(S
∗(θ2), θ2) denote the corresponding supplier’s
optimal profit. We will show that when the buyer’s second-period accuracy is θ′′2 > θ
′
2,
there exists a solution S(θ′′2) such that Π
∗(θ′′2) ≥ Π(S(θ′′2), θ′′2) ≥ Π∗(θ′2).
Suppose an optimal solution at θ′2 is given by S
























2)}, i, j ∈ {L,H} where
tLH(θ
′′
2 ) = θ
′′




2))− Γ(DH , q∗LL(θ′2))] + (1− θ′′2 )[Γ(DL, q∗LH(θ′2))− Γ(DL, q∗LL(θ′2))]
tHH(θ
′′
2 ) = θ
′′




2))− Γ(DH , q∗HL(θ′2))] + (1− θ′′2 )[Γ(DL, q∗HH(θ′2))− Γ(DL, q∗HL(θ′2))]
Notice that we adopt the same early static contract and dynamic contract as the





2) for the dynamic contract. This construction technique is the same as
what we have done in the proof of Theorem 2.1, allowing us to employ the results we
have shown there.
We will first show that this solution is feasible for the supplier’s problem with θ2 =
θ′′2 . From the proof of Theorem 2.1, it follows immediately that this contract satisfies
all the constraints in the original early static and dynamic contract. It remains to
show that the contract satisfies the forecasting capability incentive constraints. By
construction of tiH(θ
′
2′) and given that the period 2 ICiH constraints are binding for
i ∈ {L,H}, we have that the forecasting capability incentive constraints under S(θ′′2)
are the same as those under S∗(θ′2). Hence, S(θ
′′
2) is a feasible contract.
Next, we will show Π(S(θ′′2), θ
′′
2) ≥ Π∗(θ′2). Since the early static contract in S(θ′′2)
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is the same as that in S∗(θ′2), we have that the supplier’s profit from the early static
contract under S(θ′′2) is the same as that under S
∗(θ′2). Hence, it suffices to show
that the supplier’s profit from the dynamic contract under S(θ′′2) is no less than that






As in the proof of Theorem 2.1, since the differences between S(θ′′2) and S
∗(θ′2)
only arise from tiH , i ∈ {L,H}, we define Π̂DC(θ2) as the supplier’s profit from the
dynamic contract where only tiH are functions of θ2, and the rest of the quantities
and transfer payments are given. We will show dΠ̂DC(θ2)
dθ2
≥ 0 for any θ′′2 ∈ (θ′2, 1]. Since
we construct S(θ′′2) in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 2.1, we have the same
expression of dΠ̂DC(θ2)
dθ2
. Furthermore, notice that the characterization of the optimal
period 1 production is the same as presented in Proposition 2.3 since the tradeoff
between producing a unit in period 1 and in period 2 remains the same. Then, for
the case of c1
c2
> pHH , the arguments in the proof of Theorem 2.1 also apply to this
model since they are independent of the contract structure. It remains to show that
the arguments in the case of c1
c2
≤ pHH also apply. For this, it suffices to show that the
equation that characterizes qHL in the optimal two-dimensional screening contract is
the same as that in the original dynamic contract.
First, we will argue that in an optimal two-dimensional screening contract, the
period 1 incentive constraint for the incapable high-type (early static) must be bind-
ing. To see this, observe that at least one of the two period 1 incentive constraints
for the high-type must be binding. Otherwise, the supplier can increase profit by
increasing both tH and t
D
H proportionally without violating other constraints. Let
ICESH denote the early static constraint, and IC
DC
H denote the dynamic constraint.
Notice that the LHS of both ICESH and IC
DC
H are equal due to the fact that the
forecasting capability incentive constraints of the high-type are binding. The RHS
of ICESH is given by (2θ1 − 1)[Γ(DH , qL)− Γ(DL, qL)] and the RHS of ICDCH is given
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by (2θ1 − 1)[Γ(DH , qLL) − Γ(DL, qLL)], following from the binding PCL, ICLH , and
ICHH . Hence, we can show that IC
ES
H is binding by showing qL ≥ qLL. Suppose the
contrary that qL < qLL so that it is IC
DC
H that is binding. Then, t
D
H is derived from
the binding ICDCH , and tH is derived from the binding high-type forecasting capability
incentive constraints. However, this results in the following first-order conditions:
yL(qL) := (1− (1 + p1H)θ1)Γ′(DH , qL) + ((1 + p1H)θ1 − p1H)Γ′(DL, qL)− c1p1L
+p1H(2θ1 − 1)[Γ′(DH , qL)− Γ′(DL, qL)] = 0
yL̄(q̄L) := φ[(1− (1 + p1H)θ1)Γ′(DH , q̄L) + ((1 + p1H)θ1 − p1H)Γ′(DL, q̄L)− c1p1L]
−(1− φ)p1H(2θ1 − 1)[Γ′(DH , q̄L)− Γ′(DL, q̄L)] = 0,
where q̄L is the optimal low-type quantity for the dynamic contract when bunch-
ing is optimal for the low-type. Notice that yL̄(qL) = −p1H(2θ1 − 1)[Γ′(DH , qL) −
Γ′(DL, qL)] ≤ 0. Given the unimodality of the supplier’s profit in q̄L, this implies
qL ≥ q̄L. By the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 2.6 part 1, we can
show that q̄L ≥ qLL. Hence, qL ≥ qLL, which is a contradiction. This shows that
ICESH is binding at optimality. Then, it follows that tH is derived from the binding
ICESH , and t
D
H is derived from the binding high-type forecasting capability incentive
constraints. More precisely, tH is as given in Proposition A.1, which is independent of
qHL, and t
D




is the same as in the original dynamic contract.
Finally, consider the rest of the transfer payments in the two-dimensional screening
contract. It is easy to see that tL, t
D
L , and tLH are independent of qHL. The expression
of tHH is given by the binding ICHH , which is the same as in the original dynamic
contract. Hence, the first-order condition which characterizes qHL is the same as given
in Proposition 2.3. Then, the result that dΠ̂DC(θ2)
dθ2
≥ 0 for the case of c1
c2
≤ pHH also
applies to this model.
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4. We will first show that the high-type buyer’s profit is monotonically decreasing
in the capability probability φ. From part 2., we know that both incapable and
capable high-type buyer receive the same expected profit. From the proof of part 3.,
we have shown that under an optimal contract, the period 1 incentive constraint for
the incapable high-type, ICESH , is binding. Hence, the high-type buyer’s profit is given
by the RHS of ICESH , which is (2θ1 − 1)[Γ(DH , qL) − Γ(DL, qL)]. We will show the
result by showing ∂qL
∂φ





yL(φ, qL) = 0 denotes the first-order condition with respect to qL. We have shown in
part 3. that the transfer payments tH , tL, and t
D
H are functions of qL. Plugging in the
expression of the transfer payments in the supplier’s profit, we can derive yL(φ, qL)
as
yL(φ, qL) := (1− φ)[(1− (1 + p1H)θ1)Γ′(DH , qL) + ((1 + p1H)θ1 − p1H) (A.6)
Γ′(DL, qL)− c1p1L]− φp1H(2θ1 − 1)[Γ′(DH , qL)− Γ′(DL, qL)] = 0
=: (1− φ)A(qL)− φp1H(2θ1 − 1)B(qL).
Notice that B(qL) ≥ 0 by Property 3 in Assumption 1. Since yL(φ, qL) = 0 at
optimality, this implies A(qL) ≥ 0. Hence, it follows that ∂yL∂φ = −A(qL) − p
1
H(2θ1 −
1)B(qL) ≤ 0. Now, consider ∂yL∂qL . Let Π denote the supplier’s profit under an optimal









supplier’s profit is unimodal in qL by Property 4 in Assumption 1, it follows that
∂2Π
∂q2L
≤ 0 at an optimal qL. Hence, ∂yL∂qL ≤ 0. Together with what we have shown earlier
that ∂yL
∂φ
≤ 0, we have that ∂qL
∂φ
≤ 0.
Next, we will show that the high-type buyer’s profit is independent of the second
forecast accuracy, θ2. Given the expression for the high-type profit above, we can
show the result by showing ∂qL
∂θ2
= 0. It is easy to see from equation (A.6), which




Additional Results and Proofs for Chapter 3
B.1 Proofs for Chapter 3
Proof of Proposition 3.1: We will first show the results for an all-unit discount
DA = (r,K). Given the utility function in (3.3), we solve the consumer’s maximiza-
tion problem. Notice that Uij(q,D
A) is linear in q within each of the four intervals,
implying that the optimal purchase quantity is a boundary solution, which is either
















if θi ≥ K
(B.1)
and θ̄j(D






 0 if j = v or r < Rt if j = d and r ≥ R
It is immediate to see that σj(θi, D
A) and θ̄j(D
A) increase in p and K, and decrease
in r. Additionally, it follows directly from (B.1) that θ̄d(D
k) ≤ θ̄v(Dk) ≤ K and
σd(θi, D
k) ≤ σv(θi, Dk) ≤ p.
To show part i) to iii) of the proposition, we will consider the three cases of i)
s < σj(θi, D
A), ii) s ≥ σj(θi, DA) and θi < θ̄j(DA), and iii) s ≥ σj(θi, DA) and
θi ≥ θ̄j(DA), respectively. To determine the optimal purchase quantity in each case,
we compare the utility at q = 0, θi, and K. Note that the utility at q = 0 is always 0.
The utility at q = θ and K are summarized in Table B.1.
θi σj(θi, D
A)





A) p (si − p)θi
siθi − p(1− r)K + Tj(DA)
= siθi − pθ̄j(DA)
θ̄j(D




siθi − p(1− r)K + Tj(DA)
= (si − σj(θi, DA))θi
θi ≥ K p(1− r)− Tj(D
A)
K
(si − p(1− r))θi + Tj(DA) = siK − p(1− r)K + Tj(DA)
(si − σj(θi, DA))θi − ( θi−KK )Tj(D
A) = (si − σj(θi, DA))K
Table B.1: Consumer’s utility from purchasing q = θi and K
i) si < σj(θi, D
A)
It is straightforward to see from Table B.1 that the utility from purchasing θi
and K are negative in all three intervals of θi because si < σj(θi, D
A) ≤ p. Thus,
no purchase is optimal.
ii) si ≥ σj(θi, DA) and θi < θ̄j(DA)
From Table B.1, Uij(θi, D
A) ≥ 0 since s ≥ σj(θi, DA) = p. Notice also that
Uij(θi, D
A) − Uij(K,DA) = p(θ̄j(DA) − θi) > 0 since θi < θ̄j(DA). Thus, it is
optimal to buy θi at the full price.
iii) si ≥ σj(θi, DA) and θi ≥ θ̄j(DA)
From Table B.1, if θ̄j(D
A) ≤ θi < K, we have Uij(K,DA) ≥ 0 and Uij(K,DA)−
Uij(θi, D
A) = p(θi − θ̄j(DA)) ≥ 0 from si ≥ σj(θi, DA) and θi ≥ θ̄j(DA). Thus,
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it is optimal to buy K to receive the discount. If θi ≥ K, we have Uij(θi, DA)−
Uij(K,D
A) = (si − p(1 − r))(θi − K). This implies it is better to buy θi if
si ≥ p(1 − r), and it is better to buy K if si < p(1 − r). Note also that
Uij(θi, D
A) ≥ 0 if si ≥ p(1 − r), and Uij(K,DA) ≥ 0 because si ≥ σj(θi, DA).
Thus, it is optimal to buy either K or θi > K and receive the discount if θi ≥ K.
The results for a fixed-amount discount DF = (m,K) can be shown in an anal-
ogous manner, where σj(θi, D
F ) and θ̄j(D
F ) are constructed by replacing r with m
pK
in the expressions of σj(θi, D
F ) and θ̄j(D
F ), respectively.
Proof of Proposition 3.2: The results follow directly from Proposition 3.1.
Proof of Proposition 3.3: i) This result is implicitly shown in the proof of
Proposition 3.1.
ii) Part i) and Proposition 3.1 immediately imply that the optimal purchase quan-
tity under the fixed-amount discount is identical to that under the all-unit discount
when i) s < σj(θ,D
F ), and ii) s ≥ σj(θ,DF ) and θ < θ̄j(DF ). Now, consider the
remaining case where s ≥ σj(θ,DF ) and θ ≥ θ̄j(DF ). If θ̄j(DF ) ≤ θ < K, we have
Uij(K,D
F ) = Uij(K,D
A) and Uij(θ,D
F ) = Uij(θ,D
A). Hence, the optimal purchase
quantity is the same under the two discount schemes. If θ ≥ K, we have Uij(θ,DF ) =
sθ− pθ+m+Tj(DF ) and Uij(K,DF ) = sK − pK +m+Tj(DF ) = (s− σj(θ,DF ))K
under the fixed-amount discount, so Uij(θ,D
F )−Uij(K,DF ) = (s−p)(θ−K). Notice
that since s ≥ σj(θ,DF ), Uij(K,DF ) ≥ 0. Note also that Uij(θ,DF ) ≥ 0 if and only
if s ≥ p. Thus, the optimal purchase quantity under the fixed-amount discount is θ
if s ≥ p or K if s < p. But on the other hand, for any s ≥ σj(θ,DA) and θ ≥ K,
the optimal purchase quantity under the all-unit discount is θ if s ≥ p(1− r) or K if
s < p(1− r). The result follows from comparing the optimal purchase quantity under
the two discount schemes.
Proof of Proposition 3.4: i) Suppose β > 0. We consider three cases: 1)
sh < p, 2) sl < p ≤ sh, and 3) sl ≥ p. In each case, we prove the result by providing
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an all-unit discount DA = (r,K), r > 0, K > 0, which yields a strictly higher profit
than the profit from selling at no discount. Let Π(0) be the seller’s profit from offering
no discount. We summarize Π(0) and Π(DA) for each case in Table B.2.
Case DA = (r,K) θ̄j(D
A) σj(θh, D
A) Π(DA) Π(0)













sl < p ≤ sh (R, t+pθhp(1−R) )
t+pθh−Tj(DA)
p
≥ θh p γpθh + βγt γpθh






γpθh + γβt γpθh+
+(1− γ)pθl (1− γ)pθl
Table B.2: Seller’s profit from offering no discount and DA when β > 0
The seller’s profits Π(DA) are derived using the result from Proposition 3.1 and
equation (3.3). It is straightforward to see that Π(DA) > Π(0) for all three cases.
ii) Suppose β = 0. We will first show that no discount is optimal when condition
a) or b) holds. Notice that sh ≥ p in both condition a) and b). From Proposition
3.5, we know that when sh ≥ p, fixed-amount discount is the most profitable type of
discounts. Hence, to show that no discount is optimal, it suffices to show that the
optimal fixed-amount discount cannot yield a strictly greater profit than no discount.
a) Suppose sl ≥ p. From Figure 3.2, a type-i consumer buys either θi or K > θi.
Notice that it is not optimal to offer a discount and induce the consumer to
buy θi since the consumer is already willing to buy θi at the full price. Suppose
it is optimal to offer a fixed-amount discount DF = (m,K) to induce a type-
i consumer to buy K. Then, from Proposition 3.1 and equation (B.1), the
discount needs to satisfy θi ≥ θ̄v(DF ) = pK−mp . This implies that the seller’s
profit from selling to the type-i consumer is pK−m ≤ pθi. Notice however that
the profit from selling to the type-i consumer under no discount is pθi. Hence,
no discount is optimal.
b) Suppose sh ≥ p > sl and γ ≥ slp . Under no discount, the seller’s profit is
γpθh. If a fixed-amount discount D
F = (m,K) is offered, the following out-
comes of (ql, qh) can be induced: (0, 0), (0, θh), (0, K), (K,K), and (K, θh). It
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is immediate to see that (0, 0) and (0, θh) cannot be more profitable than no
discount. Now, consider (0, K). To induce the high-type to buy K, the discount
needs to satisfy θh ≥ θ̄v(DF ) = pK−mp from Proposition 3.1 and equation (B.1(.
This implies that the seller’s profit from inducing (0, K) is γ(pK −m) ≤ γpθh,
which cannot be strictly greater than the no-discount profit. Next, consider
(K,K). To induce the low-type consumer to buy K, the discount needs to sat-
isfy sl ≥ σv(θl, DF ), which from equation (B.1) implies that the seller’s profit
from inducing (K,K) is pK −m ≤ slθl. Notice that slθl ≤ γpθh since γ ≥ slp
and θh ≥ θl. Hence, the outcome (K,K) cannot be optimal. Finally, consider
(K, θh), where the seller’s profit is given by γ(pθh − m) + (1 − γ)(pK − m).
Solving the seller’s problem, we obtain that the seller’s profit from inducing
(K, θh) is maximized at K = 0 if γ ≥ slp , and is maximized at K = θl otherwise.
Since γ ≥ sl
p
in this case, we have that the seller’s profit is maximized at K = 0
and m = 0, which is equivalent to offering no discount.
To complete the proof, we will show that no discount is not optimal in the other
cases outside of condition a) and b). That is, we will show there exists a discount
which yields a strictly greater profit than offering no discount when c) sh < p, or d)
sl < p ≤ sh and γ < slp .
c) Suppose sh < p. In this case, the no-discount profit is zero. The seller can do
better by offering a price markdown with a discount r = p−sl
p
. Under this price
markdown, the high-type consumer buys θh and the low-type consumer buys
θl. The seller receives a profit of γslθh + (1− γ)slθl > 0. Hence, no discount is
not optimal.
d) Suppose sl < p ≤ sh and γ < slp . The seller can offer a fixed-amount discount
with K = θl and m = (p − sl)θl. Under this discount, the high-type consumer
buys θh and the low-type consumer buys K = θl. The seller’s profit is γp(θh −
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Proof of Proposition 3.5: i) We first show that the optimal all-unit discount
dominates the optimal fixed-amount discount when sh < p. For this, we prove that
for an optimal fixed-amount discount DF∗ = (m∗, K), there exists an all-unit discount
that results in at least as much profit for the seller. Consider an all-unit discount
DA = (r = m
∗
pK
, KA = K). We compare the profit that the seller obtains from a
consumer type ij, i ∈ {l, h}, j ∈ {v, d}, under DA and DF∗. From Proposition 3.3, if
K ≥ θi or si < p(1− r), the consumer will buy the same quantity under both the all-
unit and fixed-amount discount. Notice that under this situation, the consumer will
never buy more than K since sh < p. Hence, the seller’s profits under the two discount
schemes are the same. Now, consider the case where K < θi and si ≥ p(1− r). From
Proposition 3.3, the consumer will buy exactly K under the fixed-amount discount,
but will buy θi > K under the all-unit discount. Hence, the seller earns pK−m∗ under
the fixed-amount discount, but earns p(1− r)θi = p(1− m
∗
pK
)θi > pK −m∗ under the
all-unit discount. Thus, the all-unit discount weakly outperforms the fixed-amount
discount.
Next, we will show the existence of β̄ ∈ [0, 1] by contradiction. To represent a
price markdown, we let ε > 0 denote the smallest sellable unit of the product, where
ε is arbitrarily small. Then, a price markdown is given by DM = (r,K = ε). Suppose
that there exist β1 < β2 such that when the proportion of deal-prone consumers is
β1, price markdown is not an optimal all-unit discount; but at β2, price markdown
is an optimal all-unit discount. We will show that there exists an all-unit discount
with K > ε which is strictly more profitable than the optimal price markdown at
β2. Let D
A = (r1, K1 > ε) be an optimal all-unit discount at β1, and D
M = (r2, ε)
be the optimal price markdown at β2. Also, let Π(β,D) be the seller’s profit from
offering an all-unit discount D at β. Then, Π(β1, D
A) > Π(β1, D
M) and Π(β2, D
M) ≥
Π(β2, D
A). Since β2 > β1, Π(β2, D
A) ≥ Π(β1, DA) from Proposition 3.2. Hence,
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it follows that Π(β2, D
M) > Π(β1, D
M), which implies the seller’s profit from the
deal-prone consumer is strictly greater than that from the value-conscious consumer
with DM (i.e., DM results in an overspending). From Proposition 3.2, overspending
under DM occurs when qdi = K = ε > qvi = 0 for some i ∈ {l, h}, resulting in
the seller’s expected profit from the type-i consumer of β2(p(1− r2))ε. Now, consider
another all-unit discount DA′ = (r2, K = min{ tp(1−r∗(β2))−si , θi}). Under this discount,
σd(θi, D
A′(β2)) = p(1 − r∗(β2)) − Td(D
A∗(β2))
K
≤ si. Hence, from Proposition 3.1, the
type-i deal-prone consumer buys K; other types buy the same quantity as under
DM . The seller’s expected profit from the type-i consumer is β2(p(1− r2))K, which
is strictly greater than that under DM since K > ε. Thus, DA′ is more profitable
than DM at β2, which contradicts the optimality of price markdown at β2.
ii) There are two cases to consider here: iia) sl ≥ p, and iib) sl < p. We will show
in each case that for any optimal all-unit discount DA∗ = (r∗, K), there exists a fixed-
amount discount DF = (m,KF ) which yields at least as much profit to the seller. For
this, we will compare the seller’s profit from a consumer type ij, i ∈ {l, h}, j ∈ {v, d},
under DF and DA∗.
iia) Suppose sl ≥ p. Consider a fixed-amount discount DF = (m = pr∗K,KF = K).
From Proposition 3.3, since si ≥ p, the consumer always purchases the same quantity
q under the two discount policies, which is either θi < K,K, or θi > K . If q ≤ K,
the seller’s profit under both discount policies are the same. However, if q = θi > K,
the seller earns p(1− r∗)θi under the all-unit discount, but p(θi− r∗K) > p(1− r∗)θi
under the fixed-amount discount. Thus, the seller’s profit from any consumer type ij
under the fixed-amount discount weakly dominates that under the optimal all-unit
discount.
iib) Suppose sl < p. Consider a fixed-amount discount D
F = (m = pr∗K,KF = K).
From Proposition 3.3, if sl < p(1− r∗) or θl ≤ K, the consumer purchases the same
quantity under DF and DA∗. By the same argument as in iia), we can show that
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the seller’s profit under DF is greater than or equal to that under DA∗. Now, for
the remaining case where sl ≥ p(1− r∗) and θl > K, consider another fixed-amount
discount DF
′
= (m′ = pr∗K,KF
′
= θl). From Proposition 3.3, under D
A∗, the low-
type consumer buys θl and the high-type consumer buys θh; under D
F ′ , the low-type
consumer buys KF
′
= θl and the high-type consumer buys θh as well. The seller’s
profits from selling to the low-type consumer under both discount policies are the
same at p(1− r∗)θl. However, the seller’s profit from the high-type consumer under
the optimal all-unit discount is p(1− r∗)θh, which is less than that under the fixed
amount discount of pθh−pr∗K. Hence, the fixed-amount discount weakly dominates
the all-unit discount.
The results from iia) and iib) together complete the proof of ii).
Proof of Proposition 3.6: First, we consider the seller’s profit difference be-
tween no discount and an optimal conditional discount. Under no discount, deal-
prone consumers never receive transaction utility. Hence, the purchase quantity of
deal-prone and value-conscious consumers are always the same, implying the seller’s
profit under no discount is independent of β and t. On the other hand, the seller’s
profit under an optimal conditional discount weakly increases in β because the profit
from selling to deal-prone consumers is always greater than or equal to the profit
from selling to value-conscious consumers under any conditional discount. The profit
under an optimal conditional discount also weakly increases in t because an increase
in t weakly increases the transaction utility realized by deal-prone consumers under
any given conditional discount, resulting in a weak increase in the purchase quantity
of deal-prone consumers, and subsequently, in the seller’s profit at optimality.
Next, we consider the seller’s profit differences between price markdown and con-
ditional discount. To represent a price markdown, we let ε > 0 denote the smallest
sellable unit of the product, where ε is arbitrarily small. Then, a price markdown is
given by DM = (r,K = ε). We will show the result for the three cases: i) sl ≥ p, ii)
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sh ≥ p > sl, and iii) sh < p. For each case, Table B.3 summarizes the possible con-
sumer purchase quantities Q = (qhd, qhv, qld, qlv) under a price markdown, the optimal
markdown rM∗(Q) that induces the purchase quantity Q, and the seller’s profit from








sl ≥ p Q1 0 γpθh + (1− γ)pθl
sh ≥ p > sl Q1 1−
sl
p γslθh + (1− γ)slθl
Q2 if R < 1− slp R γp(1−R)θh + (1− γ)βp(1−R)ε
Q3 0 γpθh
sh < p Q1 1−
sl











γshθh + (1− γ)βshε if R ≤ 1− shp
γp(1−R)θh + (1− γ)βp(1−R)ε if R > 1− shp
Q3 if R > 1− shp 1−
sh
p γshθh
Q4 if R ≤ 1− shp R βp(1−R)ε
Q5 if R ≤ 1− shp R βγp(1−R)ε
Q6 0 0
where Q1 = (θh, θh, θl, θl), Q2 = (θh, θh, ε, 0), Q3 = (θh, θh, 0, 0), Q4 = (ε, 0, ε, 0), Q5 =
(ε, 0, 0, 0), Q6 = (0, 0, 0, 0).
Table B.3: Possible outcomes under a price markdown
1. sl ≥ p
From Table B.3, no discount is optimal under price markdown. Hence, the
result follows.
2. sh ≥ p > sl
From Table B.3, notice that ΠM∗(Q2) < Π
M∗(Q3) for any γ > 0, and Π
M∗(Q2) <
ΠM∗(Q1) if γ = 0 since ε is arbitrarily small. Thus, Q2 cannot be an optimal
outcome under a price markdown. Now, consider Q1 and Q3, and note that
ΠM∗(Q1) and Π
M∗(Q3) are independent of β and t. Hence, the result follows.
3. sh < p
First, notice from Table B.3 that ΠM∗(Q6) ≤ ΠM∗(Q5) ≤ ΠM∗(Q4) < ΠM∗(Q1)
since ε is arbitrarily small. Hence, Q4, Q5, and Q6 cannot be an optimal out-
come under a price markdown. If Q1 or Q3 is optimal, the result follows since
the seller’s profit is independent of β and t. Now, consider Q2. Notice that
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ΠM∗(Q2) is independent of t. Hence, the result regarding an increase in t fol-
lows immediately. It remains to show the result regarding an increase in β
when Q2 is optimal. If R > 1 − shp , then Π
M∗(Q2) < Π
M∗(Q3) for any γ > 0,
and ΠM∗(Q2) < Π
M∗(Q1) if γ = 0 since ε is arbitrarily small. Hence, Q2
cannot be optimal. If R ≤ 1 − sh
p
, Q2 is optimal if Π
M∗(Q2) > Π
M∗(Q1),
which requires γ > slθl
shθh−slθh+slθl
. However, in this situation, the optimal con-
ditional discount, derived from solving the seller’s problem, is an all-unit dis-
count which induces at least one type of deal-prone consumers to overspend
by K > ε. Thus, ΠA∗ = βPr(i)p(1 − rA∗)K + (1 − Pr(i))p(1 − rA∗)q−i,
where i ∈ {l, h} is the type of deal-prone consumers who overspends. Then,
d[ΠA∗−ΠM∗(Q2)]
dβ
= Pr(i)p(1− rA∗)K − (1− γ)shε > 0 since ε is arbitrarily small.
Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Lemma 3.1: We will first show the result for the all-unit discount.
Notice from Proposition 3.4 part i) that since β > 0, no discount cannot be optimal.
Thus, an optimal discount must increase purchase quantity of at least one type of
consumers. Let DA∗(γ) = (r∗(γ), K∗(γ)) be the terms of the optimal all-unit discount
when the proportion of high-type consumers is γ. Let ΠH(D
k∗(γ)) and ΠL(D
k∗(γ))
be the seller’s profits earned from the high-type and the low-type consumers under
the optimal discount, respectively.
We will show the result by contradiction. Suppose at γ = γ1, the optimal discount
DA∗(γ1) induces only the high-type consumers to increase their purchase quantity.
Suppose also that there exists γ2 > γ1 such that the optimal discount D
A∗(γ2) induces
the low-type consumers to increase their purchase quantity. From the optimality of
DA∗(γ1) at γ = γ1, and D
A∗(γ2) at γ = γ2, we have
γ1ΠH(D
A∗(γ1)) + (1− γ1)ΠL(DA∗(γ1)) > γ1ΠH(DA∗(γ2)) + (1− γ1)ΠL(DA∗(γ2)), and (B.2)
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γ2ΠH(D
A∗(γ2)) + (1− γ2)ΠL(DA∗(γ2)) ≥ γ2ΠH(DA∗(γ1)) + (1− γ2)ΠL(DA∗(γ1)). (B.3)
We will now show that ΠH(D
A∗(γ1)) ≥ ΠH(DA∗(γ2)). To see this, suppose
ΠH(D
A∗(γ2)) > ΠH(D
A∗(γ1)). Since sh > sl and θh > θl, the high-type purchase
quantity is always no less than the low-type purchase quantity. Given the fact
that the low-type consumer increases purchase quantity under DA∗(γ2), we must
have qh(D
A∗(γ2)) ≥ ql(DA∗(γ2)) > 0. Then, using the results from Proposition
3.1 and equation (B.1), we can construct an all-unit discount DA′ = (r′, K∗(γ2)),
with r′ < r∗(γ2), such that ql(D
A′) = ql(r = 0) and qh(D
A′) = qh(D
A∗(γ2)). Since
r′ < r∗(γ2) and qh(D
A′) = qh(D
A∗(γ2)), it follows that ΠH(D
A′) ≥ ΠH(DA∗(γ2)) >
ΠH(D
A∗(γ1)). Notice also that under the discount D
A′, the low-type does not in-
crease purchase quantity. Hence, the low-type purchases the same quantity at no
discount under both DA′ and DA∗(γ1), implying ΠL(D
A′) = ΠL(D
A∗(γ1)). Hence,
when γ = γ1, we must have Π(D
A′, γ1) > Π(D
A∗(γ1), γ1). But this contradicts the
optimality of DA∗(γ1). Thus, it must be that ΠH(D
A∗(γ1)) ≥ ΠH(DA∗(γ2)). Ap-
plying this inequality to (B.3), we have ΠL(D
A∗(γ2)) ≥ ΠL(DA∗(γ1)). Now, since
ΠH(D
A∗(γ1)) ≥ ΠH(DA∗(γ2)),ΠL(DA∗(γ2)) ≥ ΠL(DA∗(γ1)), and γ1 < γ2, it follows
that
γ2[ΠH(D
A∗(γ1))− ΠH(DA∗(γ2))]− (1− γ2)[ΠL(DA∗(γ2))− ΠL(DA∗(γ1))] ≥
γ1[ΠH(D
A∗(γ1))− ΠH(DA∗(γ2))]− (1− γ1)[ΠL(DA∗(γ2))− ΠL(DA∗(γ1))].
Then, from (B.2), we must have γ2ΠH(D
A∗(γ1)) + (1− γ2)ΠL(DA∗(γ1)) >
γ2ΠH(D
A∗(γ2)) + (1 − γ2)ΠL(DA∗(γ2)), which contradicts the optimality of DA∗(γ2)
at γ2.
The result for the fixed-amount discount can be shown in the same way.
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Proof of Proposition 3.7: We will first show the results for the all-unit discount.
In preparation, we employ the results from Proposition 3.1 and enumerate possible
purchase quantities for three cases: no discount, discount increases the high-type













A∗ = (r,K) satisfies
sh < p (0, 0)
(0, θh)
K ≤ θh; (θl, θh) K ≤ θl; sl ≥ p(1− r)sh ≥ p(1− r)
(0,K)
(K, θh)
K ≤ θh; θl ≥ θ̄d(DA);
θh ≥ θ̄d(DA); sl ≥ σd(θl, DA)
sh ≥ σd(θh, DA) (K,K) θl ≥ θ̄d(D
A);
sl ≥ σd(θl, DA)
sl < p ≤ sh (0, θh) (0,K) K > θh ≥ θ̄d(DA)
(θl, θh) K ≤ θl; sl ≥ p(1− r)
(K, θh)
K ≤ θh; θl ≥ θ̄d(DA);
sl ≥ σd(θl, DA)
(K,K)
K ≥ θh; θl ≥ θ̄d(DA);
sl ≥ σd(θl, DA)
sl ≥ p (θl, θh) (θl,K) K > θh ≥ θ̄d(DA)
(K, θh) θ̄d(D
A) ≤ θl < K ≤ θh
(K,K) K > θl ≥ θ̄d(DA)
Table B.4: Possible outcomes under an optimal all-unit discount
i) Suppose γ > ΓA(t). From Lemma 3.1, the optimal all-unit discount increases
the purchase quantity of only the high-type consumer.
ia) We will show that KA∗ ≥ θh. Notice from Table B.4 that if sh ≥ p, the optimal
discount must satisfy K > θh ≥ θ̄d(DA); thus, the result holds. Now consider
the case of sh < p. From Table B.4, the possible outcomes in this case are (0, θh)
and (0, K). Suppose that K < θh under the optimal discount D
A = (r,K). We
will show that there exists another all-unit discount which yields a greater profit
than DA.
a.1) (0, K): From the proof of Proposition 3.1 part iii), when K < θh, the
high-type consumer buys K if σd(θh, D
A) ≤ sh < p(1 − r). Applying the
definition of σd(θh, D





sh < p(1− r). This implies Td(DA) = t > 0. Thus, p(1− r)K ≤ shK + t,
implying Π(DA) = γp(1− r)K ≤ γ(shK + t).
Now, consider another all-unit discountDA′ = (r′ = max{pK′−shθh−t
pK′
, R}, K ′ =
max{θh, t+shθhp(1−R)}). This discount has K
′ ≥ θh. Applying the definitions
from (B.1), we have θ̄d(D
A′) = shθh
p
< θh ≤ K ′ and sh = σd(θh, DA′) for
the high-type consumer. Hence, from Proposition 3.1, the high-type pur-
chases K ′. For the low-type consumer, we have sl < σd(θl, D
A′), implying
the low-type does not purchase. Applying the expressions of r′ and K ′, we
have Π(DA′) = γp(1− r′)K ′ = γ(shθh + t) > Π(DA) since θh > K.
a.2) (0, θh): From the proof of Proposition 3.1 part iii), when K < θh, the
high-type consumer buys θh if sh ≥ p(1 − r). This implies Π(DA) =
γp(1 − r)θh ≤ γshθh. Notice that this profit is less than the profit from
offering DA′ given in a.1). since t > 0.
Hence, when γ > ΓA(t), an optimal all-unit discount has KA∗ ≥ θh.
ib) We will show that r∗ ≥ R. From ia), KA∗ ≥ θh. This implies the optimal
discount must induce either (ql, qh) = (0, K) when sl < p, or (θl, K) when
sl ≥ p. Suppose the optimal all-unit discount is DA = (r,K), with K ≥ θh
and r < R. Hence, the deal-prone consumers do not receive transaction utility;
i.e., Td(D





A). We will show that there exists another all-unit discount
which yields a greater profit than DA.
b.1) (0, K): First, consider the case of sh ≥ p. From Proposition 3.1 and
equation (B.1), since the high-type buys K, we must have θh ≥ θ̄d(DA) =
K(1 − r). This implies Π(DA) = γp(1 − r)K ≤ γpθh. Notice that DA′
with r′ ≥ R given in a.1) results in Π(DA′) = γ(shθh + t) > Π(DA) since
sh ≥ p and t > 0. Now, consider the case of sh < p. From Proposition 3.1,
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the high-type buys K if θh ≥ θ̄d(DA) and sh ≥ σd(θh, DA). Applying the
definition of σd(θh, D
A) from equation (B.1), we have sh ≥ p(1−r)Kθh . This
implies Π(DA) = γp(1 − r)K ≤ γshθh, which is also dominated by the
seller’s profit from DA′ given in a.1) since t > 0.
b.2) (θl, K): From Proposition 3.1 and equation (B.1), since the high-type buys
K, we must have θh ≥ θ̄d(DA) = K(1− r). This implies Π(DA) = γp(1−
r)K + (1− γ)pθl is no greater than γpθh + (1− γ)pθl, which is the seller’s
no-discount profit. However, we know from Proposition 3.4 part i) that no
discount cannot be optimal since β > 0. Hence, DA cannot be optimal for
this outcome.
We have shown that when γ > ΓA(t), an optimal all-unit discount has r∗ ≥ R.
This completes the proof of part i).
ii) Suppose γ ≤ ΓA(t). From Lemma 3.1, the optimal all-unit discount increases
the purchase quantity of the low-type consumer. We will show the result for t̂ =
(pθh − slθl)+.
iia) We will show that if t > t̂, then KA∗ ≥ θl. Notice from Table B.4 that if sl ≥ p,
the optimal discount must satisfy K > θl ≥ θ̄d(DA); thus, the result holds.
Furthermore, if sl < p ≤ sh and both types buy K, the result also holds since
K ≥ θh > θl. It remains to show the result for the outcomes of (ql, qh) = (θl, θh)
and (K, θh) when sl < p, and (ql, qh) = (K,K) when sh < p. Suppose that
K < θl under the optimal discount D
A = (r,K). We will show that there exists
another all-unit discount resulting in a greater profit than DA.
a.1) (K,K): From the proof of Proposition 3.1 part iii), when K < θl, the
low-type consumer buys K if σd(θl, D
A) ≤ sl < p(1 − r). Applying the
definition of σd(θl, D




sl < p(1− r). This implies Td(DA) = t > 0. Thus, p(1− r)K ≤ shK + t,
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implying Π(DA) = p(1 − r)K ≤ slK + t. Now, consider another all-
unit discount DA′ = (r′ = max{pK′−slθl−t
pK′
, R}, K ′ = t+slθl
p(1−R)). Notice that
since t > t̂ = (pθh − slθl)+, this discount has K ′ > θh > θl. Applying
the definition from equation (B.1), we have θ̄d(D
A′) = slθl
p
< θl < K
′
and σd(θl, D
A′) = sl for the low-type consumer. Hence, from Proposition
3.1, the low-type purchases K ′. For the high-type consumer, we have
θ̄d(D
A′) < θh < K
′ and σd(θh, D
A′) = slθl
θh
< sh. Hence, the high-type also
purchases K ′. Applying the expressions of r′ and K ′, we have Π(DA′) =
p(1 − r′)K ′ = slθl + t. Notice that Π(DA′) > Π(DA) since K < θl. Thus,
DA cannot be optimal.
a.2) (K, θh): Similar to a.1), for the low-type consumer to buyK < θl, D
A needs
to trigger transaction utility, i.e., Td(D
A) = t > 0. This implies r ≥ R.
Hence, Π(DA) = p(1−r)(γθh+(1−γ)K) ≤ p(1−R)(γθh+(1−γ)K) < pθh,
where the last inequality comes from K < θl < θh, and R > 0. Notice
that Π(DA) is less than the profit from DA′ given in a.1) since Π(DA′) =
slθl + t > pθh from t > t̂ = (pθh − slθl)+.
a.3) (θl, θh): From the proof of Proposition 3.1 part iii), when K < θl, the
low-type buys θl if sl ≥ p(1−r). This implies Π(DA) = p(1−r)(γθh+(1−
γ)θl) ≤ sl(γθh + (1 − γ)θl). Notice that this is less than pθh since sl < p
and θl < θh. Hence, it is also dominated by Π(D
A′) as shown in a.2).
We have shown that when γ ≤ ΓA(t) and t > t̂, an optimal all-unit discount
has KA∗ ≥ θl.
iib) We will show that if t > t̂, then r∗ ≥ R. From iia), KA∗ ≥ θl. Hence, from
Table B.4, the optimal discount must induce either (ql, qh) = (K,K) or (K, θh).
Suppose that the optimal all-unit discount is DA = (r,K) with K ≥ θl and
r < R. Hence, the deal-prone consumers do not receive transaction utility, i.e.,
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Td(D





A). We will show that there exists another all-unit discount
which yields a greater profit than DA.
b.1) (K,K): From Proposition 3.1, the low-type buys K if θ̄d(D
A) ≤ θl and
sl ≥ σd(θl, DA). Applying the definition of σd(θl, DA) from equation (B.1),
we have sl ≥ p(1−r)Kθl . This implies Π(D
A) = p(1− r)K ≤ slθl. Notice that
this profit is dominated by the profit from offering DA′ with r ≥ R, given
in a.1), since Π(DA′) = slθl + t and t > 0.
b.2) (K, θh): From Proposition 3.1, the low-type buys K if θ̄d(D
A) ≤ θl. Ap-
plying the definition of θ̄d(D
A) from equation (B.1), we have K(1−r) ≤ θl.
This implies Π(DA) = γp(1 − r)θh + (1 − γ)p(1 − r)K ≤ γp(1 − r)θh +
(1 − γ)pθl < pθh since r ≥ 0 and θh > θl. We have seen from a.1) that
Π(DA′) > pθh. Hence, D
A is dominated by DA′.
We have shown that when γ ≤ ΓA(t) and t > t̂, an optimal all-unit discount
has r∗ ≥ R. This completes the proof of part ii).
Now, consider the fixed-amount discount. Given the results in Proposition 3.3, it
follows that all possible purchase quantities under the fixed-amount discount DF∗ =
(m∗ = pr∗KF∗, KF∗ = KA∗) have already been included in Table B.4. Hence, the
results for the fixed-amount discount can be shown in the same way.
Proof of Lemma 3.2: i) This part of the lemma is analogous to Lemma 3.1. No-
tice from Proposition 3.4 that since β > 0, no discount is never optimal. Furthermore,
from Proposition 3.2, it is not possible to increase the value-conscious purchase quan-
tity alone. Hence, an optimal discount must either increase the deal-prone purchase
quantity alone, or both the deal-prone and the value-conscious purchase quantity.
The result can be shown in the same way as the proof of Lemma 3.1 by replacing
γ with β, H with d, and L with v, and noting that qd(D
k∗(β)) ≥ qv(Dk∗(β)) from
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Proposition 3.2.
ii) This part of the lemma is shown in the proof of Proposition 3.8.
Proof of Proposition 3.8: We will characterize the optimal all-unit and fixed-
amount discount in the two cases: i) s ≥ p and ii) s < p, and show that the optimal
all-unit and fixed-amount discount result in the same seller’s profit. Notice from
Lemma 3.2 part i) that an optimal discount must either increase the deal-prone
purchase quantity alone, or increase both the deal-prone and value-conscious purchase
quantity.
i) Suppose s ≥ p. Then, at no discount, both types of consumers buy θ.
ia) All-unit discount: From Proposition 3.1, more specifically as laid out in
Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3, the only possible outcome where only the deal-prone
consumer increases purchase quantity is (qv, qd) = (θ,K). The only possible
outcome where both deal-prone and value-conscious consumer increase purchase
quantity is (qv, qd) = (K,K). We will compare the seller’s profit under the two
outcomes and show that for any β > 0, it is optimal to induce (θ,K) by offering
K > θ and r = R. That is, β̄A(t) = 0 in this case.
First, consider the all-unit discount which results in (qv, qd) = (θ,K), and the
seller’s profit of βp(1 − r)K + (1 − β)pθ. We will show that the best all-
unit discount in this case is DA = (R, t+pθ
p(1−R)). Applying r and K in D
A to
equation (B.1), we have θ = θ̄d(D
A) < θ̄v(D
A). Hence, by Proposition 3.1, this
discount results in (qv, qd) = (θ,K) and gives a profit of Π(D
A) = βt + pθ.
Suppose there exists another all-unit discount DA
′
= (r′, K ′) which results in





) ≥ K ′(1 − r′) − t
p
from equation (B.1). However, this implies
Π(DA
′
) ≤ βt + pθ = Π(DA). Hence, DA is the best all-unit discount that
results in (qv, qd) = (θ,K) and the seller’s profit of Π
∗(θ,K) = βt+ pθ.
Now, consider the all-unit discount which results in (qv, qd) = (K,K), and the
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seller’s profit of p(1 − r)K. Suppose DA = (r,K) is the best discount. To
induce this outcome, DA needs to satisfy θ ≥ θ̄v(DA) = K(1− r) from equation
(B.1). This implies Π(DA) ≤ pθ. Notice that for any β > 0, this profit is less
than Π∗(θ,K) = βt+ pθ, the maximum profit from inducing (θ,K). Hence, the
outcome (K,K) is never optimal. It is always optimal to induce the outcome
(θ,K) with DA∗ = (R, t+pθ
p(1−R)), where K
∗ > θ and r∗ = R.
ib) Fixed-amount discount: From Proposition 3.1, the only possible outcome
where only the deal-prone consumer increases purchase quantity is (qv, qd) =
(θ,K). The only possible outcome where both deal-prone and value-conscious
consumer increase purchase quantity is (qv, qd) = (K,K). We will compare the
seller’s profit under the two outcomes and show that for any β > 0, it is optimal
to induce (θ,K) by offering K > θ and m = M = pRK. That is, β̄F (t) = 0 in
this case.
First, consider the fixed-amount discount which results in (qv, qd) = (θ,K), and
the seller’s profit of β(pK −m) + (1− β)pθ. We will show that the best fixed-
amount discount in this case is DF = (m = pRK, t+pθ
p(1−R)). Notice that D
F has
the same K and the same discount depth of m
pK
= R as DA∗ in ia). Hence, from
Proposition 3.3 part i), the switching curves under DF are identical to those
under DA∗. It then follows from Proposition 3.1 that under DF , consumers
buy (qv, qd) = (θ,K) and the seller receives a profit of Π(D
F ) = βt + pθ.
Now, suppose there exists another fixed-amount discount DF
′
= (m′, K ′) which
results in a strictly greater profit than DF does. To induce (θ,K ′), DF
′
must
satisfy θ ≥ θ̄d(DF
′




from equation (B.1). However, this implies
Π(DF
′
) ≤ βt+ pθ = Π(DF ). Hence, DF is the best fixed-amount discount that
results in (qv, qd) = (θ,K) and the seller’s profit of Π
∗(θ,K) = βt+ pθ.
Now, consider the fixed-amount discount which results in (qv, qd) = (K,K), and
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the seller’s profit of pK −m. Suppose DF = (m,K) is the best discount. To
induce this outcome, DF needs to satisfy θ ≥ θ̄v(DF ) = K(1− mpK ) from equation
(B.1). This implies Π(DF ) ≤ pθ. Notice that for any β > 0, this profit is less
than Π∗(θ,K) = βt+ pθ, the maximum profit from inducing (θ,K). Hence, the
outcome (K,K) is never optimal. It is always optimal to induce the outcome
(θ,K) with DF∗ = (m = pRK, t+pθ
p(1−R)).
From ia) and ib), we have that the optimal all-unit and fixed-amount discount
have the same K and the same discount depth, and result in the same seller’s profit.
ii) Suppose s < p. Then, at no discount, both types of consumers do not buy.
iia) All-unit discount: From Proposition 3.1, the only possible outcome where
only the deal-prone consumer increases purchase quantity is (qv, qd) = (0, K).
There are two possible outcomes where both deal-prone and value-conscious
consumer increase purchase quantity: (qv, qd) = (K,K) and (qv, qd) = (θ, θ).
Following the same procedure as in part i), we can characterize the best all-unit
discount which increases only the deal-prone purchase quantity, and the best
discount which increases both deal-prone and value-conscious purchase quantity.
The best all-unit discount in each case is provided below.
If only the deal-prone purchase quantity is increased, it is most profitable to
offer












Notice that r ≥ R and K ≥ θ. The resulting outcome is (qv, qd) = (0, K), and
the seller’s profit is Π∗(0, K) = β(t+ sθ).
If both the deal-prone and value-conscious purchase quantity are increased, it
is most profitable to offer DA = (1− s
p
, θ). The resulting outcome is (qv, qd) =
166
(θ, θ), and the seller’s profit is Π∗(θ, θ) = sθ.
Now, notice that Π∗(0, K) > Π∗(θ, θ) if and only if β > sθ
t+sθ
. Hence, it is
optimal to increase only the deal-prone purchase quantity if β > sθ
t+sθ
, and it
is optimal to increase both deal-prone and value-conscious purchase quantity if
β ≤ sθ
t+sθ
. This shows that β̄A(t) = sθ
t+sθ
from Lemma 3.2 part i).
iib) Fixed-amount discount: We know from Proposition 3.5 that when s < p,
the all-unit discount weakly dominates the fixed-amount discount. Hence, to
show that the optimal fixed-amount discount results in the same profit as the
optimal all-unit discount does, it suffices to show that there exists a fixed-
amount discount which yields the same seller’s profit as DA∗ = (r∗, K∗) does.
For this, consider DF = (m = pr∗K∗, K∗). It is easy to check that DF results
in the same outcomes and the same seller’s profit as DA∗, characterized above.
Then, it also follows that β̄F (t) = β̄A(t) = sθ
t+sθ
.
iia) and iib) complete the proof of part ii).
Proof for Optimal Endogenous Prices
We will first show the result for the all-unit discount by showing that the seller’s
profit from setting p = sl, sh, or
shθh+t
θh(1−R)
weakly dominates the seller’s profit obtained
from all other prices.
i) p < sl is dominated by p = sl
Suppose DA = (p, r,K) is optimal for some p < sl. Now, consider D




, K ′ = K). Since p′(1 − r′) = p(1 − r), K ′ = K, and r′ > r,
from equation (B.1) and Proposition 3.1, we have that a consumer purchases at
least as much under DA
′
as under DA. Notice that if the consumer purchases
at discount, the seller’s margin is the same at p(1− r) under both DA and DA′ .
However, if the consumer purchases at no discount, the seller’s margin is greater
(p′ = sl > p) under D




ii) sl < p < sh is dominated by p = sh
Suppose DA = (p, r,K) is optimal for some sl < p < sh. Now, consider D
A′ =
(p′ = sh, r
′ = sh−p(1−r)
sh




iii) sh < p <
shθh+t
θh(1−R)
is dominated by p = shθh+t
θh(1−R)






= (p′ = shθh+t
θh(1−R)
, r′ = 1− p(1−r)(1−R)θh
shθh+t
, K ′ = K). Applying the same logic as
i), we can show that DA
′
weakly dominates DA.
iv) p > shθh+t
θh(1−R)
can be replicated by p = shθh+t
θh(1−R)
. Suppose DA = (p, r,K) is optimal
for some p > shθh+t
θh(1−R)
. Notice that since p > shθh+t
θh(1−R)
> sh, the seller can make a
positive profit only when he offers r ≥ R such that σAd (r, θh) ≥ sh (so that at least
high-type deal-prone consumers buy). Now, consider DA
′





, K ′ = K). Note that r′ ≥ R since σAd (r, θh) ≥ sh. Then,
from equation (B.1) and Proposition 3.1, consumers always purchase the same
quantity at discount under both DA and DA
′
. Since p(1 − r) = p′(1 − r′), the
seller always makes the same profit under DA and DA
′
.
The result for the fixed-amount discount can be shown in the same way.
B.2 Optimal Discount Strategies for Deal-Prone
Market
All-unit discount:
i) Suppose sh < p.
ia) If γ > ΓA(t), K∗ ≥ max{ t+θhsh
p(1−R) , θh}, r
∗(K) = max{pK−θhsh−t
pK
, R}, (ql, qh) =
(0, K∗), and ΠA∗ = γ(θhsh + t).
ib) If γ ≤ ΓA(t), there exist tAi (R), i ∈ {1, 2, 3} where
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• For t ≤ tA1 (R), ΓA(t) = ΓA1 (t, R), K∗ ≤ θl and (ql, qh) = (θl, θh).
• For tA1 (R) < t ≤ tA2 (R), ΓA(t) = ΓA2 (t, R), (ql, qh) = (θl, θh) or (K∗, θh).
• For tA2 (R) < t ≤ tA3 (R), ΓA(t) = ΓA3 (t, R), K∗ ≥ θl and (ql, qh) = (θl, θh) or
(K∗, θh) or (K
∗, K∗).
• For t > tA3 (R), ΓA(t) = ΓA4 (t, R), K∗ ≥ θl and (ql, qh) = (K∗, K∗).
The closed-form expressions of tAi (R) and Γ
A
i (t, R) are summarized in Table B.5.
ii) Suppose sl < p ≤ sh. In this case, ΓA(t) and the optimal all-unit discount in
this case are as characterized in i) by replacing sh with p.
iii) Suppose sl ≥ p.
iiia) If γ > ΓA(t), K∗ = t+pθh
p(1−R) , r
∗ = R, (ql, qh) = (θl, K
∗), and Π∗ = γ(t + p(θh −
θl)) + pθl.
iiib) If γ ≤ ΓA(t):
• For t ≤ θhp(1 − R) − pθl, ΓA(t) = t2t+pRθh , K
∗ = t+pθl
p(1−R) , r
∗ = R, (ql, qh) =
(K∗, θh), and Π
∗ = (1− γ)t+ p(θl + γ(θh(1−R)− θl).
• For t > θhp(1−R)− pθl, ΓA(t) = tt+p(θh−θl) , K
∗ = t+pθl
p(1−R) , r
∗ = R, (ql, qh) =
(K∗, K∗), and Π∗ = pθl + t.
Fixed-amount discount:
i) sh < p
For all t ≥ 0, ΓF (t) = t+slθl
t+shθh
.
ia) If γ > ΓF (t), K∗ ≥ max{θh, t+θhshp(1−R)},m
∗ ≥ max{θh(p − sh) − t,M}, (ql, qh) =
(0, K∗) and Π∗ = γ(shθh + t).
ib) If γ ≤ ΓF (t), K∗ ≥ max{θh, θlsl+tp(1−R)},m
∗ ≥ max{pθh − θlsl − t,M}, (ql, qh) =
(K∗, K∗), and Π∗ = slθl + t.
ii) sl < p ≤ sh
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iia) If γ > ΓF (t), K∗ = pθh+t
p(1−R) ,m
∗ = R(pθh+t)
1−R , (ql, qh) = (0, K
∗), and Π∗ = γ(pθh+t).
iib) If γ < ΓF (t), there exist tFi (R), i ∈ {1, 2, 3} where
• For t ≤ tF1 (R), ΓF (t) = ΓF1 (t, R), K∗ ≤ θl and (ql, qh) = (θl, θh).
• For tF1 (R) < t ≤ tF2 (R), ΓF (t) = ΓF2 (t, R), (ql, qh) = (θl, θh) or (K∗, θh).
• For tF2 (R) < t ≤ tF3 (R), ΓF (t) = ΓF3 (t, R), K∗ ≥ θl and (ql, qh) = (θl, θh) or
(K∗, θh) or (K
∗, K∗).
• For t > tF3 (R), ΓF (t) = ΓF4 (t, R), K∗ ≥ θh and (ql, qh) = (K∗, K∗).
The closed-form expressions of tFi (R) and Γ
F
i (t, R) are summarized in Table B.6.
iii) sl ≥ p
iiia) If γ > ΓF (t), K∗ = t+pθh
p(1−R) ,m
∗ = R(pθh+t)
1−R , (ql, qh) = (θl, K
∗), and Π∗ = γ(t +
p(θh − θl)) + pθl.
iiib) If γ ≤ ΓF (t):





(ql, qh) = (K
∗, θh), and Π
∗ = γpθh +
(1−γ−R)(pθl+t)
1−R .





(ql, qh) = (K












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Proofs for Chapter 4
Proof of Proposition 4.1: 1. Suppose I t1 > 0 and I
t
2 > 0, so A(I
t) = {1, 2}.
We will first show that the retailer’s profit-to-go in period t is strictly unimodal in
the uniform price pt. Notice from equation (4.3) that only J t(pt, It) depends on pt,
where J t(pt, It) = µ1 [p
t − ct1 − β∆t1(It)] + µ2 [pt − ct2 − β∆t2(It)]. Hence, to show the






= 0. We derive the first- and second-order derivative of J t(pt, It) with respect






[pt − ct1 − β∆t1(Y t1 , Y t2 )] + µ1 + (C.1)
∂µ2
∂pt























= µiµ0(2µ0 − 1), i ∈ A(It).



















= −µ1 − µ2 < 0.
This shows that the retailer’s profit-to-go in period t is strictly unimodal in the uni-
form price pt, so the optimal pt is unique. Notice from equation (C.2) that ∂µi
∂pt
< 0, i ∈
A(It). Hence, it is easy to see from equation (C.1) that ∂J
t(pt,It)
∂pt
> 0 for sufficiently
small pt, and ∂J
t(pt,It)
∂pt
< 0 for sufficiently large pt. This implies that the optimal
uniform price pt∗un is an interior solution, characterized by the first-order condition,
∂Jt(pt,It)
∂pt
= 0. We can rearrange the first-order condition and apply the definition of












. Applying this to the definition of J t, we have J t(pt∗un, I
t) = exp(v1 − pt∗un) +
exp(v2−pt∗un) = R(pt∗un, A(It)). Hence, from (4.3), the retailer’s profit-to-go is V tun(It) =
Rt∗unλ
t + βV t−1un (I
t).
2. Suppose I t1 = 0 and I
t
2 > 0, so A
t(It) = {2}. Then, µ1 = 0, and J t(pt, It) =
µ2[p
t−ct2−β∆t2(0, I t2)]. Following the same procedure as part 1., we will show that the




< 0 whenever ∂J
t(pt,It)
∂pt
























= µ2µ0(2µ0 − 1)




























. Applying this to equation (4.3) results in J t(pt∗un, I
t) = exp(v2 − pt∗un) =
R(pt∗un, A(I
t)), and the retailer’s profit-to-go of V tun(I
t) = Rt∗unλ
t + βV t−1un (I
t).
Proof of Proposition 4.2: 1. Suppose I t1 > 0 and I
t
2 > 0, so A
t(It) = {1, 2}.
We will show that the retailer’s profit-to-go in period t is strictly unimodal in the
price vector pt = (pt1, p
t
2). Notice from equation (4.4) that only J
t(pt, It) depends
on pt, where J t(pt, It) = µ1 [p
t
1 − ct1 − β∆t1(It)] + µ2 [pt2 − ct2 − β∆t2(It)]. Hence, we
will show the result by showing that J t is unimodal in pt. We derive the first-order






[pt1 − ct1 − β∆t1(It)] +
∂µ2
∂pti





= −µi(1− µi) (C.9)
∂µj
∂pti
= µjµi, i, j ∈ A(It), i 6= j.
Notice from equation (C.8) that ∂J
t(pt,It)
∂pti







< 0 for sufficiently large pti. This implies that an optimal solution
must be an interior solution and satisfy the first-order conditions with respect to pti:
∂Jt(pt,It)
∂pti
= 0, i ∈ A(It).

















J t(pt, It) + 1−
(
pti − cti − β∆ti(It)
)]
= 0, i, j ∈ At(It), i 6= j.
Since µi > 0, a p
t
i which satisfies the first-order conditions must be such that p
t
i −
cti − β∆ti(It) = J t(pt, It) + 1 for i ∈ At(It). Hence, an optimal pt = (pt1, pt2) must
satisfy pt1 − ct1 − β∆t1(It) = pt2 − ct2 − β∆t2(It). Let m := pti − cti − β∆ti(It). Then,
substituting m in the definition of J t, we have J t(pt, It) = (µ1 + µ2)m. From the
first-order conditions, J t(pt, It) = m − 1. Hence, we have J t(pt, It) = m − 1 =





. Thus, an optimal solution must









+ cti + β∆
t
i(I
t), i ∈ At(It).
Next, we will show that the optimal price pt is unique. For notational simplicity,
we will drop It from the expressions below. Since pt1− ct1−β∆t1 = pt2− ct2−β∆t2 = m,
J t can be written as a function of m as follows:
J t(m) = [µ1(p
t(m)) + µ2(p
t(m))]m = [1− µ0(pt(m))]m (C.10)
























exp(v1 −m− ct1 − β∆t1) + exp(v2 −m− ct2 − β∆t2)










= 1− µ0(pt(m))[1 + J t(m)] (C.12)




















J t(m)] = −µ0(pt(m))(1−µ0(pt(m)))[1+J t(m)] < 0. This implies the unimodality of
J t with respect to m, which in turn implies the uniqueness of the optimal solution pt.









Applying this to equation (4.4), we have J t(pt∗, It) = exp(v1− pt∗1 ) + exp(v2− pt∗2 ) =
R(pt∗, A(It)), resulting in the retailer’s profit-to-go of V tdn(I
t) = Rt∗utλ
t + βV t−1dn (I
t).
2. Suppose I t1 = 0 and I
t
2 > 0, so A
t(It) = {2}. Since transshipment is not
allowed, we have I t1 = 0 and µ1 = 0 for t, t + 1, ..., T . Then, the retailer’s pricing
problem in period t and on is the same as that under the uniform pricing policy
without transshipment. It follows immediately that pt∗2 is the same as p
t∗
un and the
retailer receives the same profit as characterized in Proposition 4.1 part 2.
Proof of Corollary 4.1: First, notice from Proposition 4.2 part 2 that if I t1 = 0
and I t2 > 0, then the optimal price under both pricing policies are the same, resulting
in the same sale ratio. Hence, the result trivially holds for this case. Next, we
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will show the result for I t1 > 0 and I
t
2 > 0. From Proposition 4.1 and 4.2, we show




t), and the retailer’s expected profit under the optimal price
differentiating policy is given by V tdn(I
t) = Rt∗dnλ
t + βV t−1dn (I
t). If the retailer adopts
the optimal price differentiating policy in period t only, then V t−1dn (I
t) = V t−1un (I
t).
Let V̂ tdn denote the retailer’s expected profit under the optimal price differentiating
policy in period t only. Then, we have V̂ tdn(I
t) = Rt∗dnλ
t+βV t−1un (I
t). Since the uniform
pricing policy is a special case of the price differentiating policy, the retailer’s expected
profit under the optimal price differentiating policy in period t must weakly dominate
the profit under the optimal uniform pricing policy. That is, the profit difference is
nonnegative: V̂ tdn − V tun = Rt∗dnλt −Rt∗unλt ≥ 0. Since λt ≥ 0, this implies Rt∗dn ≥ Rt∗un.
Proof of Proposition 4.3: From the proof of Corollary 4.1, we have shown that
the benefit of adopting the optimal price differentiation policy in period t only is given
by V̂ tdn − V tun = (Rt∗dn − Rt∗un)λt. Since λt ≥ 0, it follows immediately that the benefit
from price differentiation is monotonically increasing with the sale ratio difference:
Rt∗dn −Rt∗un.
Proof of Proposition 4.4: 1. We will consider the two cases of i) I t1 = 0 and
I t2 > 1, and ii) I
t
1 = 0 and I
t
2 = 1.
i) Suppose I t1 = 0 and I
t
2 > 1. To show when a transshipment from channel 2 to 1
in period t is optimal or not, we compare the retailer’s profit with and without
such a transshipment. If the retailer does not make a transshipment, then his
profit under the optimal uniform pricing strategy is as given in Proposition
4.1 part 2: V tun(I
t) = Rt∗unλ
t + βV t−1un (I
t), where It = (0, I t2). If he makes a
transshipment in period t, the resulting inventory level is Yt = (Y t1 = 1, Y
t
2 =
I t2 − 1), and he incurs a transshipment cost of m21. Notice that since Y t1 > 0
and Y t2 > 0, the optimal uniform price after the transshipment, p
t∗
ut, can be
characterized by Proposition 4.1 part 1 by replacing It with Yt. Hence, the
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retailer’s profit with the transshipment in period t only is given by V̂ tut(I
t) =
Rt∗utλ
t + βV t−1un (Y
t) − m21, where Yt = (1, I t2 − 1). The profit difference is
V̂ tut(I
t)−V tun(It) = (Rt∗ut−Rt∗un)λt+β [V t−1un (1, I t2 − 1)− V t−1un (0, I t2)]−m21. Notice
that V t−1un (1, I
t
2−1)−V t−1un (0, I t2) = V t−1un (1, I t2−1)−V t−1un (0, I t2−1)−V t−1un (0, I t2)+
V t−1un (0, I
t
2 − 1) = ∆t1(1, I t2 − 1)−∆t2(0, I t2) = ∆t12(It), by definition. Hence, it is
optimal to make the transshipment if and only if m21 ≤ (Rt∗ut−Rt∗un)λt+β∆t12(It).
ii) Suppose I t1 = 0 and I
t
2 = 1. The only difference in this case from i) is that after
the transshipment is made from channel 2 to 1, the inventory level at channel
2 becomes 0. Since Yt = (1, 0), the optimal uniform price after transshipment,
pt∗ut, is characterized by Proposition 4.1 part 2 by replacing I
t with Yt, ct2 with
ct1, and v2 with v1. Hence, the retailer’s profit after the transshipment is made
in period t only is given by V̂ tut(I
t) = exp(v1 − pt∗ut)λt + βV t−1un (Yt) − m21 =
Rt∗utλ
t+βV t−1un (Y
t)−m21, where Yt = (1, 0). This results in the profit difference
of V̂ tut(I
t)−V tun(It) = (Rt∗ut−Rt∗un)λt+β [V t−1un (1, 0)− V t−1un (0, 1)]−m21 = (Rt∗ut−
Rt∗un)λ
t + β [V t−1un (1, I
t
2 − 1)− V t−1un (0, I t2)] −m21. Notice that V t−1un (1, I t2 − 1) −





t) as shown in part i). Hence, the result follows.
2. We will show pt∗ut ≥ pt∗un for the two sets of conditions, stated in the proposition:
a) I t2 > 1, β∆
t
12(I
t) ≥ ct2 − ct1, and ∆t2(1, I t2 − 1) ≥ ∆t2(0, I t2), and b) I t2 = 1, v1 ≥ v2,
and β∆t12(I
t) ≥ ct2 − ct1.
a) Suppose I t2 > 1, β∆
t
12(I
t) ≥ ct2 − ct1, and ∆t2(1, I t2 − 1) ≥ ∆t2(0, I t2). First,
recall from the proof of Proposition 4.1 part 2 that under the uniform pricing
policy without transshipment, and for I t1 = 0 and I
t








|pt=pt∗un = 0. Hence, to show pt∗ut ≥











t, A(Yt)) [−µ0(pt, A(Yt)) (pt − ct2 − β∆t2(It)) + 1] =
exp(v2+pt)[ct2+β∆t2(It)+1+exp(v2−pt)−pt]
(exp(pt)+exp(v2))2
since A(Yt) = {2}. Let C(pt) denote
exp(v2+pt)
(exp(pt)+exp(v2))2
, which is positive for any pt. Now, consider pt∗ut. Since I
t
2 > 1, we
have Y t1 = 1 and Y
t


















= 1 + exp(v1 −



























Given that β∆t12 ≥ ct2−ct1 and ∆t2(1, I t2−1) ≥ ∆t2(0, I t2), we have ct1+β∆t1(1, I t2−

















0, which implies pt∗ut ≥ pt∗un.
b) Suppose I t2 = 1, v1 ≥ v2, and β∆t12(It) ≥ ct2 − ct1. Following the same





0. Notice that the only difference in this case from a) is that since I t2 =
1, after the transshipment is made from channel 2 to channel 1, the inven-
tory level at channel 2 becomes zero. Hence, pt∗ut in this case is character-
ized by Proposition 4.1 part 2, with It replaced by Yt = (1, 0), ct2 replaced
by ct1, v2 replaced by v1, and ∆
t
2(I
t) replaced by ∆t1(Y























2) + exp(v2 − pt∗ut)− ct1 − β∆t1(1, I t2 − 1)− exp(v1 − pt∗ut)] =
C(pt∗ut) [c
t
2 − ct1 − β∆t12 + exp(v2 − pt∗ut)− exp(v1 − pt∗ut)]. Given that β∆t12(It) ≥
ct2 − ct1, we have ct2 − ct1 − β∆t12 ≤ 0. From v1 ≥ v2, we have exp(v2 − pt∗ut) −




|pt=pt∗ut ≤ 0, which implies
pt∗ut ≥ pt∗un.
3. From part 1, we have shown that the retailer’s benefit from transshipment in
period t is given by V̂ tut(I
t)−V tun(It) = (Rt∗ut−Rt∗un)λt +β∆t12(It)−m21. Since λt ≥ 0,
it is immediate to see that the benefit of transshipment is monotonically increasing in
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the sale ratio Rt∗ut−Rt∗un. For m21, notice that pt∗un, pt∗ut, and ∆t12(It) are independent of




un are also independent of m21. Then,
it is easy to see that the benefit of transshipment is monotonically decreasing in m21.





















. Notice that pt∗un is independent
of ct1 since without a transshipment, the customer can never buy from channel 1




= 0. On the other hand, we have seen from part 2 that
pt∗ut is a function of c
t








where Gut is the first-order condition for p
t∗















≤ 0 if I t2 = 1.
Hence, the benefit from the transshipment from channel 2 to channel 1 in period t is
monotonically decreasing in the unit transaction cost ct1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1: 1. Suppose ∆t2(1, I
t
2 − 1) ≥ ∆t2(0, I t2). Since I t1 = 0
and I t2 > 0, we know from Proposition 4.2 part 2 that without transshipment, the
optimal price at channel 2, pt∗2,10, is the same as the optimal uniform price without









|pt2=pt∗2,10 = 0. Let p
t∗
2,11 denote the optimal price at
channel 2 after a transshipment is made from channel 2 to channel 1. We will show




























2 , which is positive for any p
t
2. Now, consider p
t∗
2,11. Af-




2−1 > 0. Hence, we have that pt∗2,11 is
as characterized in Proposition 4.2 part 1 by replacing It with Yt = (1, I t2−1): pt∗2,11 =
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− exp(v1 − pt∗1,11)− β(∆t2(1, I t2 − 1)−∆t2(0, I t2))
]
≤
0 since ∆t2(1, I
t
2 − 1) ≥ ∆t2(0, I t2).
2. Let mt21 denote the transshipment cost from channel 2 to channel 1 in period
t. We will first characterize the optimal transshipment decision in period t under the
uniform pricing and price differentiating policies by showing that there exist mL and
mH , mL ≤ mH , such that:
i) If mt21 ≤ mL, it is optimal to transship a unit from channel 2 to channel 1 under
both uniform pricing and price differentiating policies.
ii) If mL < m
t
21 ≤ mH , it is optimal to transship a unit from channel 2 to channel
1 under the price differentiating policy, but it is optimal to not transship under
the uniform pricing policy.
iii) If mt21 > mH , it is optimal to not transship under both uniform pricing and
price differentiating policies.
First, consider the transshipment decision under the uniform pricing policy. From
Proposition 4.4 part 1 and 3, it is implied that there exists mut such that it is optimal
to transship a unit from channel 2 to channel 1 in period t if mt21 ≤ mut, and it
is optimal not to transship if mt21 > mut. That is, V̂
t
ut(I
t) ≥ V tun(It) if and only
if mt21 ≤ mut, where V̂ tut(It) denotes the retailer’s expected profit when making a
transshipment from channel 2 to channel 1 and charge the optimal uniform price in
period t. Now, consider the transshipment decision under the price differentiating
policy. Let V̂ tdt(I
t) denote the retailer’s expected profit when making a transshipment
from channel 2 to channel 1 and charge the optimal differentiating prices in period
t. Notice that V̂ tdt(I
t) is monotonically decreasing in mt21 since the retailer needs to
pay a fixed cost of mt21 when making the transshipment. On the other hand, if the
retailer does not make a transshipment, he can only sell through channel 2 and will
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receive the profit of V tun(I
t), independent of mt21, which is the same as that under the
uniform pricing without transshipment. Hence, the profit difference under the price
differentiating policy, V̂ tdt(I
t)− V tun(It), is monotonically decreasing in mt21, implying
the existence of mdt such that V̂
t
dt(I
t) ≥ V tun(It) if and only if mt21 ≤ mdt. Since the
uniform pricing policy is a special case of the price differentiating policy, we must have
V̂ tdt(I
t) ≥ V̂ tut(It). This implies whenever it is optimal to transship under the uniform
pricing policy, it must also be optimal to transship under the price differentiating
policy, which in turn implies mdt ≥ mut. Now, let mL = mut and mH = mdt. It is
easy to check that they satisfy the properties stated above.
Next, we will show that when the transshipment decision is made optimally, the




the retailer’s expected profit under the optimal transshipment and price differentiation
policy in period t. Likewise, let V̄ tut(I
t) denote the retailer’s expected profit under
the optimal transshipment and uniform pricing policy in period t. Let ∆V tdt :=
V̄ tdt(I
t) − V̄ tut(It) denote the benefit from price differentiation. We will consider the
three cases of optimal transshipment decisions stated above.
i) Suppose mt21 ≤ mL. Then, V̄ tdt(It) = V̂ tdt(It) and V̄ tut(It) = V̂ tut(It). The benefit
from price differentiation is given by ∆V tdt = V̂
t
dt(I
t) − V̂ tut(It). Notice that
whether the retailer uses the uniform pricing or price differentiating policy,
he incurs the same transshipment cost of mt21. Furthermore, since m
t
21 is a
fixed cost, it does not affect the retailer’s pricing decisions. Hence, ∆V tdt is
independent of mt21.
ii) Suppose mL < m
t
21 ≤ mH . Then, V̄ tdt(It) = V̂ tdt(It) and V̄ tut(It) = V tun(It). The
benefit from price differentiation is given by ∆V tdt = V̂
t
dt(I
t) − V tun(It). Since
V̂ tdt(I
t) is monotonically decreasing in mt21 while V
t
un(I
t) is independent of mt21,




iii) Suppose mt21 > mH . Then, V̄
t
dt(I
t) = V tun(I
t) and V̄ tut(I
t) = V tun(I
t). The benefit
from price differentiation is given by ∆V tdt = V
t
un(I
t)−V tun(It) = 0. Hence, ∆V tdt
is independent of mt21.
We have shown that in each interval of mt21, the benefit from price differentiation
is (weakly) monotonically decreasing in mt21. To complete the proof, it suffices to
show that ∆V tdt is continuous at m
t
21 = mL and m
t
21 = mH . To see this, notice that
at mt21 = mL, V̂
t
ut(I
t) = V tun(I
t), and at mt21 = mH , V̂
t
dt(I
t) = V tun(I
t). Then, the
continuity follows immediately from the monotonically of V̂ tut(I
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